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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
Modern-Day Lynchings 
I’ve always intended to introduce this dissertation by discussing a current event that 
highlights the legacies of U.S. lynch law, what Roy Nash once called “a peculiarly American 
institution.”1 One of the earliest drafts examined public discussions of drone strikes and targeted 
killings, methods embraced by the Bush and Obama administrations for use against suspected 
terrorists. In both administrations’ appeals to efficiency and safety (for U.S. troops), and in the 
broader racialized and decontextualized construction of ‘terrorist,’ I heard echoes of politicians 
who argued a century ago that lynch law was a justified response to the terror of alleged black 
criminality, and of politicians who argued two centuries ago that “though not strictly warranted 
by law,” certain wartime measures could be justified by “the imminence of danger.” Attorney 
John Yoo probably didn’t consult the Virginia Legislature’s late 18th-century edict exonerating 
Charles Lynch for illegally detaining suspected British loyalists during the Revolutionary war; 
but the justifications he advanced in “the torture memos” that liberalized U.S. interrogation 
policies were substantively similar. In speeches and published articles, Yoo repeatedly explained 
that, “the [Bush] administration decided that aggressive measures, though sometimes unpopular, 
                                                          
1 Roy Nash, “Memorandum for Mr. Philip G. Peabody on Lynch-Law and the Practicability of a successful attack 
Thereon,” May 20, 1916, May, 1916, Records of the NAACP, Film 19771 Part 7 Series A Reel 1, University of 
Michigan. 
 2 
 
are necessary to protect America from another terrorist attack.”2 In fact, the administration’s 
policies were not that unpopular.3 Yoo was not on the defensive because he advanced an 
unpopular position – his critics claimed he had advanced an illegal position, offering the cover of 
law to interrogation techniques prohibited by the Geneva Convention. Yoo’s response to this 
criticism generally drew on emergency discourses: “Our only means for preventing future 
terrorist attacks…is to rely on intelligence that permits pre-emptive action. An American leader 
would be derelict if he did not seek to understand all available options in such perilous 
circumstances.”4  
When photos of torture and sexual abuse from a military prison in Abu Ghraib were 
released in 2004, scholars also connected these scenes to histories of lynching. Hazel Carby 
asserted that “there is a direct, but hidden, line connecting Abu Ghraib…[with] the photographs 
and postcards of lynching that circulated widely in the early twentieth century.”5 Dora Apel and 
Shawn Michelle Smith noted that the images from Abu Ghraib and those of lynch mobs “employ 
similar strategies of domination and control.”6 In the years since, a growing body of work has 
analyzed Abu Ghraib and other abuses associated with the war on terror as extensions of 
America’s historical culture of lynching. This literature has explored the sexualization of torture, 
                                                          
2 John Yoo, “Commentary: Behind the ‘Torture Memos,’” U.C. Berkeley News, January 4, 2005, online edition, sec. 
Point of View, http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/01/05_johnyoo.shtml.  
3 Andrew Dugan, “A Retrospective Look at How Americans View Torture,” Gallup, December 10, 2014, 
http://www.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/180008/retrospective-look-americans-view-torture.aspx. Levels 
of support have fluctuated over time, and took a hit in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal. But at its lowest point 
still nearly 40% of Americans supported the use of torture against suspected terrorists; as of 2009, when the 
senate undertook an investigation of U.S. torture policy, ~55% of Americans supported harsh interrogation 
methods against suspected terrorists. Even those Americans who, in theory, do not support torture, may not feel 
strongly enough to support investigation or prosecution of torture. According to Gallup, “As of 2009, Americans 
looked increasingly ready to leave this chapter of their history behind, and believed whatever sins might have been 
committed were for good reason.”  
4 Yoo, “Commentary: Behind the ‘Torture Memos.’” 
5 Hazel Carby, “US/UK’s Special Relationship: The Culture of Torture in Abu Ghraib and Lynching Photographs,” 
Nka: Journal of Contemporary African Art 20, no. 1 (2006): 66.   
6 Dora Apel and Shawn Michelle Smith, Lynching Photographs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 77.  
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the visual spectacles and iconographies of racial violence, the social psychology of complicity, 
and the role of trauma in racial and colonial domination.7 
Another draft began with a discussion of George Zimmerman’s exoneration for the 
killing of Trayvon Martin in 2012. Zimmerman’s status as a neighborhood watch captain, and his 
subsequent decision to follow Martin and confront him with a weapon, corresponded to how 
groups like the NAACP used to define a lynch mob. The federal Dyer Anti-Lynching Act of 
1920, for example, defined mob as “an assemblage composed of three or more persons acting in 
concert for the purpose of depriving any person of his life without authority of law as a 
punishment for or to prevent the commission of some actual or supposed public offense.”8 The 
last half of the definition, which specified that lynchers were motivated by the desire to punish 
some actual or supposed offense, was really the most important part, the only thing that would 
otherwise distinguish “lynching” from simple murder.9 The reason a federal bill like Dyer’s was 
perceived as necessary was that state court systems routinely refused to punish people who 
committed murder on these grounds, just as the state of Florida failed to punish Zimmerman. In 
that draft, I focused on the racial implications of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” laws, which 
have led in general to lower rates of homicide prosecution, and specifically to fewer prosecutions 
                                                          
7Dora Apel, “On Looking: Lynching Photographs and Legacies of Lynching after 9/11.” Nka: Journal of 
Contemporary African Art 20, no. 1 (2006): 44–59; Hazel Carby, “A Strange and Bitter Crop: The Spectacle of 
Torture,” Open Democracy, October 10, 2004, http://www.opendemocracy.net/media-
abu_ghraib/article_2149.jsp; Carby, “US/UK’s Special Relationship”; Walter Cohen, “Lynching, Visuality, Empire.” 
Nka 20.1 (2006): 116–121; Sherene Razack, “How Is White Supremacy Embodied? Sexualized Racial Violence at 
Abu Ghraib.” Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 17.2 (2005): 341–363; Shawn Michelle Smith, “Afterimages: 
White Womanhood, Lynching, and the War in Iraq.” Nka 20.1 (2006): 72–85; Warren Steele, “Strange Fruit: 
American Culture and the Remaking of Iraqi Males at Abu Ghraib.” Nebula 3.4, Special Issue: Normalizing the 
Abnormal: From Lynching to Abu Ghraib (2006).  
8 H.R. 13, House of Representatives, 67th Congress, 1st session 
9 Under this definition, however, Zimmerman’s acting alone would prevent him from being defined as a “mob.” I 
am interested more in his motivation: that he acted in response to a perceived offense by Martin. 
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of white-on-black killings.10 Stand Your Ground laws, drawing on constructions of emergency, 
crime, and self-defense, share some disturbing elements with pro-lynching ideologies of a 
century ago, which routinely excused white violence against African Americans when such 
violence was framed as a response to real or perceived crime.  
Many intervening months passed before I returned to work on the introduction again. 
Now the shooting of Michael Brown was in the news, and tensions between police and protestors 
in Ferguson, Missouri were entering their fourth month. Brown’s shooting ignited a national 
firestorm of criticism, not only of the Ferguson police department, but more broadly of the 
racialized police regimen – including disproportionate killings by police – that black people are 
subject to in most U.S. cities. When the Ferguson grand jury declined to indict Officer Wilson 
for any criminal charges related to the shooting, the incident lent a spark to long-growing 
criticism by racial justice advocates, who identified criminalization and legal persecution as the 
primary mechanisms reproducing racial inequality in the twenty-first century United States. 
Beyond the push to see Officer Wilson indicted for the death of Michael Brown, organizers 
working at the intersections of racial justice and criminal justice demanded a range of reforms to 
the entire spectrum of systems (policing, prosecution, incarceration, parole, and execution) that 
contribute to contemporary U.S. racial caste systems. I noted how the incident, especially in 
concert with each preceding one, had caused the term “lynching” to reappear in the common 
vernacular, with even mainstream media outlets like The Guardian and CNN wondering about 
how the legacy of lynching might be at work in these deaths, and in the impunity enjoyed by the 
killers.11 Before I could finish this version of the introduction, Freddie Gray died while in the 
                                                          
10 John Roman, “Race, Justifiable Homicide, and Stand Your Ground Laws: Analysis of FBI Supplementary Homicide 
Report Data,” Urban Institute, Justice Policy Center. July 2013 
11 See for example, Isabel Wilkerson in The Guardian, August 25th, 2014, “Mike Brown’s Shooting and Jim Crow 
Lynching have far too much in common.” http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/25/mike-
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custody of Baltimore police who, it was later reported, had given him a “rough ride” back to the 
station after arresting him.12 The news provoked riots in Baltimore, leading to hundreds of arrests 
and intervention by the National Guard. Unlike in other cases, six officers have so far been 
indicted on serious charges of homicide and assault.13 But it remains to be seen whether these 
officers will be convicted, or what other reforms (if any) might be adopted to address the 
systemic problems highlighted by Gray’s death. 
Each revision of the introduction has faltered on my desire for timeliness – and I’m not 
the only one struggling to keep up. In 2012, the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement (MXGM) 
published a report on black people killed by police, security guards, and “self-appointed agents 
of ‘justice.’” From January through June, the organization found 110 such deaths; even so the 
report was quickly outdated, as July brought ten more fatalities.14 The report prompted David 
Leonard of Washington State University to proclaim that in contemporary America, “a lynching 
happens every 40 hours.”15 After its initial publication Arlene Eisen, the report’s researcher and 
author, released updates under the title “Operation Ghetto Storm,” including additional deaths 
                                                          
brown-shooting-jim-crow-lynchings-in-common  See also Carl Dix, “A Modern-Day Lynching - The Vigilante Murder 
of Trayvon Martin!” The World Can’t Wait. April 2012; Amy Goodman, “‘A Modern-Day Lynching’: Outrage Grows 
over Killing of Trayvon Martin by Neighborhood Watch Patrol.” Democracy Now! March 20, 2012; Whitney Hunter, 
“Modern-Day Lynching.” Savannah Now, May 22, 2012; Li Onesto, “Modern Day Lynching: The Murder of Trayvon 
Martin,” Global Research, June 5, 2012. Although sensational cases like the shooting of Trayvon Martin attract 
more media attention, other cases of violence in the name of fighting crime are also described with the rhetoric of 
lynching, particularly in black press outlets. See for example: John Noble. “Modern Day Lynching in Florida: Racist 
Cops Shot Suspect 68 Times.” Black News Weekly, February 9, 2009; “Sharpton’s Group: ‘It’s a Modern Day 
Lynching,’” The Brown Watch, August 28, 2012. 
12 Manny Fernandez, “Freddie Gray’s Injury and the Police ‘Rough Ride,’” The New York Times, April 30, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/01/us/freddie-grays-injury-and-the-police-rough-ride.html; Doug Donovan, 
“Freddie Gray Not the First to Come out of Baltimore Police van with Serious Injuries,” The Baltimore Sun, April 23, 
2015, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-gray-rough-rides-20150423-
story.html.  
13 Richard Pérez-peña, “Six Baltimore Officers Indicted in Death of Freddie Gray,” The New York Times, May 21, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/22/us/six-baltimore-officers-indicted-in-death-of-freddie-gray.html. 
14 Malcolm X Grassroots Movement. “Report on the Extrajudicial Killing of 120 Black People, January 1 to June 30, 
2012.” Accessed 8/26/2014: http://mxgm.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/07_24_Report_all_rev_protected.pdf  
15 David Leonard, “A Lynching Happens Every 40 Hours.” Huffington Post, July 18, 2012. 
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and statistical analysis of the circumstances under which they occurred – reminiscent of Ida B. 
Well’s pioneering work compiling the first inventories and statistics on lynching in the 1890s.16 
Eisen’s effort spawned a number of more comprehensive attempts to document police killings 
and brutality. This new data suggests a “modern-day lynching” occurs every 28 hours, a rate that 
outpaces the work of lynch mobs at the height of their activity in the late 19th century.   
These figures have not been independently verified, but I don’t report them here to insist 
on their accuracy. There have always been debates over the precise definition of lynching, and 
disagreements over whether particular cases really “count.” So too have there been disputes over 
inventories of lynching victims, with scholars proposing that certain names be removed, and/or 
that others be added, to the lists initially created by Wells, the NAACP, and the Tuskegee 
Institute. What interests me more about these discussions is the fact that Americans are still 
having them in the first place. If “the lynching era” is thought to have ended in the 1930s, why 
do references to the subject remain so potent and prevalent?17  
This dissertation responds to that question with a detailed study of lynching and other 
forms of “mob violence,” from the end of the 19th century into the first decades of the 20th, a 
period often referred to as “the lynching era.” Over the course of the dissertation, I deconstruct 
terms like “lynching” and “mob violence,” point to the diversity of types and forms of violence 
these phrases describe, and their elastic meaning in the hands of various historical actors. This 
project is specifically attentive to the ways in which actions of the state (or in some cases, 
inactions of the state) are implicated in the work of groups we now think of as “mobs.” By 
                                                          
16 Arlene Eisen, “Operation Ghetto Storm: Updated Edition,” November 1, 2014, 
http://www.operationghettostorm.org/   
17 Based on qualitative and quantitative analyses, sociologists and historians have defined a fifty-year “lynching 
era,” stretching from ~1880 – 1930s. This is not to say that lynchings didn’t happen prior to this or never happened 
afterward, only to say that both the numbers of lynchings, and the importance of lynching as a cultural institution, 
was at its high point during these decades.   
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examining state involvement with lynching and mob violence in the past, I hope to shed light on 
the persistent problem of state violence in the present, especially police and military violence. 
Departing from historical and sociological studies that characterize lynching and race riots as 
lawless mob violence, the central argument of this dissertation is that these phenomena have 
been forms of legalized violence, which flourish under the legal ambiguity created by 
intersecting discourses of race and crisis. Such violence is simultaneously a product of law and 
yet detached from the accountability and oversight that law is supposed to provide. Rather than 
view lynching and race riots as problems of the distant past, I argue that these phenomena 
survive as legal precedent and shape a range of debates and discourses today – from crime and 
social unrest to terrorism and war. 
 
Key Terms and Frameworks 
This project is situated at the intersections of U.S. ethnic studies, legal studies, and 
studies of trauma and violence. In this introduction, I discuss how my research is informed by, 
and contributes to, academic interpretations of lynching and mob violence, theories of critical 
ethnic studies, and literatures of critical race and legal theory. I then discuss key terms used 
throughout the dissertation, including lynching, mob violence, state of exception, and states of 
exceptionalism. I conclude the introduction with a historiographical review of lynching. This 
review includes important historical background, describing how the practice of lynching has 
changed over time and the role it played in different periods from the colonial era to the early 
20th century. The review also proposes a framework for theorizing lynching, which stresses the 
inter-relation between “mob” and “state” that characterized much of the phenomenon’s history. 
Many histories of lynching posit it as a developmental antecedent to the state, which was 
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eventually displaced by state and civil development. Other histories posit lynching as an 
alternative to the state, a form of “communal” or “popular” justice exercised either in absence of, 
or opposition to, the formal judicial system. In my account of lynching, the practice is both and 
neither of these things. Lynching was antecedent to state power, but also prototypical of state 
power in key ways. Lynching was an alternative to state power, sometimes used in opposition to 
state power, but it was also facilitated by state power, a method of (re)claiming state power, and 
of extending its reach. While offering a brief history of lynching, I try also to highlight the 
complexity of these relationships – lynching as antecedent and alternative to law, yes, but also as 
complement, supplement, and extension of law’s power and legitimacy.  
 
Academic Interpretations of Lynching 
Works by historians, sociologists, and feminist, cultural, and ethnic studies scholars, have 
offered other crucial interpretations of lynching that I drew on to design and complete this study. 
In particular, studies that analyze lynching as part of the ritualistic making of whiteness, and 
others that explain the political economy of lynching in relation to cotton production, internal 
labor migration, and demands created by industrialization, have helped to shape my perspective.   
Studies of lynching and the making of whiteness highlight several important aspects of 
the practice. One area of concern is how lynching (re)produced racial and cultural boundaries of 
whiteness in periods when these boundaries were especially porous and fluid. It is probably not a 
coincidence that the half-century known as the lynching era overlaps significantly with the 
period when the meaning of whiteness expanded.18 Lynching was a violent assertion of absolute 
                                                          
18 Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America (New Brunswick, N.J: 
Rutgers University Press, 1998); Grace Hale, Making Whiteness: The Culture of Segregation in the South, 1890-1940 
(Vintage, 1999); David R. Roediger et al., The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working 
Class, New Edition (London ; New York: Verso, 2007). 
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racial difference (and racial superiority) that belied the uncertainty and ultimately the 
arbitrariness of racial categorization. Of particular interest to scholars working in this area are 
lynchings that involved Euro-Americans whose national and racial assimilation was contested, 
such as Irish, Italians, Jews, and other euro-ethnic minorities. These groups were sometimes the 
targets of lynching, indicating that their racial and citizenship status was contested well into the 
20th century, when the majority of victims were otherwise black. At the same time, these groups 
also sometimes perpetrated lynchings, both against fellow immigrants and against African 
Americans, as a means of asserting the privileges of whiteness, differentiating themselves from 
blackness, and thereby raising their status in the broader society.19  
Scholars who study lynching and the making of whiteness also point to how lynching was 
frequently a communal affair for whites, which forged racial solidarity across gender and class 
lines. Of particular interest here are the mass lynchings and spectacle lynchings that were most 
common at the height of the lynching era. Photographs and eye-witness accounts of these events 
indicate they were attended by hundreds or even thousands of spectators; farmers and laborers as 
well as businessmen and professionals; men, women, and children; young and old alike. These 
accounts reveal the constructed nature of whiteness, and the role of violence in maintaining it.20 
My own focus on state power grows from recognition that whiteness and state power 
were intrinsically linked during the lynching era, and therefore the collective construction of 
whiteness was related to the institutional and legal construction of government. Of all the forms 
of violence that could and did work to cement whiteness, why would lynching rise to such 
prominence? My research suggests the power of lynching to confer whiteness came, at least in 
                                                          
19 Cynthia Nevels, Lynching to Belong Claiming Whiteness through Racial Violence (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2007). 
20 Amy Wood, Lynching and Spectacle: Witnessing Racial Violence in America, 1890-1940, New Directions in 
Southern Studies (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). 
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part, from its quasi-legitimate status as a means of law enforcement. To lynch someone was not 
just about the power to kill an alleged criminal, it was also about the power to allege criminality 
in the first place. As I will discuss in more depth in the conclusion, this is significant when 
considering the current-day legacies of lynching, and the remarkable persistence of lynch-like 
violence despite decades of struggle against racial discrimination and animus in general society 
and in police forces specifically.    
Studies of the political economy of lynching reveal it was deeply related to the cotton 
industry, and the violence used to control itinerant labor forces of sharecroppers and farmhands 
after slavery was abolished. In these accounts, the incidence of lynching was highly responsive 
to interlocking variables such as the market price of cotton; the proportion of tenant farmers in 
particular states and counties; and the proportion of black vs. white residents. The highest rates 
of lynching were found in the overlapping “cotton belt” and “black belt” areas, where black 
people outnumbered whites and where the workforce was dominated by tenant farmers and share 
croppers laboring on large plantations. Moreover, accusations of black criminality 
notwithstanding, Tolnay and Beck found that rates of lynching rose and fell with the price of 
cotton and had either an indiscernible or inconsistent relationship to data on violent crime.21 
Whites may have told themselves, each other, and the world at large that any particular lynching 
was an outraged community’s response to crime; or that lynching in general was confined only 
to rural areas with ineffective judicial systems; or that the best way to eliminate lynching was to 
enact reforms that made it harder for criminals to evade the law. Copious data suggests, however, 
                                                          
21 E. M. Beck, J. L. Massey, and S. E. Tolnay, “The Gallows, the Mob, and the Vote: Lethal Sanctioning of Blacks in 
North Carolina and Georgia, 1882 to 1930,” Law & Society Review 23 (1989): 317; E. M. Beck and S. E. Tolnay, “The 
Killing Fields of the Deep South: The Market for Cotton and the Lynching of Blacks, 1882-1930,” American 
Sociological Review, 1990, 526–39; Stewart Tolnay and E. M. Beck, A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern 
Lynchings, 1882-1930 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995). 
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that higher cotton prices incentivized violence against black laborers, probably because lynching 
forced them to accept working conditions and wages far worse than they would have otherwise 
been willing to tolerate. Amy Bailey and Terrence Finnegan, in more detailed studies of the 
victims of lynching, found additional factors that informed who was most at risk of being 
lynched. For example, itinerant laborers were more vulnerable to violence than black people who 
were established community members; all the better if such community ties also included 
positive relationships with local whites.22  
 This body of scholarship is especially influential to the periodization of my study, 
encompassing the lynching era broadly, but honing in on events of the early twentieth century 
that have been linked to the disappearance of lynching: industrialization & urbanization, the 
Great Migration(s), and the First World War. In the accounts of historical sociologists, these 
forces combined to dramatically increase black mobility, such that by the time WWI drew to a 
close, lynching began to have the opposite effect on labor. Rather than forcing black people to 
accept bad conditions, violence motivated them to leave the South en masse, pulled by new 
opportunities in burgeoning industrial centers of the Northeast, Midwest, and west coast.23 Not 
only did this create a disincentive for violence, it also placed strain on class relations within 
white communities, thus undermining the social cohesion lynching had previously created. 
Perhaps most important of all, black political consciousness underwent extraordinary changes 
that contributed to lynching’s decline. The opportunities offered by industrialization and internal 
                                                          
22 Amy Kate Bailey and Stewart E. Tolnay, Lynched: The Victims of Southern Mob Violence (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Terence Finnegan, A Deed So Accursed: Lynching in Mississippi and South 
Carolina, 1881-1940 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013). 
23 James Grossman, Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration, 1 edition (Chicago: 
University Of Chicago Press, 1991); Isabel Wilkerson, The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America’s Great 
Migration, Reprint edition (New York, NY: Vintage, 2011). 
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migration expanded the ranks of new black middle classes in cities around the country (including 
in the deep South where lynchings were most common); these groups in turn nurtured extensive 
social, political, and economic infrastructure that expanded black communities’ capacity for civil 
rights organizing. Participation in the first and second world wars heightened expectations of 
democratic inclusion, and underscored the hypocrisy of American racism.24     
It is here where I depart from social historians and historical sociologists, in order to track 
discourses of lynch law that persisted after its empirical diminishment. Past iterations of lynching 
had fluctuated and shifted, in terms of geography, types of violence, justifications, and targets. If 
these years were the “end” of some phase of lynching, what does the period tell us about new 
forms of lynching that may have been ascendant? What is at stake in calling these present-day 
forms of violence “lynching”?  
 
Critical Ethnic Studies 
This project is also informed by training in comparative and critical ethnic studies. 
Without denying the specificity of the incidents I study, I hope that some of the language and 
theoretical concepts explored in this dissertation will offer productive avenues for scholars 
working in diverse areas across history, ethnic, and American studies. Although my dissertation 
is grounded in African American studies, and the incidents I study predominantly involve 
violence against black Americans, my approach to analyzing these forms of violence centers 
broader ethnic studies frameworks, such as theories of colonialism and settler-colonialism, 
                                                          
24 Mark Ellis, “W. E. B. Du Bois and the Formation of Black Opinion in World War I: A Commentary on ‘The 
Damnable Dilemma,’” The Journal of American History 81, no. 4 (March 1, 1995): 1584–90; Mark Ellis, Race, War, 
and Surveillance: African Americans and the United States Government during World War I (Indiana University 
Press, 2001); Chad L. Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I Era (The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
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nationalism, and militarism, in addition to concepts from African American studies, such as 
theories and histories of slavery and anti-blackness. My scholarship is particularly indebted to 
cross-disciplinary subfields like critical prison studies and histories of racialized violence. 
 
Critical Race and Legal Theory 
Finally, this project is strongly influenced by critical race theory and, more broadly, 
critical legal theory. These distinctive bodies of theory emerged in the 1980s, to describe 
scholarship that explored how race and inequality are produced by law, both in doctrine and 
practice.25 The key intervention of critical race and legal theory is to counter liberal assumptions 
of a “universal” subject of law. Critical race theorists have described law as a technology of 
racial formation, with politicians, lawyers, judges, and juries using law to determine boundaries 
of racial identification and limitations on the rights of citizenship. Legal historians and ethnic 
studies scholars have further argued that modern systems of law and governance are 
ontologically racial, because the development of these polities was concurrent with European 
and American colonial expansion.26 Modern systems of law were crafted on the basis of a 
‘universal’ Enlightenment subject, with colonized and racialized bodies intended as the objects, 
not the subjects, of governance. Since law has never been neutral in regards to race, critical race 
and legal theorists conclude that the vision of political liberalism – equal treatment by the law of 
equal subjects before the law – is in fact a damaging racial mythology. In this framework, racial 
                                                          
25 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in 
America, Fourth Edition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013); Kimberle Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing 
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Antiracist Politics,” The University of Chicago Legal Forum 140 (1989): 139–67; Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, 
Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, Second Edition (NYU Press, 2012). 
26 Denise Ferreira da Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2007); Ann Stoler, 
Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Duke University 
Press Books, 1995). 
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and other forms of difference are external to and disavowed by law. But by conflating equality 
with sameness, the law actually creates and reproduces inequality. When the law treats subjects 
only as equal individuals, it renders itself incapable of providing meaningful remedies for 
systemic problems like discrimination, oppression, and violence, which operate on the collective 
rather than the individual level.27 
My research expands on the idea that race and racial inequality are “made” by ostensibly 
legal projects, especially when calls for collective civil rights are transformed into individualistic 
remedies that leave larger structures unchanged. In addition to being a racial project, I argue that 
U.S. law (its creation and enforcement) has been a violent project, ontologically, discursively, 
and materially. I further argue that the racialization of law and the violence of law are mutually 
constitutive. It is the violence of law that grants it race-making power, and it is the racialization 
of law that justifies its violence. Just as critical race theorists have argued that the law cannot be 
made “color-blind,” I argue that the law cannot be made “non-violent,” nor can the state’s 
monopoly on force be exercised with neutrality. Violence and race historically inhere to the 
doctrine and execution of U.S. law, and legal systems require drastic re-making, not mere 
reform, for this relationship to be undone.  
 
Key Terms 
 Lynching 
Opponents of lynching, as well as scholars of the topic, have long been challenged to find 
a satisfactory definition of the term. Writing in 1930, historian Genevieve Yost described one of 
                                                          
27 Alfred L. Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland: The Tulsa Riot of 1921: Race, Reparations, and Reconcilation 
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Austin Sarat and Nasser Hussain, eds., When Governments 
Break the Law: The Rule of Law and the Prosecution of the Bush Administration (New York, N.Y: NYU Press, 2010). 
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the main difficulties she encountered in her efforts to compile a comprehensive inventory of 
lynchings in Kansas. Put simply: “It is sometimes difficult to tell when a lynching is a 
lynching.”28 Almost a century later, many historians, sociologists, ethnic and cultural studies 
scholars have continued to search for a meaningful definition. Yet, the passage of time has not 
made it any easier to create objective (empirical) criteria. Some scholars, such as Stewart Tolnay, 
E.M. Beck, Amy Bailey, and Elizabeth Hines, rely on “the NAACP definition” of lynching, 
which holds that: 
1) There must be evidence that someone was killed 
2) The killing must have occurred illegally 
3) Three or more persons must have taken part in the lynching 
4) The killers must have claimed to be serving justice or tradition 
Yet, historian Christopher Waldrep argues that there is no such thing as “the NAACP 
definition” of lynching: “the papers of the NAACP…document staff debates, confusions, and 
disagreements – but no consensus – over the meaning of [the term].”29 The criteria listed above 
were not officially developed until 1943, the result of a contentious three day conference 
between representatives of the NAACP, the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention 
of Lynching (ASWPL), the Tuskegee Institute, and the Committee on Interracial Cooperation 
(CIC). The four criteria announced at the end of the meetings represented bitter negotiations. 
None of the organizations were very pleased with the results, but agreed some definition was 
needed for legal purposes and for record-keeping.30 Although the secondary literature on 
                                                          
28 Genevieve Yost, “The History of Lynchings in Kansas,” Kansas Historical Quarterly, no. 2 (May 1933): 184. 
29 Christopher Waldrep, “War of Words: The Controversy over the Definition of Lynching, 1899-1940,” The Journal 
of Southern History 66, no. 1 (February 1, 2000): 75–100; Christopher Waldrep, The Many Faces of Judge Lynch: 
Extralegal Violence and Punishment in America (New York ; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
30 Waldrep, “War of Words.” 
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lynching is voluminous, Kathleen Belew concluded in a recent review that there has been a 
“remarkable delay in fully theorized work about lynching” a delay she attributes to 
“disagreement over its definition.”31  
Scholars’ inability to reach consensus on a definition for lynching stems in large part 
from wide variations in how the term has been applied, variations which underscore the ways in 
which lynching has changed continuously in practice (I will discuss this in more detail later). 
Christopher Waldrep has argued that studies of lynching need to emphasize more qualitative and 
humanistic analysis; in his own work, he traces the history of lynching by defining it as a form of 
political rhetoric. That is, rather than create and impose objective criteria, he pays attention to 
how historical actors used the term lynching. How did people, in particular times and places, 
distinguish between related forms of violence, like “lynching,” “murder,” “rioting,” “terrorism,” 
“crime,” and/or “uprising/rebellion”? The contradictions in how these terms are applied, rather 
than being an obstacle to study, for Waldrep become the focus of the study, as he employs 
rhetorical analysis to track change and continuity in the practice of lynching across two 
centuries. 
I follow Waldrep’s lead, and use the term “lynching” in reference to how people defined 
and talked about the incidents I examine, when and where they occurred. In other words, if the 
NAACP, the Chicago Defender, and a local or state-level newspaper all refer to an event as a 
“lynching,” that is how I will refer to the event. Like Waldrep, my analysis finds that close 
attention to the rhetoric of lynching is crucial to understanding how it has operated and changed 
over time. I analyze moments of divergence, when (for example) the victims of violence describe 
what happened as “mob violence,” but the perpetrators describe it as “enforcing the law;” or 
                                                          
31 Kathleen Belew, “Lynching and Power in the United States: Southern, Western, and National Vigilante Violence.” 
History Compass 12.1 (2014): 84–99. 
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when critics of lynching claim that lynchers are “brutes and savages,” while defenders of 
lynching apply similar terminology to the victims (who were, in some cases, accused of serious 
violent crime). Such divergences reveal what is at the heart of debates over lynching: not a 
binary opposition between orderly government and mob rule, but rather a conflict over what 
constitutes “order” in the first place. In Yost’s words, “the difference between a lynching and a 
legal hanging [was] quite often a matter of personal opinion and party affiliation.”32 Therefore, 
rather than try to develop objective criteria that differentiate lynchings from other forms of 
official and private violence, my approach is to tease out these “matters of personal opinion and 
party affiliation,” to demonstrate how lynching and mob violence operated as state-sanctioned 
political projects, and were not nearly as “private,” “lawless,” or mob-like as the wider public 
sometimes believes. I combine rhetorical analysis with careful archival research to get at the 
deeper philosophical and ethical debates – over race, violence, crime, and inequality – that 
surround lynching, making the historical stakes of contemporary engagements with racialized 
violence more visible and resonant.  
 Mob Violence 
 As is the case with lynching, “mob violence” is another term that resists precise 
definition. Scholars of violence sometimes use the term “mob violence” synonymously with 
“lynching” (as implied by terms like “lynch mob”). But in other studies, mob violence is used to 
refer to larger-scale violence, like riots, uprisings, or pogroms. Sociologists have used inter-
locking variables to categorize various forms of mob violence, for example, the size of the mob 
is one factor that differentiates a lynching from a riot, as is the selection of victims (lynchings are 
usually directed at a specific individual accused of something, while riots tend to target a class of 
                                                          
32 Yost, “History of Lynchings in Kansas,” 185. 
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people indiscriminately). Terrorism also targets people indiscriminately, but terrorism is pre-
planned and organized while riots are spontaneous and disorganized. Of course, these neat 
taxonomies do not usually account for the wide variations in practice, especially across history 
and transnationally, but they can be useful in the development of a thoughtful and nuanced 
vocabulary for discussing different violent phenomena.  
Further compounding the problem of definition, academics’ use of “mob violence” does 
not always match how historical actors used the term, nor can they really, since the term has not 
been used with consistent meaning or intent. Newspapers during the period I study refer to many 
forms of social disorder as “mob violence” – ranging from labor strikes that turn violent 
(regardless of which side instigates); to vigilante raids of brothels, bars, and gambling houses; 
race riots and mass lynchings; and radical political violence (sabotage, property destruction, 
assassination and bombing). Civil rights organizations like the NAACP advocated legislation 
aimed at “the Suppression of Lynching and Mob Violence,” indicating that they were less 
concerned with the precise cause or form of violence than they were concerned with eliminating 
an array of violent practices that combined to significantly harm individuals and communities of 
color.33  
 A major intervention of my research is to trouble the notion of “mob violence” – 
specifically, to analyze the role played by state actors in the formation of mobs – and so I use the 
term sparingly. However, when particular historical actors (a newspaper editor, government 
officer, or civil rights leader, for example) use the term “mob violence,” I follow suit. This is 
particularly applicable in the chapters that focus on the Red Summer of 1919, which featured 
both an unprecedented number of race riots and a major spike in rates of lynching. Organizations 
                                                          
33 Kidada E. Williams, They Left Great Marks on Me: African American Testimonies of Racial Violence from 
Emancipation to World War I (New York: NYU Press, 2012). 
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like the NAACP often referred to such violence with one sweeping phrase – mob violence – in 
order to simplify their message to the public and appeal to a Progressive vision of orderly 
government.34 My critiques of the term “mob” are not intended as retroactive empirical 
“corrections” (i.e., they were wrong/mistaken to call this mob violence). Rather, I understand 
their rhetoric as a conscious choice, and analyze some of the unintended effects such rhetoric has 
had. Namely, I point out that the images conjured by the term “mob” do not adequately account 
for the extent to which state actors were involved in the creation, authorization, organization, 
arming, and deployment of so-called mobs, as well as being responsible in the aftermath for 
ensuring that perpetrators enjoyed relative impunity for their actions. I am particularly concerned 
with how the language of “mob violence” has carried forward over time. Black audiences in the 
1900s, 10s, and 20s, may have implicitly understood that the “mobs” involved in mob violence 
often included law enforcement personnel and other government officials. A century later, 
however, particularly in a context featuring widespread law enforcement violence against people 
of color, the emphasis on “mobs” has been detrimental to public discourses on race and 
violence.35 These discourses often remain mired in notions of conscious racial hatred, as one 
would expect from an irrational mob. I examine the systemic rational connections between 
violence, law enforcement, and racial inequality, and point to the ways in which 19th and early 
20th century campaigns against mob violence could also be described as campaigns against 
police violence – campaigns that are in sore need of resurrection and revival. 
  State of Exception 
                                                          
34 That is to say, as I will document in more detail in the chapter on lynching, even those Progressives who were 
ambivalent on issues of race could be appealed to on the basis of their commitment to order. NAACP campaigns 
against “mob violence” were successful precisely because this rhetoric is strategic and speaks to a national 
audience that was otherwise painfully disinterested in the plight of black Americans.    
35 I do not claim these conversations never occur, just that many public discussions center on the racial biases of 
individual officers.  
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Coined by Giorgio Agamben, who was referencing Carl Schmidt’s writings on states of 
emergency, the term “state of exception” refers to a space (temporal, physical, and political) 
governed by the abdication of law, where “application is suspended but the law, as such, remains 
in force.”36  These “states of exception” appear to be spaces that have been abandoned or 
neglected by law, but in fact they are spaces that have been prescribed and created by law, in 
accordance with a long-standing legal corpus that holds that constitutional and political norms 
can (and should) be suspended during times of emergency. The purpose of this abdication is not 
to overthrow existing loci of power and control, rather the purpose is to protect and reproduce 
political normality and the status quo in times of crisis.  
This framing is especially relevant to scholarship on lynching because, as many scholars 
have pointed out, lynching was a form of violence that served to maintain racial, sexual, and 
economic norms. Understanding lynching as a form of “exceptional” violence challenges the 
traditional language used to describe lynching, such as extralegal, illegal, unlawful, lawless, or 
criminal. Although Lynch Law did not follow the rules or procedures outlined in federal or state 
constitutions, as we shall see, it nonetheless operated with the force and legitimacy of law, and in 
the majority of cases with official or unofficial government sanction.  
  States of Exceptionalism 
In her analysis of U.S. empire and domestic race relations, Amy Kaplan observes that 
ideologies of American exceptionalism, codified through law, have worked to create “ambiguous 
spaces that are not quite foreign or domestic.”37 On the one hand, the universalizing impulses of 
American exceptionalism have undergirded political and territorial expansion, for example, 
Manifest Destiny was a philosophy that stressed the exceptional nature of American civilization 
                                                          
36 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
37 Amy Kaplan. The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture (Harvard University Press, 2005) 15. 
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and America’s ultimate destiny as a transcontinental empire. At the same time, the democratic 
impulses of American exceptionalism include celebrations of freedom and equality. It is 
America’s commitment to individual liberty that make it “exceptional” compared to Europe’s 
monarchical empires. Kaplan joins other scholars of U.S. empire in pointing out that the 
ideology of American exceptionalism contains conflicting ideals – supremacy and equality – 
whose coexistence are often untenable in practice. Kaplan asserts that the contradiction of 
American exceptionalism leads to the creation of political and territorial spaces that are 
simultaneously claimed and disavowed by the U.S. In the case of Puerto Rico, the Supreme 
Court issued a confused and confusing ruling that the territory was “foreign in a domestic sense,” 
and therefore its residents could be subject to U.S. law despite their lack of political 
representation. Investment in American exceptionalism helps to explain how jurists and political 
leaders could justify the colonization of other nations, without necessarily altering their idea of 
America as a free republic. Thus America could be an empire without having any colonies, and it 
could have colonies without being an empire.  
Drawing on Kaplan’s analysis of American exceptionalism, and Agamben’s analysis of 
states of exception, the title of my dissertation combines the terms into “States of 
Exceptionalism.”  Just as Kaplan describes the effect of exceptionalism in the creation of 
“ambiguous spaces that are not foreign or domestic,” my dissertation contends that states of 
exception involve the creation of ambiguous spaces that are not quite legal or illegal. These 
quasi-legal spaces allow violence to flourish, violence that is at once a product of law, and yet is 
detached from the accountability or oversight that law is supposed to provide. But, ideologies of 
American exceptionalism prevent many Americans, particularly white Americans, from seeing 
government and state power in this light. Police brutality, discrimination, and racial bias are 
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treated as “exceptions” to a system that is otherwise fair and just. American political and 
economic systems simultaneously rely on this violence and disavow it as “un-American.”  
The term “states of exceptionalism,” then, describes how state-sanctioned lynchings and 
anti-black riots were justified by reference to emergency conditions that required the temporary 
setting aside of legal and political norms. Although these norms were set aside in order to allow 
violence to occur, this should not be taken to mean that law somehow ceased to exist during 
lynchings and riots, or that they took place in defiance of law, or that they posed a fundamental 
threat to law. Far from it. Law not only existed during episodes of lynching and mob violence, its 
power was magnified exponentially. Lynching was never successfully outlawed at the federal 
level; attempts to gain reparations for lynching and riot-related damages have resulted in little 
more than official apologies and un-funded taskforces. Moreover, the legal architecture that 
permitted lynching to occur remains with us today, in the form of repressive criminal justice 
measures that rationalize disproportionate violence and repression of communities of color. 
Although lynching and mob violence are usually described and remembered as “illegal”, this 
descriptor belies the extent to which extralegal violence has functioned as a cornerstone in the 
development of U.S. foreign policy, state formation, and the development of criminal legal 
procedures.  
 
 
Genealogies of Lynching: Mob Violence and State-Building 
“When Virginia was the backwoods of America, without law, summary executions were 
common; and the accident which applied the term Lynch to illegal executions will never 
positively be known. Whatever else it was, in its original use it was not a term of reproach, but a 
mark of the high character and moral integrity of the people.” – Hubert Howe Bancroft, 188738 
 
                                                          
38 Hubert Howe Bancroft, Popular Tribunals (San Francisco: The History Company, 1887). 
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“He who attacks lynching attacks one of the oldest, one of the most deeply rooted of 
institutions peculiarly American, one eminently respectable in origin, which is regarded by its 
adherents, not as in opposition to the established laws, but rather as a supplement to them.” – 
Roy Nash, 191639 
 
“Lynching did not cause so much consternation then as it does now…The people banded 
themselves into vigilance committees for the protection of themselves and their property, and 
punishment by these committees was seldom considered illegal. The squatters' courts were as 
much respected and as effective as the government courts.” – Genevieve Yost, 193340 
 
This review will trace some of the important markers of change over time in the on-the-
ground practice of lynching, but it will also offer a genealogical history that highlights the 
discourses that made lynching seem, to many Euroamerican settlers at least, a righteous and even 
radically democratic institution. These pro-lynching discourses represented overarching cultural, 
legal, and social norms that developed in response to military and legal contradictions posed by 
settler-colonial expansion and the institutional development of slavery. Yet, the relationship 
between pro-lynching discourse and lynching as an actual practice was not a straight-forward 
matter of cause and effect. Pro-lynching discourses had to contend with, and adapt to, anti-
lynching discourses. Both pro- and anti-lynchers had to react as new incidents became fodder for 
public debate. Proponents of lynching struggled to quell the public’s fear of excessive and 
uncontrolled violence; opponents of lynching struggled to address the public’s certainty that such 
violence was sometimes necessary to maintain social order. By focusing on the tensions between 
lynching as discourse and lynching as practice, and the ways in which discourse and practice 
refracted back upon each other, this section reframes our understanding of lynching to reflect 
how it has constituted a type of legalized violence that has been, and continues to be, 
foundational to modern U.S. state formations.  
                                                          
39 Nash to Peabody Memo. 
40 “Yost, “History of Lynchings in Kansas,” 184 – 185. 
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Popular representations of lynching as well as academic studies (especially prior to the 
late 1990s), are often premised on the implicit or explicit assumption that lynching is an 
historical artifact. Although the term remains culturally potent, the vast majority of scholarship, 
documentaries, artwork, and other media that address lynching as a material practice situate it as 
a primarily 19th- and early 20th-century phenomenon endemic to the western frontier and the 
post-Reconstruction South.41 Many of these texts portray the violence of lynch mobs as 
unsophisticated and disorganized, reflecting a period of state formation characterized by weak or 
non-existent civil institutions, when people were more influenced by crude racial hatred, 
spurious racial science, and explicit ideological commitment to white supremacy. Without 
denying the importance of these factors, the most recent developments in scholarship on 
lynching have begun to explore how it was also a product of modernization, rapid 
industrialization, and cutting-edge developments in transportation and communication 
technologies.42 Despite growing recognition that lynching is an element of modernity, however, 
the terms lynch law and lynching have had difficulty shaking their connotations of barbarism and 
irrationality. Lynching analogies typically describe the surfacing of aggressive impulses, the 
rejection of civilized codes of conduct, and devolution into mob mentality. In fact, the origins of 
lynching are inseparable from the appearance and expansion of so-called “civilization,” that is, 
inseparable from the very modern modes of domination and dispossession inaugurated by 
European migration to the Americas.    
 
                                                          
41 For now, I will uncomfortably distinguish these areas of inquiry as “frontier lynching” versus “racialized 
lynching,” but by the conclusion of this review it should be clear that it is actually quite difficult (and potentially 
problematic) to dichotomize the two.  
42 Jacqueline Denise. Goldsby, A Spectacular Secret: Lynching in American Life and Literature (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006). 
 25 
 
‘Not Strictly Warranted by Law, but Justified by the Imminence of Danger’:  
The Colonial and Anti-Colonial Origins of Lynching 
Lynching first entered the Anglo-American vernacular in the frontier regions of what is 
now western Virginia. Early settlers of the area, including prominent planter Charles Lynch, 
were frustrated by the requirement that they transport alleged lawbreakers across nearly 200 
miles of dangerous swampland to a magistrate in Williamsburg. Arguing the law of necessity, 
these men organized themselves into a panel of judges, which unilaterally examined evidence, 
issued verdicts, and executed punishment, typically consisting of flogging and banishment. Their 
activities eventually popularized and spread under such monikers as “applying Lynch’s Law,” 
“summoning Judge Lynch,” and eventually, simply “lynching.” Correspondence between 
Charles Lynch and various colonial governors (including future president Thomas Jefferson), 
indicate that the planters’ actions elicited cautious sympathy: there was no attempt to stop them, 
but Lynch and the others were warned that they could be sued if they failed to exercise prudence 
in their unsanctioned use of governing authority.43  
The relationship between lynching and colonial governance was complicated during the 
Revolutionary War, when Lynch and his fellow planters began administering Lynch’s Law 
against suspected British loyalists. As one of the earliest historians of lynching would recall,  
There was a considerable number of Tories in Bedford County, where Charles Lynch 
lived. The unsettled condition of affairs also led many desperadoes to resort to this 
section of Virginia. Both Tories and desperadoes harassed the Continentals and plundered 
their property with impunity. The prices paid by both armies for horses made horse-
stealing a lucrative practice, and the inefficiency of the judiciary made punishment 
practically out of the question.44 
 
                                                          
43 James Cutler, Lynch-Law: An Investigation into the History of Lynching in the United States (Longmans, Green, 
and co., 1905); Michael Pfeifer, The Roots of Rough Justice: Origins of American Lynching (University of Illinois 
Press, 2011); Ashraf Rushdy, American Lynching (Yale University Press, 2012); Waldrep, The Many Faces of Judge 
Lynch; Walter White, Rope and Faggot: A Biography of Judge Lynch (Notre Dame University Press, 1929).  
44 Cutler, Lynch-Law, 24-25. 
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Lynch and his contemporaries charged suspected loyalists with treason, and imprisoned a 
number of people for years, without trial, in order to prevent them from giving aid to the 
invading British army. Following the war, in 1782, the Virginia legislature passed a law that 
“indemnified and exonerated” Charles Lynch and three other men for these transgressions, 
calling their actions “timely and effectual measures,” that “may not be strictly warranted by law, 
[but were] justifiable from the imminence of danger.”45 Thus the first codified embrace of 
lynching emerged at the intersection of threats against national security during a time of war, and 
practical obstacles to the administration of criminal justice. Faced by such conditions, Virginia’s 
new legal authorities agreed that extraordinary measures were justified. The clause that defined 
Lynch’s actions as being “not strictly warranted by law, [but] justifiable from the imminence of 
danger,” became a cornerstone of pro-lynching discourse that can still be discerned in 
contemporary debates over crime, policing, torture, and warfare. 
Roy Nash, a lead organizer for the NAACP’s national campaign against lynching and 
mob violence, explained in 1916 that Virginia’s Indemnity Act, “gave expression to a principle 
which found ready acceptance among the early settlers exposed to the dangers and vicissitudes of 
frontier life.”46 The principle was “in the air, as it were, and it was repeatedly embodied in 
motion.”47 Early practices of lynching created the basic architecture of governance (a 
rudimentary court system) along the outer edge of Anglo, and then American encroachment on 
indigenous territories of eastern North America. This territory was no longer fully controlled by 
indigenous groups, nor was it under the effective control of either the old European colonists or 
the new American settlers. As border communities, the earliest practitioners of Lynch’s Law saw 
                                                          
45 “Virginia Indemnity Act of 1782,” discussed in Maud Carter Clement, The History of Pittsylvania County, Virginia 
(1929), 178 – 179.  
46 Nash to Peabody memo, 5. 
47 Nash to Peabody memo, 5. 
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themselves as being on the precipice between civilization(s) and wilderness, a boundary that 
carried a heavy burden of religious, racial, and sexual symbolism.48 Settler-colonists felt an acute 
need “to take matters into their own hands, to punish lawlessness of every kind.”49  
Their description of frontier zones as “lawless” was empirical in the sense that many 
alleged criminals traveled to these areas to escape trial and punishment by colonial courts; but 
more importantly, the designation of “lawless” was a performative utterance that rejected the 
possibility of allowing the land to come under the control of non-Americans (British, French, 
Spanish, Mexican, and Indian) who might be attempting to impose or preserve their own systems 
of law. Just as the migration of the actual colonists was justified by the notion of an infinite, 
empty wilderness, the spread of Lynch’s Law was justified by the notion that this wilderness was 
also politically empty – lawless – and thus a perfect laboratory for the creation of new 
republican, democratic, and populist forms of governance.50 Even though lynchings in this 
context were usually aimed at other Euroamerican settlers and colonists, the sense of danger that 
justified lynching was fueled by the religious, military, and racial paranoia that accompanied 
colonial competition and settler-colonial expansion. 
 
Lynching and Westward Expansion 
Lynching associated with settler-colonial expansion continued unabated into the late 19th 
century, particularly in response to horse theft and other major crimes. In the words of 
Genevieve Yost, a chronicler of lynching in Kansas, “What the negro problem was to the South 
                                                          
48 Richard Slotkin, Regeneration through Violence; the Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860. 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1974). 
49 Nash to Peabody memo, 7.  
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as a cause for lynching, horse stealing was to the West.”51 This might seem a strange analogy at 
first, but in fact the outrage engendered by horse thieves was inseparable from early colonists’ 
commitment to racial superiority, military supremacy, and capitalist expansion, just as was the 
case with “the negro problem” in the post-Reconstruction south. Ned Blackhawk explains that 
the Indian nations American settlers encountered as they expanded further west were already 
reeling from the effects of Spanish colonization in other parts of North America. Horses were a 
prime currency in the ensuing competition for land, resources, and trade advantage.  
For neighboring Indians, [trade relations with Spain] became the oxygen for the 
community body’s survival. Acquiring these items, however, required tremendous and 
often violent labor, for by offering new trade items, the Spanish provided powerful 
incentives to those who most consistently brought in items of worth, most notably slaves, 
horses and hides, as the competition both to trade and to raid reshaped Indian 
economies.52  
 
This inducement “to trade and to raid” made the areas where American expansion intersected 
with European colonial claims and indigenous struggles for livelihood notoriously dangerous. 
For American settlers in particular, who were in the process of creating a new nation with new 
forms of law, the need to rely on lynching was as obvious as the need to breathe: “it was in the 
air, and repeatedly embodied in motion.”   
As urgent the need for lynching seemed, however, it was also the object of fear, 
suspicion, and skepticism. Critical questions surrounded the practice: if lynch law was a form of 
governance, what were the checks and balances on its power? Were lynchers and members of 
self-appointed vigilance committees truly disinterested dispensers of justice, or had they merely 
found a clever cover for violence that furthered their own interests? If lynch law was in part 
justified on the revolutionary principle that people have a natural right to “alter and abolish 
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government,” and to provide for their own protection and self-defense, what was to prevent 
socially marginalized groups from “lynching” members of elite classes? If lynch law was only 
supposed to be a substitute for official governance until political infrastructure caught up with 
human migration, who would decide when lynch law was no longer needed, and in the meantime 
what effects might it have on nascent American institutions?  
As cycles of vengeance and vigilantism played out against the backdrop of colonial and 
Indian warfare and white migration, lynching came to occupy the curious cultural and legal 
status of being a “necessary evil.” It demarcated a border between civilization and savagery, and 
“upon this border, as upon the edge of mighty fermentations, accumulated the scum of the 
commonwealth. […] Society there was low and brutal, and the lynchers were not always much 
better than the lynched.”53  Although there was no dearth of justifications for frontier lynching, 
the very need for it, and the character of the people who were most prone to use it, seemed to 
indicate something troubling about the status of civilized mankind:  
Thus paradoxical is our freedom when it comes, liberty leading only to greater bondage; 
for the more advanced the civilization the more powerful the unwritten law [of 
vigilantism and lynching]. Is it not humiliating; is it not far from high or holy satisfaction, 
the thought that of all animals, man alone should require conventional rules…that with 
his intelligence and reason he should require laws to govern him, when brutes associate 
in comparative harmony, each with its kind, without the appointment of legislature, 
governor, judge, or hangman? Obviously this is the penalty man pays for his reason.54 
 
Early historians of lynching frequently conclude that  
The social conditions which produced lynchings produced also a tolerance for them, and 
both vanished together. The extension of civil authority into the territory provided 
punishment of criminals, and its enforcement gave the people confidence to rely upon it. 
We like to think, also, that an advancing civilization yielded some influence against the 
practice.55  
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But, though we might like to think that the advance of civilization caused lynching to vanish, 
ironically, the opposite is also true: the advance of civilization is what caused lynching to appear 
in the first place. Especially when performed by posses and sheriff’s deputies, lynching could 
occur with impunity only because it was covered by “the veneer of legality” civilization provided 
through subsequent extension of its own authority.56 Bancroft, writing in a time and place when 
lynching enjoyed more popular support, described lynching as civilization’s chaperone – “the 
law’s mentor as well as the law’s master.”57 But as opinion shifted against lynching, more and 
more histories, like that of Yost, drew sharper lines between lynching and legitimate state action 
despite significant evidence that lynch law and settler-colonial law were constitutive rather than 
strictly oppositional. 
 
The Rise and Decline of Lynching During the Long Civil War 
Starting in the 1830s and 40s, the process of westward expansion began to intersect with 
increasingly violent debates over slavery, as abolitionists and pro-slavery forces fought over 
whether it would be permitted in annexed territories and new states. Both pro-slavery and anti-
slavery settlers were targets of lynch law during border wars in present-day Nebraska, Kansas, 
Missouri, and Texas. Free blacks and escaped slaves, and even well-established white citizens, 
became targets as slave-holding states encouraged vigilantism against people suspected of 
assisting the abolitionist cause.  
This re-coding of the political meaning of lynching led to a temporary decline in its 
legitimacy, if not its frequency. In a notable address to the Springfield Lyceum in 1837, future 
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president Abraham Lincoln reflected on the great success of American colonization.58 Given 
America’s vast resources and growing military might, Lincoln predicted that “if destruction be 
our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen, we must live 
through all time, or die by suicide.” He then identified lynching, or “mobocracy,” as America’s 
primary form of suicidal ideation, condemning “the increasing disregard for law which pervades 
the country; the growing disposition to substitute the wild and furious passions [of savage mobs] 
in lieu of the sober judgment of Courts.” To those Americans who imagined themselves to be 
unaffected by lynch law, he described a recent outbreak of mob violence in Mississippi:  
They first commenced by hanging the regular gamblers; a set of men, certainly not 
following a very useful or honest occupation [but technically not breaking any 
laws]…Next, negroes, suspected of conspiring to raise an insurrection, were caught up 
and hanged in all parts of the State: then, white men, supposed to be leagued with the 
negroes; and finally, strangers from neighboring States, going thither on business were in 
many instances subjected to the same fate. Thus went on this process of hanging, from 
gamblers to negroes, from negroes to white citizens, and from these to strangers; till dead 
men were seen literally dangling from the boughs of trees upon every road side; and in 
numbers almost sufficient to rival the native Spanish moss.59 
 
Lincoln’s comments were delivered at a moment when there was a growing sense that lynch law 
had been allowed to prevail for too long, in places that no longer required it, with potentially 
irreparable effects on America’s social fabric.60 Widespread support existed for lynching when it 
was viewed as a rudimentary mechanism of populist crime control. But now significant portions 
of the public began to perceive lynching as a form of political terrorism.61 Eventually, lynching 
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became almost indiscernible from border warfare as violent clashes in the new territories 
escalated toward Civil War.62  
 
“The Lynching Era”: Reconstruction and the Closing of the Frontier 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, both frontier lynching and pro-slavery lynching re-
emerged in new forms, and the institution of lynching began to regain the legitimacy that it lost 
during the strife of the prewar decades, reinvigorated by the closing of the frontier in the 1880s 
and 1890s. In the west, lynching was used as part of the domination of indigenous and migrant 
populations in order to claim meaningful sovereignty over newly acquired lands.63 In the south, 
along with disenfranchisement and economic exploitation, lynching reestablished pre-abolition 
racial hierarchies. This represented a key moment in the history of lynching, when the 
coexistence of frontier lynching in the west and racialized post-Reconstruction lynching in the 
south fueled and influenced each other. In both arenas, the violence involved with lynching 
escalated, while the reasons a person might be lynched were increasingly petty.  
White southerners drew on the rhetoric of frontier lynching to justify violence against 
African Americans, despite the fact that they did not live on the frontier, and courtroom justice 
was not only available but also quite severe. In a widely publicized speech in 1913, for example, 
South Carolina governor Cole Blease promised that he 
would never order out the militia and ask the home boys of South Carolina to shoot down 
their friends and their neighbors to protect a black brute who had assaulted a white 
woman…when a negro criminally assaults a white woman, all they want to know is that 
they have got the right man, and there will be no need of a trial, and there ought not be 
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any need of it in any civilized community. If we can’t protect our white women from a 
black fiend what can we do for our country’s civilization and for man’s uplift? 
 
Governor Blease’s statement that “there ought not be any need” of a trial “in any civilized 
community,” marked African Americans as excluded not only from whiteness but also 
civilization itself, constructing the hypothetical rapist as both “black” and as a “brute” or “fiend.” 
In 1913, South Carolina’s population density far surpassed that used by the U.S. census to 
designate frontier areas. For that matter, on the actual frontier it would be the presence of a trial, 
not the absence, which indicated a community was civilized, with the need for lynching having 
vanished upon the arrival of a regular court system. It should be noted also that Blease’s embrace 
of lynching was not a generic embrace of chaotic mob violence – he specifies that lynchers in 
South Carolina “want to know they’ve got the right man,” underscoring his perception that 
lynching was justified, essentially, as an emergency law enforcement mechanism, and did not 
conflict with the ideals of justice found in a regular courtroom. Despite the seemingly disparate 
targets and circumstances, pro-lynching Southerners succeeded in mobilizing the rhetoric of 
civilization because justifications for lynching on the frontier were already laden with ideas 
about the violence needed to shore up the borders between civilization and savagery, and the 
degeneration white/civilized peoples were vulnerable to if they were not vigilant(es). It was not 
difficult for whites living in other parts of the country to accept Southerners’ decision to resort to 
the same law enforcement strategies that had long been utilized along the Western frontier.  
Southerners’ appropriation of frontier-based arguments in favor of lynching had a ripple 
effect back onto the practices and discourses associated with lynching on the actual frontier. Pre-
Civil War, the term lynching was occasionally applied to execution-style killings, but it had also 
referred to a range of corporal punishments (whipping, banishment, mutilation, tarring and 
feathering, etc.), and it was directed more often against Euroamericans than it was against people 
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of color. After the Civil War, frontier lynching came to mirror Jim Crow lynching, in that it 
involved the summary execution of mostly indigenous peoples and people of color, who could be 
lynched not only as suspected criminals, but also for political or religious affiliations, perceived 
social or sexual deviance, or merely for using land and resources that settlers wanted to control.  
In many respects – certainly in numbers – lynching was at the high-point of its power. 
Yet, the more power lynchers presumed to exercise, especially when characterized by gratuitous 
brutality, the more backlash lynching attracted. The high point of lynching in the 1890s also 
marked the birth of the first organized anti-lynching movement the nation had ever seen, led by 
formidable writers and activists such as Ida B. Wells, Frederick Douglass, and Jesse Daniel 
Ames. As the 19th century drew to a close, these women and men honed new arguments to use 
against lynching, which would prove enormously successful – though not always in the ways 
they had predicted or hoped for.    
 
Lynch Law as a “Colonial Topic”64 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, both the discourse and the practice of lynching 
were in serious turmoil. Advocates of lynching still leaned heavily on the anti-crime, pro-white-
civilization logics of frontier lynching. But opponents of lynching pointed out that the frontier 
was effectively ‘closed,’ American civil and criminal courts were firmly established (even if not 
always 100% effective), and policing as an occupation was becoming more skilled and 
professionalized. Anti-lynchers insisted that the arguments in favor of frontier lynching were 
now irrelevant, certainly in the south if not nationwide. Organizations like the Tuskegee Institute 
and the NAACP, building on the journalism of Ida B. Wells, began to systematically record and 
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publicize incidents of lynching, and could point to countless examples that did not represent 
some unified public expression against crime, but instead advanced particular racial, class, 
sectional, and political interests, sometimes at the expense of the larger community or economy. 
After decades of rampant violence, with lynch law operating virtually unchecked throughout the 
West, Midwest, South, and Southwest, rates of lynching peaked in the 1890s. As opponents of 
lynching wore away at its rationalizations, a particular version of the practice began a slow but 
mostly steady decline from the 1900s through the 1930s. 
It is important, however, to consider the success of the anti-lynching movement in 
historical context. The late-19th and early-20th centuries witnessed a major shift from 
transcontinental expansion to transoceanic imperialism, a transformation that weakened 
arguments in favor of lynching.65 In contrast to the wars of the 19th century, which were a means 
of annihilation and annexation, America’s early twentieth-century wars were promoted on the 
basis that American political and economic systems would have a liberating effect, protecting 
people and territory from European aggression and helping with the development of modern 
political and economic institutions as the basis of future claims to sovereignty.66   
Whether one favored isolationism or intervention, the idea that America’s expanding 
civilization was synonymous with the benevolent imposition of democracy – rather than the 
violent destruction of pre-existing political orders – became hegemonic in debates over 
America’s experiments with overseas colonization. This development did not go unnoticed by 
the increasingly powerful anti-lynching movement, which began to denounce lynching as 
unpatriotic and uncivilized. Lynching in America became a “colonial topic,” increasingly 
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frowned upon as a local law enforcement practice in light of domestic and foreign policy goals 
and international scrutiny.  
The nationalist and imperialist packaging of anti-lynching rhetoric during this period 
should alert us to the ways in which denunciations of violence in the domestic sphere may have 
served to naturalize U.S. recourse to violence internationally. When President Woodrow Wilson 
rallied the nation for entry to World War I, for example, black editor Robert Owens, writing in 
his St. Louis, Missouri-based Post-Dispatch, stated, “the question that is first and uppermost in 
the minds of the vast majority of the black people of this country is, Are we included in this 
world that is to be made safe for democracy?”67 But for President Wilson, who issued a national 
address against lynching a few months later, the question was, “How shall we recommend 
democracy to the acceptance of other peoples[?]”68 Wilson and other national leaders adopted a 
public stance in opposition to lynching to maintain ideological coherence in the U.S.’s 
“recommendation” of democracy to other nations – a recommendation that, if refused, would be 
enforced through armed invasion, coup d’etats, naval embargoes, and extended military 
occupation. 
 
The Strange Career of “Lawlessness” 
This project focuses on the period when lynching is thought to have declined and even 
disappeared. I am particularly concerned with analyzing the discourses of “lawlessness” and 
“law and order,” terminology that appeared in the rhetoric of both pro-lynchers and anti-
lynchers. When civil rights activists borrowed such terms (along with “barbaric,” “savage,” and 
“criminal”) from nationalist and colonialist discourses to invigorate their arguments against 
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lynching, they inadvertently brought with them some of the most racially coded arguments that 
had once existed in favor of lynching. For more than a century, pro-lynchers held that lynching 
was necessary in response to the “lawless” behavior of primitive Indians and white and black 
criminals. Now anti-lynchers held that lynching itself was lawless and primitive. But if the 
problem of lynching was that it represented primitive lawlessness and thus brought shame to 
civilization, what was the solution? Just as proponents of frontier lynching in the 18th and 19th 
centuries promised it would disappear with the establishment of political (colonial) 
infrastructure, critics of racialized lynching in the late 19th and early 20th centuries proposed to 
defeat lynching by strengthening, expanding on, and re-regulating that same infrastructure.   
My reading and research into lynching during this period digs more deeply into this 
fundamental contradiction: lynching declined when it became associated with the rhetoric of 
“lawlessness,” but prior to this, lynching had in fact been a technique of law enforcement. Some 
of the most lawless aspects of lynching did decline – but what about lynching’s lawful 
undergirding, as an accepted method for apprehending and punishing alleged criminals? 
According to historian Ken Gonzalez-Day, “contrary to the popular image of the American West 
as a lawless frontier, it was areas with the most law enforcement that had the greatest number of 
summary executions, vigilance committees, and lynch mobs.”69 This was true for Jim Crow 
lynchings as well. Nationally, from the 1870s through the 1890s, lynch mobs obtained their 
victim from police custody more than 75% of the time.70 In some states, the rate was even 
higher: Fitzhugh Brundage found that from 1880 to 1930, lynchers in Georgia obtained their 
victims from police custody 80% of the time and in Virginia 94% of the time. He concluded that 
“local law officers, whether through woeful incompetence or complicity, often aided the work of 
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the mobs.”71 A study of the 21 lynchings that occurred in 1930 found that “in every case the 
local officials were either grossly negligent or in open connivance with the mob.”72  
In this dissertation, drawing on a range of primary and secondary literature, I work to 
make it more apparent that lynching and mob violence are problems of law, not lawlessness. In 
Chapter Two, I describe law enforcement participation in incidents of lynching and challenge the 
typical narrative that this was a result of law enforcement officers being “overpowered” by 
mobs. In many cases, law enforcement collaborated with mobs. In other cases they made little or 
no effort to protect people who had been arrested. In still other cases, they failed to diligently 
investigate lynchings which, along with equally negligent prosecutors, allowed the phenomenon 
of lynching to continue for more than a half-century with an arrest and conviction rate in the 
single digits. NAACP strategies to counter lynching included a number of measures aimed at 
curbing police violence, seeking to protect black citizens not just from white citizens, but also 
from capricious violence at the hands of state actors.   
In Chapter Three I describe how the principles of lynch law carried over onto the national 
stage as the United States grew into its position as a global power during the early twentieth 
century. Rather than describe this period as the “end” of lynching, I suggest it may have 
represented the “nationalization” of lynching. Racialized ideas of crime and savagery were 
woven into national narratives of domestic and international threat. Lynchings aimed at 
individuals declined, and local police began to close ranks against would-be lynch mobs. At the 
same time however, an era of violent anti-black riots took place, frequently justified by similar 
rationales as had once driven lynching, and ultimately claiming a much larger death toll. Yet, the 
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nationalization of lynching discourse was not a seamless process. Lynching had been a means for 
many different types of whites to claim power: immigrants used lynching to assert their 
whiteness politically and culturally; economically marginal whites used lynching to claim the 
‘wages of whiteness,’; planters, land-owners and businessmen used lynching to control a 
racialized workforce; police participated in or acquiesced to lynching as an extension of their 
role as crime-fighters. On the national stage, such divergent groups did not have equal claim to 
legitimate perpetration of violence. Immigrants were suspect for their potentially anti-American 
politics. Economically marginal whites were feared for their pursuit of militant labor organizing. 
Yet, the labor movement was strong enough that capitalists’ use of violence also met heavy 
resistance. Out of the many groups who had once been authorized to engage in ‘exceptional’ 
violence, after World War One, discourses of crisis began to primarily conjure up the image of 
police, soldiers, and veterans as the legitimate wielders of violent emergency powers.  
In Chapter Four I embark on a case study that explores in more detail the consequences 
of this shift. Usually narrated as an incident of “mob violence,” exemplary of race relations in the 
Jim Crow south, my treatment of the Elaine riots of 1919, adds to this understanding a deeper 
awareness of how the riot grew out of the nationalist sentiments of the first world war, and how 
the highly lethal violence that characterized the riot reflected the actions of organized bodies of 
soldiers and combat veterans more so than the frenzied, out-of-control actions of a “mob.”  
To the extent that states of exception are often framed as problems of sovereignty and 
executive power, in Chapter Five I extend my analysis of the Elaine riots to include the trials and 
appeals that came out of the conflict. I show that the problem of “the exception” extends into 
areas of governance that are typically considered less vulnerable to the logics of emergency and 
crisis. In a democratic context, the judicial branch ideally enforces the checks and balances that 
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are supposed to exist against executive or legislative overreach. The Moore v. Dempsey decision, 
however, raises questions about courts’ ability to right the wrongs that are committed during 
states of exception. In this case, the court proved unable to discern between the “form” of law 
and its substance. That is to say, since the declaration of an emergency allowed all sorts of 
irregularities to proceed under cover of law, the court found itself unable to pin down what, if 
anything, had occurred “illegally,” despite the sympathetic desire of some justices to find in 
favor of the Elaine defendants. The strongest verdict they could issue was still “minimalist” and 
“feeble” according to some legal historians. The court was able to insist on judicial legitimacy – 
“a trial that looks like what a trial is supposed to look like.”  But substantive justice – revoking 
the state’s right to put the sharecroppers on trial in the first place – remained far beyond the 
court’s reach.    
The final chapter suggests criminal justice reformers would most benefit from a sustained 
and rigorous critique that refuses to idealize the rule of law. To the extent that lynching has never 
stood in opposition to state power, but has instead been mutually constitutive of it, strategies for 
change must avoid reifying the notion that an ideal state maintains a monopoly on the use of 
force. This framing raises new questions for future generations of reformers who follow in the 
footsteps of yesterday’s anti-lynching activists: can the state's monopolization of violence be 
reduced in ways that democratize power and society? Is monopolization of violence congruent 
with democracy? If not, how can or should the function and powers of the state be (re)defined? 
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CHAPTER 2 
Lynching and the Legal Order 
 
A resident of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, wrote to the editor of the Baptist Vanguard 
newspaper in Little Rock in 1921. The letter is undated, but it could have been written in 
response to a number of events in Arkansas that year, including at least six lynchings and 
ongoing legal developments in the Arkansas riot cases stemming from the Elaine riots of 1919. 
The letter describes widespread police involvement in lynching and mob violence: 
[W]hen A Negro is linched, it don’t matter, Night or Day, it goes to the news papers, the 
negro name that was linched, but know one gives the name of any one that does or helps 
to do the linching. […] It is always are so that the mob gets the negro out of the hands of 
the Officers[.] The mob never get hands on A negro untell the Officers get him in there 
hands, and put him in Jale or take him by violence. But no one know the name of any 
member of the mob. In my judgement it appears to me that the Officers of the Law is a 
Part of the Mob. The lawless mob never go after A negro untell they get an Officer with 
them, and when the negro is killed the Officers don’t know a single one in the gang.73 
 
Its lack of date necessitated that the letter be placed out of sequence with other archived 
correspondence that was filed chronologically by month and day. The final page of the letter is 
missing, and thus so is the signature, rendering its author anonymous. The migration of the letter 
is mysterious as well. Although addressed to the editor of the Baptist Vanguard, I found the letter 
in the papers of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), in a 
folder of general office correspondence. There are no accompanying papers indicating the 
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identity of the letter writer, or that of the addressee, how the letter came into the possession of 
the NAACP, the reaction of the staff member who received the letter, why they chose to keep it, 
or if anyone ever wrote back. There is just one brief note from the original archivist – “not 
complete,” jotted at the bottom and initialed.  
The letter is barely legible as historical evidence – it is unaddressed, unattributed, 
undated, and decontextualized – and yet it is precisely these unmoored qualities that make it 
well-suited as a starting point for discussion of law enforcement complicity in lynching. The 
content of this letter describes what was an open secret to anti-lynching activists in the early 
1900s, that is, despite the tendency of critics to describe lynching as “lawless” and the circulation 
of definitions that insisted on the practice’s “illegality”, lynching was in fact deeply embedded in 
the legal order. As the letter-writer indicates, it was not just that the legal system tolerated 
lynching or ‘looked the other way.’ The problem of lynching was that “the Officers of the Law is 
a Part of the Mob.”  Although the mob in question might be “lawless,” its lawlessness was 
imbued with the force and authority of law because police officers, judges, sheriffs, and deputies 
were active as participants and bystanders to the violence. It was not its illegality, but precisely 
its legality that gave lynching its apparently omnipotent power.  
Opponents of lynching, as well as scholars who study the topic, have long been 
challenged to find a satisfactory description of the relationship between lynching and law. Some 
scholars, such as Stewart Tolnay, E.M. Beck, and Elizabeth Hines, rely on “the NAACP 
definition” of lynching, which holds that: 
1) There must be evidence that someone was killed 
2) The killing must have occurred illegally 
3) Three or more persons must have taken part in the lynching 
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4) The killers must have claimed to be serving justice or tradition 
Yet, despite the inclusion of the second criterion, which specifies that lynching is a killing that 
occurs “illegally,” disagreements within the NAACP and amongst other anti-lynching 
organizations indicates a lack of clarity over what this terminology meant. 74 NAACP staffers did 
not agree on whether killings by police officers should or should not count as lynchings. 
Advocates of including such killings in annual lynching statistics argued that the police often 
killed black suspects summarily, and that sheriffs were elected with the votes of KKK members. 
But opponents contended that crafting anti-lynch laws in a way that would interfere with police 
work provided ammunition to defenders of lynching, who claimed that anti-lynching laws were 
essentially “pro-crime.” Killings by posses were even more difficult to classify since posses were 
technically lawful formations of officially deputized citizens, yet their brutal and 
disproportionate violence made them indistinguishable from mobs in the eyes of many of their 
targets. In their public rhetoric, anti-lynching activists described lynching as a form of 
“lawlessness.” But privately, in debates with each other and in lengthy exchanges with legal 
advisors, there wasn’t any prevailing opinion as to where the legitimate violence of the state 
ended and the illegitimate violence of the mob began.  
This chapter builds on and extends conversations about these topics by exploring the 
legitimation of lynching more closely, in order to explicate the relationship between lynching 
and the legal order in a way that does not reproduce some of the false binaries that have so far 
dominated these examinations: binaries between legal and extralegal, between public and 
private, and between “the rule of the mob” and “the rule of law.” First I revisit the theoretical 
framework of the dissertation, the notion of the state of exception, and discuss why this concept 
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is useful for understanding the complex relationship between “lynch law” and formal law. I 
argue that when lynching is defined and remembered as illegal, this obfuscates the mechanisms 
by which it operated as a tool of the state’s policing powers. I critically analyze tropes that 
appear in news coverage of lynching, particularly in incidents that involve the custodial transfer 
of suspects out of police custody and into the hands of lynchers. Newspapers repetitively 
narrated stories of overpowered jailers and anonymous crowds; I speculate about what these 
tropes reveal about the means by which lynchers maintained anonymity and legal impunity, even 
while participating in public and nominally illegal activities. Ultimately, I depart from scholars 
who have characterized this period as marking the beginning of the end for lynch law. When 
lynching is understood as an expression of the cultural logic of exception or emergency, these 
decades appear to be a moment when one manifestation of lynch law was suppressed while other 
forms flourished. In particular, the logic of exception – the legitimating essence of lynch law – 
was preserved and exercised frequently in new forms of federal and international military power. 
This subject is taken up in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4, which examine the participation of 
military veterans and federal troops in the race and labor riots of the Red Summer of 1919. 
 
Lynching as Exceptional Violence 
The relationship between lynching and law has been quite convoluted. Binaries like legal 
vs. illegal, lawful vs. lawless, and constitutional vs. unconstitutional, fail to capture the ways in 
which lynching has acted simultaneously within and outside of the law. However, the concept of 
“the exception,” which describes these binaries as symbiotic rather than dichotomous, provides a 
more useful framework for understanding this “peculiarly American” form of violence.  
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In my focus on ‘the exception,’ I center the practices and discourses that allowed the 
perpetrators of lynching to carry out these acts with impunity. It is well known how the victims 
of lynching were cast out of law; but how did the perpetrators of lynching manage their 
relationship to law, which was also necessarily liminal? Lynchers could be defined as those who 
perpetrate violence within states of exception: they abandon law, yet this abandonment is 
justified in the law’s name. Although they almost always declare their actions were a response to 
crime, or the threat of crime, lynchers are themselves guilty of crime. Such a contradictory 
cognitive process, even if it is justified by hegemonic discourse, requires cultural labor in order 
to succeed. Too often, lynching is described as a senseless, irrational form of violence. The 
moniker “mob violence” that is often used synonymously with lynching invokes the excited 
masses engaged in collective hysteria, allowed to go unchecked because of a weak state that is 
unable or unwilling to exert sufficient control. But, we remember lynching this way at our own 
peril. Lynchers and their defenders not only found their engagement with violence reasonable, 
they also crafted rhetoric to explain the legitimacy of this violence to various publics (including 
the state itself, which generally supported or acquiesced to their activities). They did not 
mindlessly break the law, they intentionally and systematically adjusted the application of law, 
often quite self-consciously. Understanding how lynchers claimed exceptions to law helps us 
understand, not only the exceptions, but also the nature of law itself.  
 
Persons Unknown 
Basic information about lynchings, especially during “the lynching era” when a number 
of individuals and organizations began documenting the practice, is widely available in print and 
online. Usually, one will find lists that categorize lynchings by the name and race of the victim, 
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the county and state where the lynching occurred, the alleged offense (if any) that led to the 
lynching, and the method of execution (hanging, burning, shooting, etc.).75 But while these lists 
are a rich source of information about the victims of mob violence, they include almost no 
information about the perpetrators. This is not because such information is unavailable. The 
NAACP did not just passively document lynchings, they proactively investigated them. They 
sent letters to their local contacts requesting additional information about news of any lynching 
the clipping services sent – even if only rumors or gossip. Depending on what information they 
gleaned through these means, NAACP staffers then selected some cases to investigate further, by 
use of hired private detectives, travelling office staff, and journalists who were allies to the anti-
lynching cause. In some cases, lynchings occurred on the watch of anti-lynching governors; in 
these cases state-level investigations and prosecutions into lynching sometimes occurred. The 
U.S. State Department also investigated lynching allegations, usually prompted by the lynching 
of foreign nationals on U.S. soil, which led other governments to request compensation and legal 
accountability.76 Newspaper records, archival material, and secondary literature also include 
many detailed recollections, from which much information about perpetrators can be gleaned. 
Even when the names of individual perpetrators remain unknown, these and other records still 
might include information about who is most likely to have participated, because the local 
dynamics that led to a lynching sometimes strongly indicate a certain class of perpetrators – for 
example, a scholar might conclude that members of a particular immigrant community were 
responsible, even if they don’t know which members exactly; or they might conclude that the 
                                                          
75 Philip. Dray, At the Hands of Persons Unknown: The Lynching of Black America (New York: Random House, 2002); 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People., Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States, 1889-
1918. (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969); Tolnay and Beck, A Festival of Violence. 
76 Because of this they offer very little insight to the lynching of black people during the post-Reconstruction era; 
but, they offer tremendous insight to how officials in the federal government thought about lynching, both before 
and after anti-lynching movements forced such official responses.  
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perpetrators represented particular occupational or class interests. Yet, there is rarely any attempt 
to account for this information in published lists of lynching; existing scholarship on lynching 
tends to reproduce the lie of coroner’s juries, giving the impression that the majority of lynchings 
happened “at the hands of persons unknown.” 
By far the most common pattern of law enforcement participation in lynching involved 
the custodial transfer of victims from police or jail into the hands of lynchers. Merely being 
arrested carried the threat of death, as those in police custody frequently found themselves in a 
shadowy jurisdiction of law presided over by Judge Lynch. This pattern aligns with the assertion 
of the anonymous Pine Bluff resident whose letter claimed that “The mob never get hands on A 
negro untell the Officers get him in there hands.” In most cases, the officers involved claimed 
that the custodial transfer was accomplished against their will or without their knowledge. On 
March 24th of 1914, for example, an unidentified man was removed from the county jail in 
Inverness, Mississippi. The local newspaper reported that the mob broke down the doors of the 
jail and the sheriff claimed that the perpetrators could not be identified.77 In Elmore, Alabama, in 
January of 1915, Sheriff Jackson reported that a mob of 15 – 20 men physically restrained him, 
bound him to a chair, and took away his keys, before removing Ed and James Smith from the 
local jail and lynching them both from a nearby railroad trestle.78 Most infamously, in the events 
leading up to the Omaha race riot of 1919, a mob of hundreds of citizens surrounded the city jail, 
fired on the sheriff, set fire to the jail when he refused to give up the keys, and almost killed the 
mayor when he tried to interfere with their pursuit of their target.79  
                                                          
77 “Mississippians Lynch Negro,” Belleville News-Democrat, March 25, 1914. 
78 “Negro Hanged By Alabama Mob,” Savannah Tribune, January 9, 1915. 
79 They were eventually successful in lynching Will Brown, a black man accused of rape; but in this case, the 
completion of the lynching was only the beginning of a three day course of rioting, in which large portions of 
Omaha’s African American community were burned out of house and home. The riot only ended after national 
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The Omaha case, however, was unusual. Far more often, lynchings were contained events 
that started with the arrest of a criminal suspect, and ended with that suspect’s death at the hands 
of un-named persons. The ability of these persons to access prisoners kept under lock and key 
demands some explanation beyond that typically provided by officers implicated in the incident. 
On a case by case basis, the story of being overpowered by a mob might be believable. It 
stretches credulity, however, to propose that lynch mobs all across the country were so clever, 
and local sheriffs so incompetent, that bands of men could go about breaking down jail doors and 
escaping detection 98% of the time.  
As is the case with many aspects of newspaper coverage of lynching, the articles that 
discuss these cases of custodial transfer report the news with formulaic stock phrases, often 
repeating hearsay and acting as a mouthpiece for the white community. Descriptions of these 
events, if they offer any detail at all, tend to stress the overwhelming strength of the mob, the 
relative powerlessness of local police, and the likely guilt of the lynched suspect. Phrases like 
“overpowered by a mob of masked men,” and “forced to surrender,” generally written in passive 
voice constructions, operate to construct plausible deniability for local and state law enforcement 
personnel, whose possible participation in lynch mobs is minimized by the repetitive insistence 
that their interest in protecting the prisoner was overwhelmed by an anonymous showing of 
community force. Of course, since official investigations of lynching were exceedingly rare, in 
most cases historians can only speculate as to the veracity of police officer’s claims. 
Occasionally there is some evidence supporting the officer’s claim of resistance, as in cases 
where there is a verifiable paper trail documenting a request for help from nearby counties or 
from the governor. More often than not, however, police officers claimed to have been 
                                                          
guard troops were brought in to restore order. I discuss federal troops’ conduct in the race riots of 1919, and the 
rhetoric of “restoring order” in Chapter 3.  
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overpowered by mobs without offering, or being asked for, any evidence to support this version 
of events (Figures 1 – 5).  
 
 
Figure 1: The appearance of masked men to remove a prisoner from custody is a trope that appears repeatedly in 
coverage of lynchings. Very rarely did journalists or other officials ask questions about how this custodial transfer 
was possible.  Source: “Negro Lynched in Texas,” The Idaho Daily Statesman (Boise, ID), January 4, 1914.” 
 
 
Figure 2: Another vague description of a mob “overpower[ing]” a jailer. Source: “Negro Lynched in Oklahoma,” 
The Aberdeen Daily News, January 27, 1914. 
 50 
 
 
Figure 3: "The mob, which was masked, overpowered the jailer." Although the lynching occurred only a block away 
and the sheriff was on the scene quickly, no investigation or arrests resulted. Source: “Lynch Negro Woman who 
Killed White Man.” The Olympia Daily Recorder, March 31, 1914. 
 
 
Figure 4: These articles further convey the helplessness of the officers by frequent use of the passive voice. Source: 
“Georgians Lynch Black.” New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 7, 1914. 
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Figure 5: "Masked men overpowered the county jailer." A typical example, no further explanation is offered. 
Source: “Negro is Lynched,” The Kalamazoo Gazette, June 5, 1915. 
 
In a few cases where investigations did occur, these types of stories were quickly 
undermined by inconsistencies, gaps, and contradictions. The previously mentioned case of the 
lynching of Ed and Will Smith in Elmore, Alabama, serves as one example. Wetumpka County’s 
Sheriff Jackson initially claimed to have been bound to a chair and physically restrained, while a 
group of fifteen to twenty masked men forced the jail trustee to unlock the two prisoners’ cells.80 
This version of the story was reported in a number of newspapers on January 4th, the morning 
after the lynching occurred.81 Alabama Governor Emmet O’Neal, however, was a critic of lynch 
law, and ordered an investigation into the incident. Five days later, after the investigation had 
been concluded, the Savannah Tribune reported a somewhat different set of details than those 
that were given initially. Now the sheriff described the mob as being comprised of only five 
masked men, though he still insisted they were armed, and that they overpowered him and bound 
                                                          
80 “An Alabama Lynching,” The Emporia Gazette (Emporia, KS), Jan. 4, 1915. In some news articles, the sheriff is 
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81 “Alleged Negro Slayers Are Lynched by a Mob,” The Evening News (San Jose, CA), January 4, 1915; “Two Negroes 
Lynched by Mob in Alabama,” Fort Worth Star Telegram, January 4, 1915; “Mob Takes Negroes,” Idaho Daily 
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him to a chair. There was no mention, however, of a jail trustee unlocking the jail for the 
members of the mob. Instead, the sheriff’s wife was reported to have told investigators that “she 
bolted the jail door before retiring, but that later the sheriff unbolted it and went out.” The 
investigation failed to determine, however, whether or not the sheriff ever re-bolted the door 
prior to the arrival of the lynch mob.82 
The sheriff’s story was first reported as a sympathetic and believable tale of being 
overpowered by at least 15 armed men, tied up, and forced to stand by while another employee 
was coerced into unlocking the jail. Under investigation, however, this story changed to one in 
which the sheriff intentionally unlocked the jail and left the premises for unknown reasons in the 
middle of the night. Five men came to the jail – not fifteen – and when they arrived they found 
the doors already unlocked. The sheriff still maintained that the men tied him to a chair before 
removing the Smith brothers from their cell, but this detail is less believable in light of these 
allegations. The overall story is less sympathetic, as the sheriff appears at best to be someone 
who would accidentally leave the jail unlocked in the middle of the night, or at worst in active 
collusion with the men who carried out the lynching.  
A similar incident occurred on December 20th of 1918, when Maggie and Alma House 
(sisters, 20 and 14 years old respectively), and Major and Andrew Clark (brothers, 20 and 18 
years old respectively) were taken from the county jail at Shubuta, Mississippi, and lynched on a 
bridge over the Chickasawka river, a few miles from town.83  They were accused of conspiring to 
murder Dr. H.L. Johnston, who owned the land where they were all employed as laborers. Initial 
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reports of the incident included statements from Deputy Sheriff William Crane, the officer on 
duty when the lynching occurred, who explained his failure to protect his prisoners with the 
familiar story of having been overpowered by masked men, made to surrender his keys, and 
forcibly restrained while members of the lynch mob removed the Clark brothers and House 
sisters from their respective cells and brought them outside to waiting automobiles.84  
The NAACP employed a private detective named Robert Church, a white man from 
Memphis, Tennessee, to travel to Shubuta and investigate this quadruple lynching. As in the case 
of the lynching of Ed and Will Smith, the findings of the investigation reveal troubling 
inconsistencies with the version of events published in contemporary news clippings. Local 
papers had reported that the alleged murder victim was a wealthy, retired dentist; Detective 
Church found that the actual victim was the dentist’s son (of the same name), and that he had 
been engaging in a non-consensual sexual affair with both of the House sisters. Furthermore, the 
younger Alma House was rumored to be pregnant with the young Dr. Johnston’s child. 
According to Church’s report, the affair was discovered by the Clark brothers when they arrived 
to live on the farm for what was supposed to be a brief stint of labor to pay off a debt incurred by 
their father after he purchased a mule from the older Dr. Johnston. Major Clark and Maggie 
House, who were both the same age, became enamored of each other; however, their relationship 
was threatened by the possessive claims of the younger Dr. Johnston, who threatened to kill 
Major if he did not end the relationship.  
On December 10th, Dr. Johnston was shot and killed; in the words of Detective Church, 
his killing is “surrounded in mystery,” and “as all of the principals are dead, it will never be 
known how Dr. Johnston met his death.” In an early draft of his article for the Crisis on the 
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Shubuta lynching, W.E.B. Du Bois asserted that the conflict between the younger Dr. Johnston 
and Major Clark was well known in the surrounding community, and that a local white man may 
have committed the murder knowing it would be blamed on the Clark brothers.85 However, he 
also allows for the possibility that Major Clark, with or without help from his brother and the 
House sisters, may have killed the dentist. This possibility is couched in terms of Southern 
values and masculine honor, when Du Bois points out that “If the negroes did kill Dr. Johnston, 
yet they were only following the example set by ‘the superior race’ in the South, who avenged 
violation of womanhood by violent means.”86 
Certainly, the fact that this lynching involved two female victims, and that two of the 
victims were teenagers, was a major impetus for the NAACP’s decision to investigate the 
lynching in the first place. There was enhanced rhetorical value in publicizing this lynching 
because of how the facts of the case overturned core tenets of the gendered and racialized 
assumptions that were usually offered in defense of lynching. Maggie and Alma House’s 
respectability and honor had been threatened by Dr. Johnston’s repeated assaults. Major Clark – 
if he was even guilty of the murder at all – was only abiding the same norms of masculinity that 
white men regularly invoked as carte blanche justification for violence against black men. That 
the four were lynched anyway did much to support the NAACP’s assertion that lynching was 
not, in fact, a justified response of self-defense by white men on behalf of white womanhood. 
The Clarks and Houses were not lynched to protect white womanhood, they were lynched to 
protect white manhood, specifically the right to sexually and economically exploit agricultural 
workers in the larger context of a plantation economy.  
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 55 
 
Detective Church’s investigation overturned another trope as well: that of the 
overpowered jailer obligated to stand by and helpless to interfere as a mob removes his prisoner. 
As previously discussed, the generic conventions of lynching coverage usually worked to 
reinforce this trope through the repetition of certain phrases like “forced” and “overpowered.” 
These phrases functioned to discursively partition mob rule from the rule of law by constructing 
arrest and incarceration as a legitimate and orderly state function that was interrupted and 
usurped by the actions of an hysterical mass of people. The partition between mob and officer 
was underscored by the relative brevity and lack of details included in many news articles. As in 
Figures 1 – 5, the news coverage tended to begin in medias res, giving the impression that the 
lynching happened spontaneously, with masked men simply appearing at a jail to remove a 
prisoner as if out of thin air. These articles feature decontextualized action, lending an aura of 
chaos to the lynching event.  
In some cases this may have been accurate, but in the Clark-House case the lynching 
seems to have been a well-planned, choreographed affair. Plans were made in advance, 
transportation was organized for potential spectators, and logistical arrangements were made 
regarding transportation of the prisoners and the site of the execution. Detective Church’s 
investigation revealed that the arrestees were first moved to two different county jails each 
several miles from Shubuta. In the jail in Meridian, police tortured Andrew Clark until they 
extracted a confession that he helped his brother murder Dr. Johnston. Several days later, all four 
prisoners were returned to Shubuta for a preliminary trial; by this time, the lynching was already 
the subject of open discussion around town. During the day “automobiles began pouring into the 
little town, as well as other vehicles and individuals on foot.” If not previously aware that a 
lynching was to occur, by this point it seems unlikely that local law enforcement could have 
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failed to notice such an uptick in pedestrian and vehicular traffic. Indeed, Church’s report 
indicates that the Chief of Police from the jail in Meridian, where Andrew Clark had been 
tortured before being returned to Shubuta, was among those who arrived by auto late in the 
afternoon of December 20th. 
A mob of this size would certainly be sufficient to overpower one person, even if that 
person was armed. But in this case, it does not seem that any effort was needed to convince 
Deputy Sheriff Crane to surrender his prisoners. Church reported,  
Although [Deputy Sheriff Crane] states that he was overpowered and forced to surrender 
the keys to the jail, the evidence shows that he went into the street in front of the jail at 
the request of the mob, allowed them to handcuff him, take his keys from him, and go 
into the jail and take the four prisoners without any trouble whatever. […] There is no 
evidence to show that he made any attempt whatever to protect the prisoners in his charge 
or to prevent the mob from taking them from the jail. 
  
This section of the report concludes with the curious detail that, “At the same time that the mob 
was approaching the jail, another group went in the power house nearby and shut off all light 
from the town, plunging it in darkness.” Presumably, this was done to lend credence later on to 
the inability of witnesses to identify any particular individual as the lynch mob’s leader.  
In both of these cases – the lynching of the Smith brothers, and that of the Clark brothers 
and House sisters – we have instances of a sheriff or deputy sheriff failing to maintain custody of 
prisoners, in each case claiming they were prevented from doing their duty by the strength of an 
overwhelming mob. Under investigation, the Smith case turned out to involve a much smaller 
mob than originally claimed by the sheriff, and the very real possibility that the sheriff colluded 
with the mob by intentionally leaving the jail unlocked for them. In the Clark-House lynching, 
the mob turned out to have been pre-organized and accompanied by other law enforcement 
officers. Each case also features the somewhat choreographed binding or handcuffing of the 
jailer to a chair in front of the jailhouse, or at least a carefully fabricated story of such, despite 
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the lack of any real resistance on the part of the officers. Did the mobs in each case tie Sheriff 
Jackson and Deputy Sheriff Crane to their chairs in order to prevent them from interfering with 
the lynchings? This is possible, but it seems unlikely given other details of the cases. In the 
Smith lynching, the Sheriff is implicated as being the one who unlocked the jail in the first place; 
in the Clark-House lynching, the Deputy Sheriff at the least was aware of the lynching for many 
hours and did nothing to prepare for it, and at worst was acting in concert with officers in charge 
of the other jails where the suspects had been held during the days prior to their transfer to the 
jail at Shubuta.  
 Similar questions surround the choice of the mob in the first case to don masks, and in 
the second case to cut the lights to the town so that it would be “plunged into darkness.” Though 
the police officers in each case would have us believe this was done to conceal the mob 
member’s identities, it’s not clear in either case why the mob would need to conceal themselves. 
They had the sympathy if not the outright cooperation of local law enforcement. Masks and 
darkness only served as partial concealment in any case; neither mob took care to conceal other 
forms of evidence that could have led to their identification (in particular, their vehicles). 
Assuming for the moment that each sheriff in question was in active collusion with the lynch 
mob, why would they have to be tied or handcuffed, and why would the mob feel compelled to 
performatively conceal their already-known identities?  
Methods of cultural analysis can be a useful starting point for resolving some of these 
contradictions. It is not enough to simply say that the perpetrators of lynching lied in order to 
serve certain obvious and practical needs, such as the need to avoid prosecution. If it were only a 
matter of serving practical needs, any story would do, and over the course of hundreds of 
incidents we would likely encounter hundreds of different stories explaining (or explaining 
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away, as it were), the troubling details of each case. But in incidents of lynching a particular 
story tends to be told again and again with little regard for the actual details of the individual 
cases – and this particular story seems to have worked most of the time. The story of being 
overpowered, helpless to stop the mob and ignorant of their identities, was repeated whether or 
not it effectively accounted for other known details of particular incidents of lynching.   
I would argue that these stories were told for some other purpose, fabricated not merely 
to meet individual needs, but also in response to broader social and political imperatives 
connected with the process of invoking and revoking states of exception in the context of 
representative democracy.87 The trope of the prisoner dragged from jail and the sheriff 
overpowered by a mob played an important symbolic role in the establishment of a state of 
exception – an officially legitimated space in which some form of otherwise illegitimate violence 
was permitted to occur.  
The restraint of the sheriffs – either the reality of doing it, or the fabricated claim that it 
occurred – created a symbolic narrative about the law itself, and the relationship of both the 
sheriffs and the lynchers to it. Apologists for lynching claimed that formal law was not powerful 
enough, certain enough, or swift enough to punish alleged rapists and murderers, particularly if 
they were black.88 This assertion is undermined by the fact that so many lynching victims (75% 
of the cases I have so far located) were removed from police custody. Formal law was powerful, 
certain, and swift enough to arrest these alleged law-breakers within hours or days of their 
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supposed crime. Any serious study of the fate of black defendants in southern courts at the time 
would further confirm the power, certitude, speed, and severity of formal law when it came to 
the conviction and punishment of alleged black lawbreakers. Yet, by restraining and binding the 
sheriff in charge of the jail – perhaps at his own behest – the lynch mob and the police officer 
engaged in an elaborate staging of the powerlessness of the law, discursively creating a power 
vacuum that did not really exist, and then eagerly rushing to fill it.  
In the case of the Smith lynching, the script also featured the masking of the mob, despite 
the very real possibility that its members were known to Sheriff Jackson and that he may have 
colluded with them to make sure the jail would be unlocked when they arrived. In the case of the 
Clark-House lynching, there is a similar element in reports of the mob’s dramatic step of cutting 
power to the entire town, “plunging it into darkness,” despite the fact that during a lengthy period 
of daylight the mob had already begun assembling in full view of the deputy sheriff, and that it 
included at least one fellow police officer. This element of the event can be interpreted as part of 
how the state of exception was staged to permit a state-sanctioned regime of lynching without 
directly implicating any officers of law. The concealment functioned on a symbolic register to 
sever lynching from the normal bounds of space and time, marking it as an event that could not 
be seen and therefore could not be remembered or accounted for later.  
This concealment allowed individual law enforcement officers to claim with a thin veneer 
of credibility that they did not know who removed and lynched their prisoners. More 
importantly, however, it bespoke a larger cultural and political need to inculcate the legal system 
from association with or responsibility for such miscarriages of justice. Since witness and 
testimony are crucial aspects of the jury trial system, the masking of the mob, and the plunging 
into darkness of the scene of the lynching, symbolically communicated the powerlessness of the 
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legal system to locate the lynchers or hold them accountable, even after normal conditions were 
restored. Of course, this script obscures the likelihood that representatives of the legal system 
colluded with the mob before, during, and after the lynchings, that the members and leaders of 
the mob were known to police, and that numerous witnesses to these premeditated acts of 
violence certainly must have existed. In spite of this, the script maintained that lynchings 
occurred in an unseeable space, carried out by unknowable forces, while law was temporarily 
bound off to the side.  
This narrative helped to resolve the legal contradictions posed by lynching, allowing 
lynching to occur under the auspices of legal authority. This form of exceptional violence could 
occur without compromising nationalist claims regarding the exceptional character of American 
democracy, contributing to a ‘state of exceptionalism’ that simultaneously relied on and denied 
the resort to violence outside of formal systems of law. The sheriff’s next-day testimony to 
inquiring outsiders served not only to protect himself against liability, but also to protect the 
relationship between violence and law from scrutiny or reform. Having been temporarily 
suspended, the power of the law was quickly restored, with a slightly damaged but recoverable 
reputation. With the mob now dispersed, the normal order of things could and would return, 
usually accompanied by vigorous protestations by the powers that be against the “lawless” mob 
that had dared to usurp the regular functions of the state. Such protestations, whether or not they 
may have been genuine, rarely yielded concrete forms of accountability for either private 
individuals or police officers who conspired in the lynching of American citizens.  
Sheriffs and police officers permitted their real or discursive immobilization so that some 
other application of law could occur. But at no point was the sheriffs’ power, or the power of the 
law, actually usurped, as the language of force and overpower would have us believe. The 
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sheriffs maintained authority by assuming the power to set the terms of the exception. 
Simultaneously, the sheriffs’ impunity was also maintained, because the invocation of the 
exception as a practical matter meant no police officer would directly carry out the violence in 
their official capacity as a representative of state power. That most lynchings could not possibly 
have occurred without the explicit or implicit blessing of those holding positions of power was 
rendered invisible by the trope of literally or figuratively binding the sheriff to a chair. The 
binding was not necessary as a matter of practicality because in most cases there is little evidence 
that police put up any resistance against would-be lynchers in the first place. Instead, the binding 
served as part of a script that allowed the letter of the law to be broken, even as the power of the 
law to govern was exponentially amplified. Lynchings occurred as a manifestation of the 
strength of the legal system when it was permitted to operate within a state of exception. The 
successful invocation of a state of exception unleashed the power of the state, transforming the 
power to arrest and detain into the far greater power of granting life or death.  
 
Investigate, Indict, Prosecute, Convict 
The real and symbolic legal authority that gave cover to the act of lynching offered 
protection in the aftermath as well. Until well into the twentieth century, lynching was 
considered outside the bounds of legitimate federal action, and even state governments were 
wary of (and prohibited from) intervening in local matters of crime, unless asked for assistance 
by a mayor or sheriff, or propelled to action by pressure or scandal. Considering the extent of 
official involvement in lynching at the local level, it is unsurprising that investigations were 
rarely initiated by county officials unless a significant split occurred between major power 
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brokers in an area where a lynching occurred.89 Nonetheless, domestic political in-fighting, 
international pressures, and requests for financial reparations from families of victims sometimes 
led to official investigations, indictments, and prosecutions.   
Dating back to at least the 1850s, and continuing into the post-Reconstruction lynching 
era, the United States was petitioned by other governments to investigate the lynching of foreign 
nationals in U.S. states and territories on many occasions. During this period, the U.S. paid 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in indemnity settlements to the governments of Albania, China, 
Greece, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and Sweden among others.90 Long before public opinion shifted 
against lynching, almost every president from Benjamin Harrison to Woodrow Wilson issued 
denunciations of the practice, usually after some local incident caused a scandal of national or 
international proportions.91 Significantly, however, the State Department usually claimed that 
these settlments were voluntary – a matter of respectful politics, not legal obligation.92 This 
desire to deny liability sometimes incensed foreign governments, particularly those who had 
been at the receiving end of vigorous harassment by U.S. embassies for far lesser crimes 
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committed against Americans traveling abroad.93 As the U.S. became an increasingly powerful 
military and economic force at the global level, its apparent inability to wield power within its 
own borders became a cause for embarrasment and concern for state and national leaders, who 
were removed from the local tensions and politics that often precipitated incidents of lynching.  
There was also pressure from within. Starting in the early 20th century, with the 
emergence of muckraking journalism and the formation of organizations like the NAACP, 
private parties began conducting their own investigations, especially of the lynching of African 
Americans who comprised the majority of victims by the 1890s.94 With the help of journalists, 
private investigators, field officers, and sympathetic locals, early civil rights organizations 
carefully inquired into each incident of lynching that was reported in the press, and in a number 
of cases they forwarded the results of their investigations to responsible state and local actors. 
Although elected officials and impaneled juries did not always choose to act on the information 
gathered by these independent investigations, their dissemination in publications like The Crisis 
and The Chicago Defender did much to inflame anti-lynching sentiment. This kind of publicity 
made it more difficult for law enforcement officials to lose their prisoners without attracting the 
criticism and disbelief of outsiders. Moreover, vivid and sensationalized descriptions of 
lynchings – often accompanied by photographs – gave moral strength to a growing national anti-
lynching movement, which pressed for state and federal measures to bring an end to the 
practice.95  
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In the long-term, investigations of lynching certainly contributed to the demise of the 
practice. In the short-term, investigations were rarely successful, and tell us more about the limits 
of law than they tell us about its power. If the most prominent pattern in the act of lynching 
involved the removal of a prisoner from the custody of police, then the most prominent pattern in 
the aftermath of lynching involved the massive failure of systems for investigating and 
prosecuting violence. Processes designed to ensure a fair and speedy trial for private citizens 
accused of crime utterly failed when set to the task of prosecuting violence perpetrated by 
lawfully constituted authorities. In fact, investigations and trials of lynchers did not just fail, they 
often failed spectacularly. Official investigators rarely secured reliable witnesses, which were 
necessary for successul prosecution. As is clear in the cases previously described, the lack of 
witnesses was sometimes given a thin cover by the lynchers’ wearing of masks, or their 
disruption of electric lighting systems. But in many other cases, even unmasked lynchers failed 
to elicit the recognition of their friends, neighbors, and elected officeholders who were 
subpoenaed as witnesses. When investigations did yield cooperative witnesses, and officeholders 
willing to pursue prosecution, juries often failed to return indictments. When the rare indictment 
was secured, convictions did not usually follow, as formerly cooperative witnesses disappeared 
(along with police and coroner records), judges issued hostile instructions, and juries refused to 
return guilty verdicts.  
A few examples illuminate the typical problems that plagued investigations of lynching. 
After a double lynching in Madison County, FL, in 1882, although there was clear evidence of 
police misconduct, and two eyewitnesses furnished the names of five men who led the lynching, 
the coroner’s jury returned the usual verdict that James Savage and Dennis Eagan had met their 
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deaths “at the hands of unknown parties.”96 In Decatur, IL, in 1893, despite the combined 
investigative efforts of the Governor, the State’s Attorney, and the county sheriff, and despite a 
judge’s strongly worded jury instructions encouraging the return of indictments, coroner’s juries 
twice refused to do so against any of the fifteen to forty men (including police officers) who 
were considered as probable participants in the lynching.97   
In 1916, tensions mounted with the Italian embassy after Albert Piazza and Joe Speranza 
were lynched in Illinois in October of 1914 and June of 1915, respectively. In the case of Piazza, 
he was in the custody of the acting mayor of Haynesville and three sheriff’s deputies at the time 
of the lynching, who gave the usual story of being overpowered by a mob of unknown men. A 
number of details did not add up – or added up too precisely. The mayor transported the prisoner 
by car instead of taking a train that would have left earlier and gotten to the destination faster. 
The mob materialized at the precise point in their journey in which they happened to be passing 
through the corner of a different county, which complicated issues of investigation and 
jurisdiction. Although none of the men wore masks, and many hailed from the small village over 
which the mayor presided, the mayor and his deputies implausibly claimed they did not 
recognize a single person in the crowd of men who abducted their prisoner.98  
They mayor and his deputies may not have realized their conspiracy would touch off 
international tensions, but it did, and soon a liasion of the Italian consulate and an Illinois State’s 
Attorney arrived in Randolph and Perry counties and spent more than a month investigating the 
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incident. After weeks of working against a wall of silence in the town, one man who participated 
in the lynching, Thomas Kilgrove, broke down and told the investigators what had happened. His 
statements to investigators were sufficient for the indictment and arrest of the mayor and all three 
sheriff’s deputies, with the strong implication that further arrests would soon follow.  
When it came time for the trial, however, Kilgrove could not be located. The liasion of 
the Italian consul, Charles Watson, was deputized, found Kilgrove in a nearby county, and 
brought him to court the next morning. At the first court’s recess, Kilgrove was surrounded by 
friends of the defendants, who attempted to throw him out of the courtroom. When the state’s 
attorney protested to the judge, he was informed that since the court was in recess, it had no 
power to intervene. Kilgrove managed to remain in the courtroom but he did not testify that day, 
and the next day he was gone again; this time Watson was unable to locate him. The state 
proceeded to make their case on circumstantial evidence, but at the end of the day’s proceedings, 
declared themselves unable to move forward with the prosecution of the mayor. With the 
mayor’s charges dropped, the attorney for the sheriff’s deputies was able to have the charges 
against his clients dismissed as well. A few months later Kilgrove returned to town. He was 
remanded before the same judge who had earlier failed to protect him from harassment when he 
attempted to testify. Charged with failure to appear before the court when summoned, the judge 
found Kilgrove guilty of contempt and sentenced him to 90 days in jail. Thus Kilgrove, the 
would-be witness for the prosecution, was ultimately the only person to be sentenced in 
connection with Piazza’s lynching. 
When a crowd killed Jay Lynch outside the courthouse where he was convicted of 
murder in Lamar, Missouri, in May of 1918, there were some indicators that legal accountability 
might be possible. The Governor of Missouri expressed his disapprobation and assisted county 
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Prosecutor H.W. Timmonds with an investigation of the incident. A journalist from the nearby 
Kansas-City Star reported that “nearly everybody in this town of twenty five hundred persons 
knows who was in the mob. The men wore no masks, and in the fight made in the circuit court 
room…Sheriff Sewell called many of the participants by their given names.” But during follow-
up conversations the next day, the journalist was already beginning to witness the collective 
decision to forget, the early stages of the formation of an open secret: “When telling of the affair 
today [however] persons inadvertently mentioned the names of participants, then qualified their 
statements by saying that perhaps it was a case of mistaken identity. ‘Really I couldn’t remember 
a single man in the mob,’ a resident said today, ‘although I saw the whole affair.’”99 Sheriff 
Sewell reported that he would not reveal the names of those who took the prisoner from him, 
even if he was subpoenaed, but he was never forced to make good on this as the Governor’s 
investigation quickly stalled due to lack of information.100  
A similar pattern of thwarted action and lack of follow-through characterized many cases 
that were initially met with expressions of outrage and condemnation,101 but even vigorous 
attempts at prosecution rarely succeeded. A few months after the lynching of Jay Lynch in 
Missouri, in November of 1918, Will Byrd and George Whiteside were removed from the jail in 
Tuscumbria, Colbert County, Alabama and killed outside the courthouse. With the wartime rise 
in lynchings, race riots, and other forms of mob violence, state and local officials were eager to 
take action. Governor Charles Henderson and the Alabama Attorney General immediately set out 
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to collect evidence for presentation to a grand jury. The first attempt to bring evidence to the 
grand jury failed, but the second attempt yielded 24 indictments, including against one of the 
officers on duty at the time the prisoners were removed from custody. The case was assigned to a 
judge from a different county to ensure greater objectivity.102  
Frank Dillard, a restauranteur, and Jeff Jenkins, an auto mechanic, were the first to stand 
trial. But witnesses whose testimony had been sufficient for indictment did not hold up as well 
with the passage of time. The first witness for the prosecution was the Chief of Police, who was 
present in the jail when the lynchers came for their victim, but who may also have been working 
in concert with them. An observer reporting to the NAACP noted that the chief was rumored to 
have told the jail trustee, “Don’t put that…Byrd in a cell as they are coming after him in a few 
minutes.”103 Despite his proximity to and possible foreknowledge of the event, the police chief 
claimed not to know anything about the lynching or the lynchers. The next witness, a black 
teenager by the name of Sam Rivers, provoked laughter from the jury when he admitted that the 
detectives who procured his testimony offered him money to secure his cooperation. Saul 
Stubbs, a black prisoner lodged at the jail when Byrd and Whiteside were removed, definitively 
identified Frank Dillard as a leader of the lynch mob, and proved to be the best witness the state 
was able to put up. Aspects of his testimony were corroborated by two other witnesses, one white 
and one black. 
In a curious pattern, all the witnesses for the defense claimed they were close enough to 
the mob to say with certainty that Frank Dillard and Jeff Jenkins were not part of it, but not so 
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close that they could clearly make out who was. John Sharp, resident of Colbert County and 
friend of Dillard’s for over twenty years, reported that he saw Dillard “standing about twenty feet 
from the jail,” that he “stood alone, away from the mob,” and that “although the men in the mob 
were nearly as close to him as was Dillard, he could not recognize any of them.” Conveniently, 
the only other person Sharp could recognize was co-defendant Jeff Jenkins, who Sharp claimed 
was also “standing apart” from the mob. Other witnesses testified they had seen Dillard eating at 
his restaurant at the time of the lynching, and that Jeff Jenkins had been near the mob but not a 
member of it.  The testimony of one white man and three African Americans (one a boy, one a 
fellow prisoner), were not enough to overcome the witnesses called by the defense. Dillard and 
Jenkins were found not guilty by the jury, which prompted the judge hearing the case to dismiss 
the charges against the remaining defendants, including the police officers who had allowed the 
prisoners to be taken.  
Even near the close of the lynching era, when the annual rate of incidents was at an all 
time low, and each newly publicized outbreak of violence prompted a familiar cycle of national 
outrage, regional defensiveness, and local shame, convictions remained difficult to procure. In 
Virginia in 1926, the killing of Raymond Bird (removed from police custody) attracted the 
immediate outrage of the Governor, and the judge presiding over the grand jury said the incident 
had brought shame on the state, whose dignity could be recovered only through a reassertion of 
law and order. Nonetheless, the grand jury failed to bring any indictments. The investigation was 
suspended for five months, during which time Floyd Willard went on a hunting trip with some 
friends and bragged about taking part in the lynching. The grand jury reconvened and indicted 
Willard, but a number of witnesses attested that he had an alibi. Willard put aside his pride and 
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ascribed the bragging to drunkneness and misplaced regret for having missed the event. After a 
10-minute deliberabtion, the jury found him not-guilty of all charges.104  
The same year, in LaBelle, Florida, Henry Patterson was killed by a posse that included a 
number of town officials and sheriff’s deputies. The only prominent official in the town to 
oppose the lynching was the county judge, Herbert Rider, who expended considerable social and 
political capital seeing to it that the lynching was investigated and alleged participants put on 
trial for murder and rioting. The investigation featured problems that sound extraordinary, but as 
we have seen in lynching trials, were actually quite common: witnesses failed to appear, the jury 
was openly hostile, the coroner’s inquest vanished, and the sheriff was (implausibly) able to 
recall only a handful of names out of the dozens of accused lynchers who included his neighbors 
and people he regularly worked with in an official capacity. The State’s Attorney resigned (citing 
the case as the reason) and the new State’s attorney was not motivated to continue the 
prosecution. Citing a lack of witnesses or concrete evidence, the grand jury failed to indict 
anyone for the lynching. They did recommend removal of the sheriff for his negligence in 
preventing or investigating the lynching, but in an unfortunate example of circular reasoning, 
Florida’s Governor Martin refused to follow the jury’s recommendation because, he explained, if 
even a grand jury investigation could not turn up the identities of the lynchers, certainly the 
sheriff could not be held responsible.105 Instead of leading to his condemnation, the sheriff’s 
obstruction of the grand jury had the effect of inculcating him from responsibility.  
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Prosecutions of accused lynchers did not always fail, but it was easier to get convictions 
for minor charges than it was for the gravest crime of lynching, which was usually murder.106 
The most serious punishments dealt out to lynchers involved cases where the alleged perpetrators 
were perceived as social outcasts (drawn, in other words, from the smaller and non-
representative fraction of cases that did not involve police officers or prominent citizens), or in 
cases where the victims were not black. In 1889 in Wisconsin, in a rare case involving a female 
lyncher, Norwegian immigrant Bertha Olson enlisted the help of male relatives and neighbors in 
the lynching of her husband, an abusive alcoholic whose threats and assaults Olson had suffered 
for years.107 In theory he was just the type of unrepentant criminal, unassimilated immigrant, and 
threat to women’s safety, who might have fit some people’s ideas of a deserving target for lynch 
law. But in practice, the incident was perceived by the Olson’s anglo-American neighbors as a 
sign of dangerous disorder amongst the enclaves of recent immigrants, and allowing a woman to 
murder her husband with impunity was not something the community would stand for. In the 
words of historian Jane Pederson, “as the dialogue about the case developed, no virtue associated 
with womanhood could be claimed for Bertha”; she and her son, and two of their neighbors, 
were prosecuted and sentenced to life in prison.108 The only other case I have found so far in 
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which the conviction of a lyncher resulted in such a severe sentence (life imprisonment) was in 
Geneva County, Alabama, in December of 1920; the victim, Alto Windham, was white.109   
Even some of the most highly celebrated efforts to hold officials liable for complicity in 
lynching reveal the difficulty of achieving meaningful accountability. In March of 1906, Ed 
Johnson of Chattanooga, Tennessee, was convicted of murder and sentenced to hang. Against 
great odds, lawyers on his behalf filed a series of successful appeals, until the case eventually 
came before the Supreme Court, where Johnson’s conviction was called into question and a new 
trial ordered. Sheriff Joseph Shipp, in sympathy with outraged white residents of Chattanooga, 
allowed a large crowd of lynchers to remove Johnson from jail, and did nothing to prepare for or 
defend against the mob despite having ample warning that crowds were forming for that purpose. 
As the numbers show, Shipp had good reason to think he could get away with this – 99% of 
lynchings ended without any investigation or prosecution, and perhaps as many as three-quarters 
of these incidents involved officers of the law. Yet, the case of Johnson was unique compared to 
the vast majority of lynch victims who were taken from officers before a trial ever took place, 
rather than after one had already been completed, let alone appealed to the Supreme Court. Since 
the Supreme Court had already issued a writ of habeas corpus in the Johnson case, the usual 
objections regarding state’s sovereignty in criminal matters could be side-stepped, and Sheriff 
Shipp and five other men were brought up on charges in connection with the lynching, 
convicted, and sentenced to serve time in the federal penitentiary.110 
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The case of United States vs. Shipp is lauded as an early civil rights victory that sent a 
strong message to law enforcement officers regarding their responsibility to uphold due process 
and the rights of the accused. Yet it is important to note that Shipp and the other lynchers were 
not actually convicted of lynching (nor of murder, assault, kidnapping, manslaughter, or any of 
the other serious felonies that might be a likely charge in the aftermath of a lynching). They were 
convicted only of contempt of court; three served sentences of ninety days in jail, while the other 
two served only sixty days. All were released early, their sentences reduced for good behavior. 
The case did help set an important precedent for federal judicial review over allegations of denial 
of due process; but it did not set a precedent for the rigorous prosecution or punishment of 
participants in lynching.    
 
Anti-Lynching Legislation and the Logic of the Exception 
Although the public rhetoric of anti-lynching activists positioned lynching firmly outside 
of the law, using terms such as barbaric, uncivilized, lawless, mob rule, and un-American to 
describe the practice, their internal conversations and the strategies they pursued for ending 
lynching reveal that they understood it to be deeply embedded in the routine operations of the 
criminal justice system. The NAACP drafted template anti-lynching legislation for adaptation at 
both the federal and state level. Representatives of these and other organizations disagreed on 
how to formulate criteria that would distinguish lynching from officially sanctioned capital 
punishment on the one hand, and plain old murder on the other. They debated topics like how 
large must a group be to qualify as a ‘mob,’ whether or not the term applied only in fatal cases, 
and how to characterize a lynch mob’s intentions and motivations.111 These debates yielded 
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multiple competing definitions of lynching, which were further multiplied in the texts of 
proposed anti-lynching laws that were adjusted to comply with various state’s constitutional and 
juridical particularities. Yet, across the many definitions to be found in organizational 
documents, dictionaries, and legislative texts, common threads are discernible. The way these 
statutes define lynching, the consequences they outline, and the means of enforcing the 
measures, all indicate that activists in the NAACP and other progressive circles saw lynching as 
a method of law enforcement. A close reading of some of these texts supports my contention that 
a positivist description of lynching as “illegal” is a misnomer. These laws do not merely identify 
illegal behavior and codify its illegality; rather, they confront the ways in which lynching had 
been embedded in law and attempt to disarticulate lynching and law from each other – a task that 
would prove difficult if not impossible until after World War One.    
In effect, one can read the texts of anti-lynching legislation as counter-discourses to the 
dominant scripts offered by sheriffs who routinely claimed to have been overwhelmed by 
masked mobs in the process of shepherding a prisoner toward safekeeping or guarding him 
whilst in custody. Where the dominant scripts maintained the primacy and legitimacy of the legal 
system by discursively severing the rule of the mob from the rule of the law, the text of the 
NAACP’s template state-level anti-lynch law rejected this binary by defining the term “mob” as  
[A] collection of […] persons assembled for the unlawful purpose of offering violence to 
the person or property of another person suspected of having violated the law, or for the 
purpose or under the pretense of exercising correctional or regulative powers over 
another person by violence, and without lawful authority.112 
 
By characterizing the mob’s intent as “exercising correctional or regulative powers over another 
person by violence,” the NAACP spoke directly against the logic of exception that claimed crime 
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justified the setting aside of legal norms. At the same time, the clause “without lawful authority” 
signalled the NAACP’s acquiescence to law-and-order forces who insisted on the legitimacy of 
police use of force, incarceration, capital punishment, and other officially sanctioned exercises of 
violent governance.  
The template legislation also tackled the problem of legal impunity for lynching, by 
directly addressing the problems of custodial transfer and refusal to witness. The draft law 
asserts that, “if anyone shall be taken from the custody of a sheriff or his deputy, whether 
confined in jail or not, and shall be lynched, it shall be prima facie evidence of a failure on the 
part of the sheriff to do his duty.”113 The final section of the template holds that  
[I]t shall be the duty of every citizen, upon learning that anyone is advising the formation 
of a mob, or that a mob has formed, or that a lynching is contemplated, or is under way, 
to immediately notify the sheriff, and it shall then be the duty of the sheriff, in addition to 
other duties imposed by law, to inform the Governor by the quickest means possible, and 
it shall then be the duty of the Governor to immediately use every means at his command 
to prevent the formation of the mob, or to disperse it if already formed, and to prevent the 
mob from lynching or committing any other unlawful act.114 
 
These sections are alternative scripts of power that refuse the power of police officers to decide 
on an exception, and reject the flimsy trope of the helpless, overwhelmed officer. They also 
reject the symbolic “masking” of the perpetrators of violence; they declare interference with 
lynch law to be a duty of all citizens. They demand that witnesses and bystanders actively see, 
remember, and testify against lynching, in defiance of the dominant social scripts that cast 
lynching into impenetrable darkness and insisted on the indiscernibility of its perpetrators.  
Significantly, these sections also establish a clear chain of command, from citizen to 
sheriff to Governor, with every level of power having clearly defined responsibilities vis a vis the 
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prevention of lynching. This leaves no room nor any plausible excuse for the dereliction of duty, 
regardless of whether that dereliction would be caused by popular excitement or official 
negligence. The bill aspires to prevent the law from disavowing responsibility for lynching by 
casting blame on “the mob,” so too does it aspire to prevent “the mob” from escaping the notice 
of the law. If “sovereign is he who determines the exception,” in the words of political theorist 
Carl Schmidt, then the NAACP’s ideal vision of an anti-lynching law repudiates this vision of 
sovereignty. Neither the mob nor the police would be permitted to declare an exception to the 
rule of law as formally written; such exceptions would be de facto illegitimate, and the mere fact 
of a lynching would constitute evidence that such an exception had been permitted. To 
underscore this point, the legislation outlined a variety of consequences that went far beyond 
penalizing individual lynch mob participants. The legislation also provided that sheriffs be 
removed from office, and that the taxpayers of the locale where a lynching occurred be held 
financially liable for punitive damages brought against the city or county by any surviving 
relative or other legal representative of a lynched person.  
In both the definition of terms and the provision of punishment, anti-lynching legislation 
sought to eliminate the exception by undermining the narratives that law enforcement officers 
had created to conceal their widespread collusion in lynching. Correspondence between private 
lawyers, NAACP legal advisors, and lawmakers underscores the intentionality and critical 
importance of this aspect of the legislation. In the fall of 1914 and winter of 1915, for example, 
the NAACP was working to secure sponsors for a proposed anti-lynch law in the state of 
Pennsylvania, part of the long-term response generated by the public burning of Zach Walker in 
Coastesville in 1911.115  May Nerney (NAACP Secretary) and Joel Springarn (Chair of the 
                                                          
115 Dennis B. Downey and Raymond M. Hyser, No Crooked Death: Coatesville, Pennsylvania, and the Lynching of 
Zachariah Walker, Blacks in the New World (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991). 
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NAACP Board of Directors) approached Samuel Scott, a member of the Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives, about introducing a law for the suppression of mob violence. Scott passed the 
proposed text to James McKirdy, the Assistant Director of the Legislative Reference Bureau in 
Harrisburg for review. McKirdy and Scott were both sympathetic to the idea of an anti-lynching 
law, but McKirdy flagged a number of practical concerns about the bill for discussion with the 
NAACP legal counsel, including the sections providing for the removal of sheriffs from office 
and spelling out the financial culpability of cities and counties where lynchings occurred.  
Regarding the removal of sheriffs from office, McKirdy described such a penalty as a 
form of “cruel and unusual punishment,” holding that 
In the case of action against the officer whose dereliction of duty permitted the lynching 
you require the man to prove an impossibility; that is to say, to prove affirmatively that 
he did all in his power to protect the person. The presumption is that he has done all that 
lies in his power and the burden should be upon the prosecutor or plaintiff to show that he 
was derelict and that through his dereliction the disturbance arose.  
 
[…] You state that the officer through whose dereliction of duty the lynching occurred 
shall thereafter be ineligible to any […] office of profit or trust in Pennsylvania. If this is 
not cruel and unusual punishment I do not know the meaning of the term. Through a 
temporary dereliction at a time of sympathy with the mob, or detestation of the crime 
committed, or using his heart instead of his head, should be punished through the rest of 
his life with a liability of a monetary damage [sic]. I think the mere statement of the 
proposition shows the unreasonableness of it.116 (emphasis added)  
 
This objection posed a problem for the legal counsel of the NAACP, who knew that any 
presumption of innocence for law enforcement officers would all but guarantee the continuation 
of lynching. Indeed, the cultural scripts that had grown up around lynching, which narrated the 
story of the helpless officer overpowered by a mob, depended on a presumption of innocence for 
the officer in question. The officer’s innocence went hand-in-hand with his helplessness, 
                                                          
116 James McKirdy, letter to Samuel Scott, October 15, 1914. Records of the NAACP, Film 19771, Part 7, Series A, 
Reel 1, Subject file lynching, general. University of Michigan. Scott appears to have passed McKirdy’s letter on with 
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concretized in his symbolic blinding and binding in the public narratives that frequently 
circulated after a lynching. 
Attorney Chapin Brinsmeade, responding on behalf of the NAACP, was generally 
amenable to the revisions suggested by McKirdy, particularly when it came to the adjustments 
required to align the proposed law with existing components of Pennsylvania’s criminal code. 
But he squarely rejected McKirdy’s suggestion that sheriffs should enjoy any presumption of 
innocence. “We do not agree with you at all as to the last part of Section 6,” he wrote in an 
unusually curt tone.  
We think the burden of proof should be on the sheriff. […] The punishment does not 
seem to me to be too severe. An officer of the law, charged with the suppression of mob 
violence, who “because of sympathy with the mob, or detestation of the crime committed, 
or using his heart instead of his head” allows one of the public, whom he is charged to 
protect, to be injured or killed, thereby shows himself unfit to hold any office under the 
commonwealth.117     
 
The NAACP thus rejected a version of sovereignty that would forgive police officers and sheriffs 
for consciously stepping aside and granting jurisdiction to Judge Lynch. Lynching, they insisted, 
was not merely a criminal act in and of itself. Lynching was also evidence of another criminal 
act – the criminal negligence of police officers. In the face of this evidence, the burden fell on 
police officers to prove that they had resisted the mob with every means available to them. The 
requirement that the Governor must be notified meant that police officers would have to leave an 
official trail of resistance; their word would not be taken for granted. The unwillingness of the 
NAACP to shed these provisions from proposed anti-lynching legislation indicates that they 
were aware of the frequency with which incidents of lynching could be traced back to the 
collusion and complicity of police officers and the custodial transfer of victims from police to 
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mob.118 Where the dominant scripts obfuscated the ways in which lynching often occurred as a 
normal (albeit controversial) technique of policing, anti-lynching legislation placed primary 
importance on the recognition that lynching was being used in this way and included components 
designed specifically to put a stop to the practice.    
Tracking the successes and failures of state and federal anti-lynching laws offers further 
evidence challenging any analytical framework that would position the rule of the mob and the 
rule of law as opposites.  At the state level, the sections of the laws that provided for the 
punishment of police officers and the financial liability of cities and counties were the most 
frequent subjects of constitutional challenge. At the federal level, the very assertion of federal 
jurisdiction in cases of lynching proved to be so controversial that national anti-lynching 
legislation was never passed. Lawmakers at the state and federal level were more than willing to 
pass laws criminalizing the participants in lynch mobs; indeed, such participation was technically 
criminal with or without the existence of legislation aimed specifically at the suppression of mob 
violence. They balked, however, at components of the bill that directly challenged the 
mechanisms by which states of exception were invoked. This proved a source of great frustration 
to the NAACP, whose staff knew that the prosecution of individual lynchers would never occur 
if sheriffs maintained the ability to officially or unofficially distribute quasi policing powers to 
citizens at their own discretion, under the guise of being “overpowered.” Staff working for the 
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passage of anti-lynching legislation bemoaned the impossibility of its passage, noting that “those 
states that do prove willing to enact these laws are generally those that need them the least.”119  
 
War: The Grim Emancipator 
Although legislative campaigns to eliminate the state of exception for lynching were 
never successful, lynching began to attract increasing amounts of attention and criticism across a 
broad spectrum of the public during World War One. This was partly because of the rhetoric 
crafted by national political leaders to secure the broader public’s support for the war, which was 
justified under the ambitious slogan of “Making the World Safe for Democracy.” Those who had 
been working on the fight against lynching immediately capitalized on this rhetoric by 
admonishing President Wilson and asking for federal support in “making the South safe for 
Democracy.” As early as 1914, before the U.S. had formally entered the war, the NAACP’s 
editorials and press releases began to include statements about lynching that compared it to the 
behavior of America’s wartime enemies. When the state of Louisiana was the site of four 
lynchings over just one month in August, Board Chairman Joel Springarn wrote to Governor 
Luther Hall that “surely it is a cause for reproach to the whole country that events are occurring 
within its borders which equal in barbarism any that are reported from the theatre of war in 
Europe.”120 Progressive publications, such as The Nation, were quick to adopt this rhetoric. 
When Jim McIllheron was taken from police and burned at the stake in Estill Springs, 
Tennessee, a Nation columnist commented sardonically:  
Had any such item as this come out of Belgium or Armenia, we should know what to 
think of the unspeakable Germans and Turks responsible. A wave of horror would sweep 
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over the country and there would be an extra rush to the enlistment offices. But when 
Americans thus debase themselves, nobody volunteers to end the evil, nobody speaks 
about it – at least, nobody who is white – and we complacently turn to the congenial task 
of setting up democracy in Germany.121 
 
Not only did this discourse appear in left-leaning circles, it was increasingly embraced in 
Progressive circles, which included many “law and order” elements, who had previously been 
hesitant to criticize lynching because of their perception that it helped to control crime. This 
change of heart in mainstream sectors of white American society was reflected in increasing 
numbers of correspondents with the NAACP who represented commercial, religious, and 
educational institutions, as when Jackson Davis of Richmond, Virginia’s Chamber of Commerce 
wrote to the NAACP in support of their anti-lynching efforts, noting the role of the war in his 
transformed position on racial matters:  
The World War has set us all to thinking in new terms of brotherhood. Surely we in this 
country who have a belated race at our very doors, cannot preach brotherhood unless we 
practice it at home. This thought is being brought home to hundreds of people throughout 
the country as never before in our history.122 
 
In 1918, the Tennessee Law and Order League – a participant in the Tennessee Conference of 
Charities and Corrections – issued a resolution that referred to lynching as “treasonable,” and 
asserted that it would “inevitably increase the length of the war and the cost in dead and 
wounded we will have to pay for victory and thus give aid and comfort to the enemy.”123 The 
Tennessee organizations joined the NAACP and many others in demanding that President 
Wilson issue a national address on the subject. With pressure mounting, and rates of lynching 
having nearly doubled since the U.S. had entered the War, President Wilson finally did issue a 
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proclamation criticizing lynching. In crafting his address, Wilson drew on rhetorical arguments 
that had originated in the black press, arguing that lynchers harmed America’s war efforts.  
No man who loves America, no man who really cares for her fame and honor and 
character, or who is truly loyal to her institutions, can justify mob action while the courts 
of justice are open and the governments of the States and the Nation are ready and able to 
do their duty. We are at this very moment fighting lawless passion. Germany has 
outlawed herself among the nations because she has disregarded the sacred obligations of 
law and has made lynchers of her armies. Lynchers emulate her disgraceful example.  
 
This was the same president who, three years earlier, had hosted in the White House a private 
screening of the newly released film, Birth of a Nation. But in the interim, the United States’ 
entry to war had drastically changed the terms of the exception, turning a pro-lynching President 
– and arguably a pro-lynching American populace – to a new outlook which exalted American 
institutions and courts of justice and declared adherence to law a “sacred obligation.” 
Yet, Americans’ newfound commitment to the rule of law cannot necessarily be taken at 
face value. Here, the insights of scholars like Amy Kaplan, Sarita See, and Melanie McAllister 
are helpful for reminding us that the foreign and the domestic have always been linked in U.S. 
policy, rhetoric, statecraft, and cultural production. In that light, the statements of Wilson and 
other Progressives might be interpreted as a culmination of pro-imperialist thinking, not merely a 
repudiation of lynch law. Indeed, if lynch law is understood as an expression of the logic of 
emergency, then the imperialist packaging of anti-lynching rhetoric during this period should 
alert us to the ways in which these denunciations of violence in the domestic sphere served to 
naturalize U.S. recourse to violence in the international sphere. The contradiction faced by 
President Wilson as a result of World War I was related to but distinct from the contradiction 
faced by African Americans. For black editor Robert Owens, writing in his St. Louis, Missouri-
based Post-Dispatch, “the question that is first and uppermost in the minds of the vast majority 
 83 
 
of the black people of this country is, Are we included in this world that is to be made safe for 
democracy?”124 But for President Wilson, as articulated in his anti-lynching address two months 
later, the question was, “How shall we recommend democracy to the acceptance of other 
peoples[?]”125 To the extent that black and white progressive activists had framed lynching as 
anti-democratic, Wilson was forced to adopt a public stance in opposition to lynching in order to 
maintain ideological coherence in his “recommendation” of democracy to other nations – such as 
Haiti in 1915, new European nations post-WWI, and the numerous territories and protectorates 
across the pacific that had been only recently acquired during the Spanish-American and 
Phillipine-American wars two decades prior.  
During World War I, the U.S. faced an unprecedented national emergency, in the form of 
full-scale mobilization for entry to a global, multi-front war. As had happened frequently 
throughout U.S. history up to this point, the terms of racial formation, war-making, international 
relations, and capitalist development precipitated drastic changes in the practice of lynching, 
spelling the end of a particular post-Reconstruction version of this long-standing institution. 
Nonetheless, the cultural logic of lynch law, the logic of exception, persevered, just as it had 
persevered before. The logic of emergency, which holds that legal norms can be set aside, and 
the killing power of the state unleashed during exceptional times of crisis remained a central 
aspect of U.S. statecraft and jurisprudence. New understandings of national sovereignty made it 
increasingly rare that correctional powers would be distributed to unofficially deputized citizens 
at the local (city, county, or state) level.  This power was retained, however, by policing units 
positioned at higher levels of government. And, this power was frequently exercised, in the form 
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of brutally broken strikes and other labor actions, collusion between troops and mobs during race 
riots, and ongoing military incursions in central and South America, Africa, and the Pacific.   
An editorial cartoon (Figure 6), published in the NAACP’s official publication, The 
Crisis, edited by W.E.B. DuBois, perfectly symbolizes the contradictory effects of WWI in terms 
of how black people became both newly empowered to resist some forms of violence, while 
simultaneously remaining particularly vulnerable to the imperialist vision of statecraft that would 
continue to rely on violence to govern peoples of color both domestically and globally. The 
cartoon’s caption reads “War: The Grim Emancipator,” and the image features a hyper-
masculine, larger-than-life, godlike image of The War, holding an outstretched sword of War 
Work, which he uses to break the chains of the Negro Wage Earner, thus emanicpating him from 
Economic Slavery. Given DuBois’ writings on the war – he supported African American 
participation although this cost him significant social and political capital within many black 
political circles – it is likely that this cartoon can be taken at face value as an attempt to drum up 
excitement about the war by highlighting its potentially liberatory effects on ordinary black 
laborers.126  
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Figure 6: “War: The Grim Emancipator,” The Crisis, Vol. 16.2, 72. 
 
Yet, perhaps unintentionally, there is something sinister about The War’s proffered sword 
of War Work, which seems to coercively propel the Negro Wage Earner forward under the threat 
of injury or impalement. The image also suggests the possibility of betrayal, as the Negro Wage 
Earner is positioned not merely to be impaled, but specifically to be stabbed in the back. An 
ominous wisp of smoke severs the arm holding the sword from the body of The War, as if the 
arm and the sword are autonomous forces that will outlast the finiteness of The War as a 
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contained historical event. Although the Wage Earner’s chains have been broken, his shackles 
remain and there is a sword at his back. The disembodied body holding the sword is marked as 
German by his helmet, nonetheless the figure could also represent a growing transnational (or at 
least transatlantic) identification of civilized whiteness in relation to less-developed Others. The 
image speaks to the elusive, and perhaps illusory, promises of increased civil and economic 
status that figures like DuBois predicted would result from actively supporting the U.S. at war.    
 
Conclusion 
In many respects, obstacles to the criminalization of lynching can be interpreted as a 
straight-forward matter of federalism. One of the most important lessons of lynching is that, 
when local officeholders fail to protect citizens’ rights, higher powers (either state or federal 
governments) must be legally entitled to intervene. Certainly, this was the strategic analysis 
pursued by Progressive-era lawyers, policy-makers, and philanthropists, such as Albion Tourgee, 
Moorfield Storey, and George Peabody, who wrote extensively of the need for state and federal 
anti-lynching legislation that would remove power from sheriffs and allow Governors and U.S. 
attorneys to safeguard constitutional protections when necessary (or to investigate and punish 
local officers who failed in this regard). So too has this been a prominent theme in scholarship on 
lynching, of which a considerable portion is devoted to tracking the failure and success of anti-
lynching legislation and analyzing major Supreme Court decisions that strengthened federal 
oversight of state and local criminal proceedings. This line of inquiry is also in keeping with the 
long-standing notion that the solution to lynching was to “use the law against lawlessness.”  
Despite the utility of federalism as an analytical frame for analyzing lynching, however, 
there are a few limitations to this lens. A primary limitation in my view, relates to how the 
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concept of federalism implicitly defines lynching as a problem of “localism,” in which localized 
popular sentiment undermines the rules of law, and thus a higher (i.e. less local) form of law is 
empowered to supercede it. Yet the problem of lynching was not necessarily that local sentiment 
overwhelmed law, but rather that pro-lynching sentiment in general (regardless of whether it 
reflected local, regional, or national views) was given expression in the actions of lawful 
authority, and thus perpetrators of violence were protected even when higher powers found cause 
to intervene. Absent extraordinary scandal or other external political pressures, higher authorites 
often failed to take advantage of their legal powers, or exaggerated their limits. Thus, if one sets 
aside the issue of local vs. federal protections, some of the central philosophical (and legal and 
political) problems posed by lynching remain, in large part, unresolved. What can be done when 
representatives of the state use their actual power to exceed their constitutionally-defined power? 
What if there is no higher power to provide recourse, or the higher powers that do exist do not 
have the capacity or the political will to respond?  
These questions will be especially relevant for the next chapters, which examine state and 
federal involvement in race riots of the early twentieth century. I examine both the written 
protocols and the actual behavior of state and national guard units and federal troops especially 
during the Red Summer riots of 1919, and show how their actions were driven by racialized 
notions of emergency, not unlike those that rationalized lynching. The numerical decline of 
lynching during these decades belies the immense loss of life and destruction of communities 
that occurred as the logics of lynching were incorporated to national policing and military 
bodies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Use of Organized Bodies127 
 
Like a prairie-fire, the blaze of revolution was sweeping over every American institution of law 
and order a year ago. It was eating its way into the homes of the American workmen, its sharp 
tongues of revolutionary heat were licking the altars of the churches, leaping into the belfry of 
the school bell, crawling into the sacred corners of American homes, seeking to replace marriage 
vows with libertine laws, burning up the foundations of society. – Attorney General Mitchell 
Palmer, 1920128 
 
"The very idea of America makes me shake and tremble and gives me nightmares." – Josephine 
Baker, remembering the East St. Louis riot of May, 1917129 
 
The Birth of a Nation 
Previous chapters have suggested that the early 20th century witnessed a series of national 
and international phenomena that altered the material and ideological terrain of debates over 
lynching and lynch law. Many of these centered on emergencies related to national security, and 
accompanied the U.S.’s ascendance to global power: the Spanish-American and Philippine-
American wars; limited military conflicts with Haiti and Mexico in the 1910s; the start of WWI 
in 1914; and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The sense of peril and threat felt by U.S. leaders 
is well symbolized in Figure 7, a political cartoon penned by John McCutcheon of the Chicago 
Tribune, and reprinted widely. The United States is analogized as “The World,” a globe in a 
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hospital bed, surrounded by menacing figures labelled “terrorism” and “Bolshevism.” 
Miniaturized and racialized, “Costa Rica” and “Mexico” shoot weapons and wave swords from 
the floor below, which is littered with empty bottles: War 1914, War 1915, War 1916…. From 
above and behind, a laborer and presumptive trade unionist slams a sledgehammer repeatedly 
onto the globe’s head; the literal and figurative “strikes” threaten to debilitate the patient just 
when he is most in need of strength.  
 
Figure 7: "A Nervous Wreck," Literary Digest, July 5th, 1919. 
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 It is during this period of international crisis that lynching in the U.S. is thought to have 
declined, and even disappeared. Most scholars agree that WWI and the interwar years constitute 
the final decades of the “lynching era,” a period when rates of lynching dropped to single digits, 
after staying in the double and even triple digits for nearly five decades, since ~ the 1880s.130 
During these same years, however, the expansion of federal power domestically and 
internationally also led to new forms of violence that took a disproportionate toll on African 
Americans. In the years 1916 – 1921 alone, while approximately 334 individuals were lynched, 
as many as 800 people were likely killed in major civil disturbances at East St. Louis (1917), 
Omaha (1919), Elaine, Ark (1919), and Tulsa, Okla. (1921), all of which involved state militia, 
national guard troops, and federal military battalions, acting in concert with deputized posses, 
members of the Citizens Protective League, and (later) the American Legion.131 In other words, 
between 1916 and 1921, more African Americans were killed by members of the U.S. armed 
forced acting in concert with large organized vigilante groups than were killed by lynch mobs 
acting in concert with local police.   
 In previous chapters I have argued that lynching acted as a supplement to law in times of 
crisis or emergency. As sociologists have noted, however, most lynchings (as distinguished from 
related forms of collective political violence) were instigated in response to specific, local 
emergencies. Lynchings were usually justified on the basis of individual crimes (and/or crime 
waves); county and even municipal-level power struggles; and interpersonal conflicts within 
relatively small communities.132 This is not to say that lynching was unrelated to larger national 
                                                          
130 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People., Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States, 
1889-1918; Tolnay and Beck, A Festival of Violence. 
131 This does not include those who were killed in less serious incidents that had lower death tolls, nor does it 
account for the thousands of persons who were displaced during these and other acts of violence. 
132 R. Senechal de la Roche, “Collective Violence as Social Control,” in Sociological Forum 11 (1996): 97–128; R. 
Senechal de la Roche, “Why Is Collective Violence Collective?,” Sociological Theory 19, no. 2 (2001): 126–44.  
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issues – the topic was inseparable from conflicts over slavery and race; social upheaval created 
by western expansion; economic booms and downturns, etc. However, although lynching might 
have been caused or exacerbated by national issues, its manifestation was usually personal and 
local in nature. This chapter explores how the logics of lynch law – and its relationship to official 
state action – expanded and nationalized during the early 20th century, focusing specifically on 
the domestic effects of World War I. As with other chapters, I am particularly attentive to 
linkages between state-sanctioned and ‘extralegal’ forms of violence. First, I look at specific 
incidents of mass violence, and attempt to identify the “organized bodies” who incited and 
participated in them. I map these organized bodies onto official power networks to demonstrate 
that, similar to regional variations of lynching, the major race riots of this era were characterized 
by joint operations of ‘private’ vigilante groups with ‘official’ law enforcement personnel. In 
addition to material acts of violence, I examine how the discourses that undergirded lynch law on 
the frontier and in the postbellum U.S., were incorporated to law and protocol surrounding 
domestic emergencies, a category which includes riots, strikes, and ‘insurrections.’ I argue that 
the legal frameworks that dictated how national state power could be used in these situations 
reproduced earlier “states of exception,” in which the suspension of legal norms operated to 
strengthen national policing power. Even as some forms of exceptional violence (such as the 
extrajudicial execution of suspected criminals) became less common, other forms of exceptional 
violence flourished, and they did so in spaces of impunity created by national legal and military 
powers. The Jim Crow and frontier versions of lynching began to decline in the South and West, 
but lynch-like collective violence, rationalized by similar cultural and legal logics, was ascendant 
on the national stage.  
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The Red Summer, and Jim Crow lynching more broadly, are often discussed in the 
context of the re-emergence of the Klan, emblematic in the popularity of the film Birth of a 
Nation. Disciplinary divides between history, American studies, ethnic studies, and labor studies, 
has led to limited analysis of how the Red Summer of 1919 and the Red Scare of WWI are 
related to each other, despite the fact that they happened simultaneously. I do not wish to 
disconnect lynching from the longer narrative of racial formation that is suggested by examining 
texts like Birth of a Nation. I do, however, want to explore in more depth the simultaneity of the 
Red Summer/Red Scare. Both waves of violence may have been related to a different “birth of a 
nation” that was occurring, a birthing of modern American statehood whose nationalist 
discourses – even when they were race-neutral – impacted the character of collective racial 
violence as much as did the explicitly race-conscious discourses associated with the Klan. 
After the signing of the armistice in 1918, rather than subside, domestic racial and 
economic tensions only continued to escalate. The demobilization of nearly two million soldiers 
coincided with a global postwar economic contraction, fueling an unemployment crisis in the 
U.S. The tenuous consensus against wartime labor action gave way to increased union agitation 
as workers who had borne the brunt of wartime inflation were now left to shoulder the fallout of 
a postwar recession. In ways that were shaped and inflected by regional variations such as 
population density, immigration patterns, and predominant types of industry, multiple forms of 
racial violence spiked precipitously in every region of the country. Concentrated in rural areas of 
the South, West, and Midwest, rates of lynching rose dramatically. During the economic boom-
time of the war, rates of lynching had fallen, with an average of 56 incidents per year from 1914 
– 1918, including an all-time low of only 38 lynchings in 1917. But in 1919, at least 83 
lynchings were recorded, and it would be another four years before these rates returned to their 
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lower pre-war levels.133 In the urban population centers of the Northeast and Midwest, the 
exponential growth of African American neighborhoods as a result of the first Great Migration 
stressed social relations, and increased conflicts between African- and European-Americans over 
jobs. These conflicts were exacerbated by unions’ policies of racial exclusion, which led 
employers to use black workers as scabs and strikebreakers when all-white union memberships 
walked off the job. This dynamic set the stage for a wave of severe race and labor riots, which 
afflicted more than two dozen towns and cities (Figure 8). In fact, more race riots occurred in 
1919 than had occurred during the previous twenty years. On top of all this, with some of the 
constraints on wartime political dialogue lifted, many of the most militant voices of the labor 
movement returned with a fury, and several cities and industries were rocked by violent and 
protracted general strikes.  
  
 
Figure 8: Red Summer of 1919 Race Riots – Red/yellow markers occurred in the winter/spring, while 
green/blue/purple markers show riots in the summer-fall. The most riots occurred in mid-summer, in July (blue 
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markers), and it was shortly after this long and violent month of conflict that leaders in Helena consulted military 
leaders stationed near Little Rock about emergency preparations for similar violence in Phillips County.  
 Against this backdrop of social chaos, as American society struggled with the 
reverberations of its recently completed war, a new organization called The American Legion 
was formed, ostensibly to represent the interests of World War I veterans, millions of whom 
were navigating difficulties such as accessing the health and pension benefits their service 
entitled them to, finding employment in a tight postwar economy, and generally reintegrating to 
civilian society. Yet the Legion was more than just a veterans’ social and advocacy organization, 
it was also highly nationalistic, and its members envisioned themselves as having a domestic 
moral and political mission that extended directly from the overseas missions they were sent on 
as soldiers. “For God and country we associate ourselves together,” proclaimed the editor of the 
Legion’s national magazine in its second issue, which coincided with the height of Red Summer 
race rioting in July. Legionnaires committed themselves “To uphold and defend the Constitution 
of the United States of America; to maintain law and order; to foster and perpetuate a one 
hundred per cent Americanism; … [and] to inculcate a sense of individual obligation to the 
community, state and nation.”134 The goals set by the organization to meet these objectives 
mapped squarely onto the ways in which the emerging national security state envisioned its own 
role in guaranteeing security and upholding Americanism. For example, the Legion committed 
its members to “fight Bolshevism and ultra-radicalism,” to pressure Congress to investigate and 
prosecute conscientious objectors, and to enact harsher immigration laws that would allow the 
U.S. “to deport alien slackers as well as every naturalized citizen convicted under the Espionage 
Act.”135 During the first two years of its publication, the Legion’s national magazine instructed 
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its members to lend active assistance to law enforcement and other government agencies, so as to 
uphold what they constructed as “law and order.” Legion posts from around the country reported 
proudly on their vigilance, as members assisted police with strike duty, surveilled their 
communities, and reported anything they deemed suspicious to the authorities. In a number of 
cases Legion posts were involved in explicit acts of harassment, intimidation, and violence, acts 
which were celebrated in the pages of the national magazine as necessary and laudable examples 
of positive action on behalf of the nation these former soldiers swore to defend.  
 A statement published in the inaugural issue of The American Legion’s weekly 
magazine, issued on July 4th, 1919, is representative of this other birth I refer to. The first page of 
the first issue of the magazine declared:  
The American Legion Weekly is born on this one hundred and forty-third anniversary of 
the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Appropriately so. The principles and 
ideals of that epochal document in human liberty are those of The American Legion, 
which the American Legion Weekly represents.  
 
The Legion itself is a spontaneous expression of purpose by those millions of Americans 
who helped crush autocracy. Out of their common experiences through the dark months 
of the war has grown a comradeship and a patriotism which is vitalized by their 
organization into this single concrete force which will stand always as a barrier against 
the forces of greed, ignorance, and chaos. 
 
The American legion is the epitome of that Americanism for which it stands.136  
 
 The two births – Thomas Dixon’s Birth of a Nation represented by the second Klan, and 
the syndication of The American Legion’s weekly magazine on the 143rd anniversary of the 
Declaration of Independence – were united by a notable term: “Americanism.” It is important to 
note that the groups stressed Americanism, rather than whiteness. This is not because whiteness 
had lost its political or social valence; quite the contrary. In fact, the term “Americanism,” 
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particularly when accompanied by “100%” and “pure,” as it often was, carried with it the 
assumption of whiteness. Yet, during this same period, the category of whiteness was undergoing 
major contestation, transformation and expansion. As used by organizations like the Klan and the 
Legion of the 1920s, “Americanism” indicated conformity to a specific form of whiteness. Not 
just Anglo, not just European, not even necessarily hereditary or genealogical, “Americanism” 
described whiteness of a particular ideological, economic, political, and sexual persuasion. To be 
100% American was to be white, yes, but also to be pro-capital, nationalistic, suspicious of 
foreign influences, committed to self-sufficiency and individualism, Christian, and normatively 
heterosexual.  
 This point is underscored by close analysis of political cartoons from the time. The 
benefit of examining evidence from visual culture is that elements of racialization are made more 
visible in artists’ renderings of the ideology of Americanism. These images also underscore the 
extent to which the fundamental logic of lynch law (the logic of “emergency”) was evoked 
against those people who fell outside the category of “100% American,” thus contributing to the 
unleashing of state violence that occurred when unions went on strike, and when African 
Americans defended themselves against physical and political attacks.   
One image in particular stands out because it replicates Attorney General Mitchell 
Palmer’s description (in the epigraph) of the radical alien “burning up the foundations of 
society.” The cover illustration of the American Legion Weekly’s second issue depicts a bomb-
wielding man, labeled as a bolshevist, who is poised to destroy “American Institutions,” 
represented by a federal-style pillar (Figure 9). The cartoon’s language of “American 
Institutions” represented as a pillar resonates with Palmer’s description of work, church, school, 
home and marriage as the “foundations of society.” Next to this foundational pillar, a menacing 
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figure labeled “American Legion” is authoritatively approaching the Bolshevik, with a clenched 
fist and a determined look on his face. Who is this man, and what does he signify (beyond a 
specific organizational membership)? What is his relationship to the Bolshevist and the bomb? 
How will he defend “American Institutions,” and what authorizes him to do so? What do the 
 98 
 
answers to these questions tell us about the shifting logics of racialized state-sanctioned 
violence?  
Figure 9 The American Legion Weekly, July 11, 1919 [cover image] 
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The American Legion has been a difficult organization to analyze. It could accurately be 
described as a veterans’ social organization, a non-partisan advocacy organization, or as an 
organization of veterans-turned-vigilantes, and the balance of the organization’s activities shifted 
over time, with the vigilante aspect declining sharply after the initial hysteria associated with the 
early years of the 1920s Red Scare. Even in the Legion’s own materials, contradictory assertions 
are made regarding the group’s political identity or lack thereof. On the one hand, one of the 
weekly magazine’s most oft-repeated slogans was “Policies, Not Politics,” signaling a 
disinterested, non-partisan approach to defending veterans’ interests, as well as a strong 
opposition to anything representing what they sometimes called “special interests” and other 
times described as “the autocracy of the masses and the classes” (referring to what they implied 
were the greedy behaviors of both the wealthy classes and the working class rabble rousers of the 
labor movement).           
The most notable non-partisan policies pursued by the Legion included an array of 
veterans’ compensation and benefits, the likes of which would eventually form the basis for the 
G.I. Bill passed after WWII. On the other hand, particularly during the Red Scare of the 1920s, 
Legion members also acted as vigilantes, taking it upon themselves to rid their communities of 
undesirable elements and pressuring Congress’ to enact decidedly political policies, such as 
deportation measures, new immigration restrictions, and limitations on freedoms of speech and 
political association.  
Members of the American Legion also joined civilians from organizations such as the 
Citizens Protective League (CPL) and volunteered their assistance to local law enforcement 
agencies. In at least two incidents, the major riots at Omaha, Nebraska and Elaine, Arkansas in 
1919, these sorts of public-private partnerships were implicated in deadly displays of militarized 
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violence. In countless other communities across the country, immigrants, members of labor 
unions, and racialized groups were black-listed by major employers, subject to random assaults, 
surveilled, and run out of town as a result of organized efforts by members of the American 
Legion, the CPL, and similar local organizations.  
When viewing the images in this chapter, therefore, it’s important to note that though the 
image may be laden with symbolism, it is not necessarily metaphorical. Political cartoons often 
use the visual rhetoric of warfare to depict social tensions and conflicts that have not actually 
entailed any violence. But in this case, the image of a member of the American Legion taking 
physical action against the perceived threat of the bomb-wielding Bolshevik, reflects realities of 
political violence during the period – both that of Bolsheviks (some of whom really did set 
bombs in various American cities), and that of organizations like the Legion, who pursued 
strategic campaigns of vigilantism that supplemented and complemented official campaigns of 
repression.   
The Legionnaire pictured in Figure 9 has discarded his coat so recently that it has yet to 
hit the ground, symbolic of the veterans’ recent return from combat overseas.  Between his face 
and the pillar of American Institutions is a thin plume of smoke rising from the Bolshevik’s lit 
bomb. The plume of smoke is the emergency, the exception, which authorizes the “legion” to 
respond to the danger – likely with violence, if the Legionnaire’s facial expression and body 
language are any indication. The image offers official legitimation for the members’ violence by 
positively framing them within and on behalf of “American Institutions,” with the implied 
violence perpetrated by a respected social actor who blurs the line between soldier and civilian. 
Political cartoons of this time are abundant with similar images of bombs, usually wielded by 
figures whose dark hair and skin allude to the “swarthy” features of Eastern European 
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immigrants who were most associated with radicalism (Figures 10 – 13). These images invoke 
the idea of a mortal threat facing America – a threat that necessitated a drastic response. 
 
Figure 10: “Come Unto Me, Ye Opprest!”  Literary Digest, July 5, 1919. 
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Figure 11: “Close the Gate,” Literary Digest, July 5th, 1919.  
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Figure 12: “The Bomb-erang,” Literary Digest, May 13th 1919. 
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Figure 13: "What a Year Has Brought Forth," Literary Digest, November 22, 1919. 
 105 
 
 
In most cases, the bomb-wielders are implicitly or explicitly represented as European 
immigrants – as in Figure 14, where a member of “American Labor” has delivered a knock-out 
punch to a radical who is clearly labeled “foreign extremist.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: "The Patriotic American," Literary Digest, June 28, 1919. 
 
There is a double meaning, however, in the American Laborer’s assertion that he is “kind of 
particular about who calls me brother.” The presumably European extremist is much darker than 
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his counterpart, the conspicuously white member of “American Labor,” a pattern that is also 
evident in the other images. Some historians of racial formation in the U.S. assert that this kind 
of blackening is one of many indications that European immigrants were not initially perceived 
as fully white.137 Others have challenged this narrative, arguing that European immigrants – even 
those members of despised groups who faced discrimination – were nonetheless granted 
privileges of whiteness that were still denied to persons of color, such as a path to citizenship, 
rights of property ownership, and relatively unencumbered enfranchisement, which allowed 
immigrants to improve their status over time by creating vibrant neighborhoods and sought-after 
voting blocs.138 I shift away from debates over the construction of whiteness, and instead 
consider how the darkening of the “foreign extremist” is also a construction of Blackness, 
invoking the racialization of lawlessness that was a central component of the lynching discourses 
described in previous chapters. Belying the apparently anti-European and xenophobic nature of 
the texts, these images can and should also be read as a commentary on international and 
domestic colonial and racial tensions.  
The conflation of Bolshevism and blackness was not just a matter of visual rhetoric. 
Many white Americans feared that Bolshevik spies and propagandists had infiltrated African 
American communities and were exacerbating racial discontent – a rather improbable contention 
but one that was widely shared. In Philips County, Arkansas, for example, in an incident known 
as The Elaine Massacre (which I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter), African 
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American farm workers created a sharecroppers’ union and hired a lawyer to protect their 
economic interests during the autumn cotton harvest. The sharecroppers union was infiltrated, 
and on the night of October 1st, 1919, one of their meetings was attacked by a sheriff and his 
deputies. In the resulting shoot-out, one of the deputies was killed, inciting an all-out assault on 
African Americans living in the region by local whites, who were deputized en masse, organized 
into posses led by members of a local chapter of the American Legion, and eventually supported 
by a battalion of federal troops from nearby Camp Pike. The political elite of Philips County 
claimed that the black sharecroppers had planned a general uprising and intended to 
systematically kill all the whites of the area, urged on by Bolshevik propaganda and an 
“organized effort” of white trade unionists. Although no evidence was ever produced to verify 
this alleged plot, local residents continued to assert for many years that the so-called “uprising” 
had been the result of Bolshevik propaganda.139  
Some accounts of the Red Summer suggest the violence was the result of “hysteria,” 
which psychologizes the Black-Bolshevik connection as paranoid conspiracy theory.140 However 
paranoid it may have been, the feared relationship between black people and Bolsheviks become 
the subject of highly methodical and deliberate investigations taken on by respected community 
leaders nationwide. One group that carried out this work was the American Protective League, a 
joint public-private venture, authorized by state governments to carry out the local work of 
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national defense. Governor Thomas Kilby’s proclamation admitting individuals to Alabama’s 
APL stated that 
Reposing full trust in your Patriotism, Prudence, integrity, and Ability, I do, by virtue of 
the Power and Authority in me vested as Governor of the State of Alabama, hereby 
commission you a member of the Alabama Post-War Council of Defense, established by 
Act of the Legislature of 1919, charged with the duty of organizing the State for 
cooperation with the Federal Government and all local agencies, in meeting the 
exigencies and emergencies incident to post-war adjustment. 
 
African American unrest, or the potential for it, was a central ‘exigency and emergency’ this 
group concerned itself with. In the state archives in Alabama, for example, I found a brief letter 
circulated by members of the American Protective League to county officials and business 
owners throughout the state, and even to APL leaders in other parts of the country, inquiring as 
to whether there was any trouble or unrest amongst African Americans in their area. The urgency 
with which the problem was treated is evident in the letter’s opening, which began “Dear Sir: I 
communicate with you in confidence regarding a matter, about I am, of necessity requesting of 
you immediate response and report.” The letter went on to inquire of each recipient a report on 
“any feeling or discussion, or meetings of any character, in secret or otherwise, among negroes 
relative to their status after the war.” Responses flowed in from around the state, which taken 
together indicate an extensive level of surveillance. This was not the result of national hysteria, it 
was the result of methodical national planning and preparation, justified in the name of national 
emergency (Figures 15 – 16). 
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Figure 15: Inquiry from American Protective League to the Honorable William Sanders. Alabama State 
Records and Archives, Papers of the American Protective League.   
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Figure 16: The American Protective League forwarded responses to Governor Charles Henderson. This 
letter also indicates communication with governors of other states. Alabama State Records and Archives, Papers of 
Governor Charles Henderson.   
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Not only did this narrative take hold in the rural South, by the fall of 1919, at the height 
of post-war violence, the notion of radical influence in black communities was a key component 
of national discourse, and an important factor influencing national security policy as defined by 
the newly created Federal Bureau of Investigation, headed by J. Edgar Hoover (whose later 
authorship of COINTELPRO was largely inspired by the impression of black radicalism he 
formed during these earlier years).141 An article published in The New York Times in the fall of 
1919 summarized a congressional inquiry regarding the violence of the Red Summer, which 
concluded that “[Bolshevists] are winning many recruits among the colored race.”142 Under the 
subheader “Reds Inflaming Blacks,” the article explained, 
When the ignorance that exists among negroes in many sections of the country is taken 
into consideration the danger of inflaming them by revolutionary doctrine may be 
apprehended. It is held that there is no element in this country so susceptible to organized 
propaganda of this kind as the less informed class of negroes. 
 
The article goes on to conflate these alleged Bolshevik racial agitators with members of 
organizations like the NAACP, implying that a dangerous fusion was taking place between 
Bolshevik ideology and African American aspirations for basic civil rights, and that it was this 
combination (not racial injustice per se), that was responsible for the intense levels of violence. 
The article claimed that “governmental response” and “carefully considered policy” were needed 
to remove the causes of race riots, else they would continue. Ironically, this was a claim that 
members of the NAACP probably would have agreed with, if it weren’t for their drastically 
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different diagnosis of what those causes were. Although civil rights organizations were 
successful in pressuring government offices to take some positive actions to address racial 
discrimination, the most immediate government actions and carefully considered policies 
undertaken in response to the racial and industrial clashes of WWI and the post-war era involved 
the devotion of significant resources to the surveillance of civil rights organizations and black-
owned newspapers.143   
The political cartoon in Figure 17, titled “It Happens About Like This,” captures the 
blurring of the lines between blackness, bolshevism, and foreignness particularly well. The 
figure is portrayed drawing on the cartoonish aesthetics of minstrelsy. The first two blocks depict 
a figure with “No Brains” who is riled to treason by the influence of “poison literature,” a 
narrative that is remarkably similar to the official stance on the relationship between bolshevism 
and blackness. It is not until the third block that the figure is revealed to be a Russian immigrant 
and thus headed for deportation.  
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Figure 17: "It Happens About Like This," Literary Digest February 7, 1919 
 
Black people who were engaged in organized resistance, however, unlike the Russian immigrant, 
could not be deported. Their exclusion was instead accomplished by campaigns of mass 
violence, murder, and displacement. This is resonant with Agamben’s assertion that states of 
exception come into being as a way of dealing with categories of citizen who cannot be 
integrated to the political system. While the Red Bolshevik could be captured and returned to 
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Russia, the Black Bolshevik could not be sent anywhere, nor be permitted to fully assimilate into 
“100% Americanism” (despite military service and fervent claims of patriotism from many 
influential black spokespeople), given the term’s conflation with whiteness. As a threat that 
could be neither absorbed nor repelled, the logic of exception dictates elimination. 
As lynching discourses were incorporated into narratives of national emergencies and 
war, important transitions occurred. Jim Crow era lynchings were justified on the basis of 
specific individual threats: African Americans targeted for lynching were accused of brutal 
crimes. As the discourse of ‘threat’ took on a broader, national scope, the racialized criminal 
threat expanded as well; whole populations were deemed dangerous and threatening. Certainly 
Jim Crow-era lynching also relied on the criminalization of whole racialized populations. But 
lynchings, while they terrorized and intimidated everyone in the targeted group, were still 
usually aimed at individuals who had been accused of specific criminal acts. In the massive race 
riots and industrial clashes that characterized the Red Summer and the Red Scare, this no longer 
held true. The racialized images of crime were used to justify violence that embraced what 
sociologists like Roberta de la Roche would call “collective accountability.” In events like the 
mass deportation at Bizbee, Arizona, and the dozens of race riots of the Red Summer of 1919, 
violence was aimed at entire populations of people – neighborhoods were emptied of their 
residents, hundreds of people were killed in short spans of time, mass exoduses of sometimes 
thousands of residents followed. Usually such an exodus was precisely the intended effect of the 
violence in the first place, as police and business leaders asserted the need to “clean up” a 
lawless area, or “clear out” an undesirable group from a particular section of the town or county. 
Both forms of violence (Jim Crow-era lynching, and the race and labor riots of the Red 
Summer/Red Scare) were justified by similar logics. But the changing character of this violence, 
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from individual to mass, reflects the nationalization of culture, the emergence of a national 
military infrastructure, and the surge of industrial development facilitated by the completion of 
continental expansion and the pursuit of new military and capital ventures overseas.   
Just as the racialization of threat was collectivized and mapped onto nationalistic 
binaries, shifts occurred in the sexualization of threat as well. The violence of Jim Crow-era 
lynching relied on accusing individuals of rape, an individual threat whose veracity was 
supported by what Angela Davis has labeled “the myth of the black male rapist.”144 These 
individual accusations (linked to group stereotypes) were accompanied by sensationalized 
accounts of the sexual victimization of individual white girls and women (also linked to larger 
intersectional social constructions). In the nationalization of lynching discourse, the violence of 
militarized policing relied on the creation of an association between criminality and any 
amassment or mass movement of racialized and/or immigrant groups. Individual accusations of 
crime were hardly necessary to justify violence against these groups, rather, newspapers reported 
on “crime waves” and general conditions of “lawlessness.” When individual accusations of 
crime did occur, the entire group faced repercussions, not just the accused individuals. 
Concomitant with this collectivization, the notion of (white) female victimhood was also 
collectivized, as in Figures 18 and 19, in which the potential for female victimization is 
abstracted to represent the vulnerability of America as a nation, and the aggression of 
vigilance/vigilante organizations is thus naturalized as a form of masculine honor on behalf of a 
besieged Lady Liberty.  
 
 
                                                          
144 Angela Y. Davis, “The Myth of the Black Male Rapist,” Women, Race, & Class (Vintage, 1983). 
 116 
 
 
 
Figure 18: “Come Unto Me, Ye Opprest!” Literary Digest, July 5, 1919. 
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Figure 19: “Her Big Brother,” American Legion Weekly, August 15, 1919 [cover image] 
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These depictions of Lady Liberty signal a potential openness to certain aspects of gender 
liberalism. In a period when white women gained the franchise, these images indicate an 
emergent heterosexual nationalist gender scheme, in which both white men and white women 
play a role in national politics – women representing the moral culture of the U.S. while men 
provide the muscular security that defend these national values from both external and internal 
threats.  
And yet, as Figures 20 and 21 indicate, if America was often feminized and represented 
as vulnerable, there was less consensus around what the abstraction of white manhood might 
look like. Who could be an appropriately masculine, national figure capable of defending her 
(America)? Images I’ve shown so far sometimes depict structural/symbolic obstacles to 
radicalism (pillars, columns, walls, flags, fortresses); others depict masculine defenders, either 
generic Workers, or generic Soldiers. But by the early 1920s, the image of the soldier had 
become much more common than depictions of workers, which reveals an important aspect of 
states of exception.  
In depictions of Workers as masculine defenders of America, some commentators took 
comfort in the idea that nativist working class white Americans would reject the ideological 
influence of European immigrants. In Figure 20, the strength of laborers – in this case, the 
American farmer – is communicated via a visual iconography of masculinity, made all the more 
stark by contrast with the short, skinny-chested, raggedy Bolshevik. The disparity is underscored 
by reference to able-bodied-ness, as the farmer queries the Bolshevik, “Do I Look Sick?” 
(Indeed, he does not.)  
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Figure 20: “Do I Look Sick?” Literary Digest, July 5th 1919. 
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Yet, the strength of labor was also a source of tension and anxiety, even more so after the 
U.S. became a major supplier for warring European nations in 1914, and then entered the war 
itself in 1916. Any work stoppage – and during this period of industrial volatility, there were 
many – had the potential to disrupt the mobilization for war, which required massive upticks in 
resource extraction, manufacturing, and international shipping of supplies, from the soldiers 
themselves (and everything needed to sustain them), to the materials of war such as munitions, 
planes, battleships, and communications infrastructure. This put the U.S., and the capital 
investors whose interests were served by the containment of labor, in a difficult position. 
Accommodation of labor threatened profits, but alienation of labor threatened to transform a 
“radical alien” problem into a “radical nativist” problem – or worse, a radical interracial working 
class coalition. In Figure 21, this tension is communicated by the depiction of labor as a form of 
monstrous femininity. The caption reads, “There are moments when married life seems quite 
endurable even to a man who thinks he’s henpecked.” This image does a lot of contradictory 
gender work, as the feminization of labor operates to queer the “Reds” whose lack of masculinity 
is evidenced by their domination at her [Labor’s] hands, and yet at the same time, Labor itself is 
depicted with a rhetoric of female masculinity, as a wife who inappropriately dominates her 
husband, the henpecked capitalist (whose own weakness vis a vis the labor movement is also 
portrayed through the trope of failed masculinity).  
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Figure 21: “Married Life,” Literary Digest, July 2, 1919. 
 
The ambiguous gendering of American Labor underscores one of the central difficulties 
of the “exception,” that is, the actual perpetration of violence. The reason this issue of 
perpetration is so important is that the people who perpetrate violence within spaces of exception 
are endowed with a powerful form of absolute sovereignty. Agamben suggests that, along with 
the power to decide the exception, comes the power to delimit the boundaries of normal life. The 
entwinement of these two powers is crucial to one of Agamben’s central arguments, which holds 
that the exception is not really an exception at all, since the “moment of decision,” that is the 
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moment in which sovereign power may decide to suspend the law, merely recedes during the 
normal legal order, but never disappears entirely.145 The ambiguous gendering of American 
Labor is one way of expressing the dangers of enfranchising the wrong type of man with the 
power to enact exceptional violence. Such a power could not and would not be contained to 
“exceptions,” it would include within it a certain degree of power over the normal order of 
things. Such power could not be entrusted to just any white man – it could only be entrusted to a 
“100% American” white man. In a pinch, the crude working class power of labor would do and 
was certainly powerful both numerically and organizationally in the form of whites-only labor 
unions; but the loyalty of labor could not be trusted, as the white working class was liable to 
succumb to economic propaganda and place its own class interests ahead of emerging national 
priorities.   
In light of this tension, a “new national figure” (Figure 22) was needed who could offer 
unambiguous protection for American interests in the face of domestic and international 
emergencies, defined as threats against the interlocking national imperatives of racial formation, 
capital accumulation, and (trans)national expansion. The figure capable of protecting these 
interests was depicted as a soldier, or a veteran, tested by war, aware of the dangers facing 
America: a manly patriarch uncompromised by private or ideological interests. His experience of 
armed combat ensured that he was capable of taking individual action against threat; yet this 
same experience also ensured that his individual actions were channeled through a hierarchy of 
military rank, and expressed themselves on behalf of national interests that were determined at a 
much higher level of the chain of command. The ability to decide the exception – to substitute 
personal conceptions of justice and morality for legal and constitutional norms – was a 
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dangerous sort of power that only certain kinds of subjects could claim. The danger of sharing 
this power was tempered by the soldier’s military training, which stressed conformity and 
obedience as much as it did individual initiative and bravery. The new national figure was a 
patriotic warrior –precisely the kind of friend America would want in an emergency (Figure 23).    
 
Figure 22: “The New National Figure,” Literary Digest, December 27, 1919. 
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Figure 23: "When Fellers Need a Friend," The American Legion Weekly, July 25, 1919, 9. 
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Most of the images I have shown, like Figure 24, explicitly invoke government – not just 
“the nation” but also the “state.” The soldier, the eagle, and Uncle Sam are the legitimate 
perpetrators of violence. But to the extent that these images appear as part of popular culture, it is 
not always easy to discern to what extent they depict state-sanctioned violence, vs. to what extent 
they merely utilize the iconography of government as a rhetorical strategy for claiming 
legitimacy for nationalist-popular violence.  
 
Figure 24: “One National Strike He Didn’t Plan,” Literary Digest, February 7, 1920. 
 
This confusion is amplified by the participation of organizations like the American Legion, the 
Citizens Protective League, and other groups that blurred the line between citizen, soldier, and 
police in major acts of violence associated with industrial disturbances and racial conflict. 
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Should these be considered “private” organizations, lending credence to the monikers “mob 
violence” and “riot”? Or were the members of these organizations acting in accordance with 
lawfully constituted authority to a sufficient degree that their behavior should be considered 
governmental, lending credence to terms like “state sanctioned,” and substitution of the term 
“riot” for alternatives such as “massacre,” “race war,” and “pogrom”? 
Although there is certainly an element of both popular and state-sanctioned violence, I 
would argue that the implied state sanctioning in the cartoons is not just a rhetorical strategy for 
legitimating popular violence, but rather a realistic portrayal of the workings of state power in 
periods of crisis, when the state’s ability to wield violence is amplified by the legal invocation of 
exceptional governance, and the state’s monopoly on violence is loosened to allow extralegal and 
extrajudicial actions to occur with impunity. I draw this conclusion based on two bodies of 
evidence. One is comprised of evidence of explicit collusion between official police and military 
forces in many violent and deadly conflicts of this period. The second consists of a close reading 
of legal texts of the period, which describe the role of the military in responding to civil 
emergencies, and indicate that the massive use of violence was not only lawful, but an 
encouraged tactic for maintaining and restoring order.  
 
Collusion between American Legion and Law Enforcement Officials 
My interest in the American Legion began with research into the Elaine Massacre, which 
was one of the deadliest of the three dozen major and minor race riots that occurred during the 
Red Summer of 1919. One might suppose that the coordination between the American Legion, 
prominent town officials, and military officers was idiosyncratic. It is tempting to think that the 
American Legion posts that operated in the deep South (Philips County is in the Mississippi delta 
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region of Arkansas), were Klan-like and this form of collusion emerged from the regional 
adherence to the Jim Crow system. Reading the Legion’s national weekly newspaper for the year 
1919, however, gives more credence to the assertion of scholars like Jacqueline Goldsby, who 
hold that anti-black mob violence of this period was a “networked, systemic phenomenon 
indicative of trends in national culture.”146 Based on the self-reported activities of Legion posts 
published in a regular feature of the magazine, the involvement of the Legion in the Elaine 
Massacre may have been an extreme incident, but it was not an isolated one.147 The pages of the 
organization’s weekly magazine are replete with accounts of newly established Legion posts 
offering their assistance to law enforcement agencies, including in several locales where deadly 
and destructive riots would eventually occur in 1919 and throughout the early 1920s.  
These accounts are not a distinctly southern phenomenon – they pour in from around the 
nation. The very first edition of the magazine, issued July 4th, 1919, featured a report from 
Oakland, California, informing the national readership that “Active propaganda is now in effect 
to overcome anarchistic tendencies in the State by supporting the effort of the local police 
authorities.” Leaders of Kansas’ first post of the Legion issued a similar announcement, 
promising law officers “that members of the society would lend active assistance in stamping out 
the Bolshevist menace during the 1919 harvest.” Members of a post in Louisiana promised that 
they stood “ready to oppose any anarchistic disorder that may take place.”148 In the next issue of 
the magazine, an update from the post in Oakland reported that members had “organized an 
armed force of 200 ex-service men to co-operate with the police in the event of any IWW 
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outbreaks,” describing their “obligation to perform this duty at home as it was for us to defend 
the flag in the trenches of France.”149 Legionaires in nearby Stockton warned that “The time has 
come to teach a lesson that America should be run by and for Americans.” Members of the 
Redwood, California post actively worked to expel Asian immigrant workers from the area.150 
The Detroit Post of the Legion reported that they had created “a reserve police force which 
makes any previous protective measures sink into insignificance.”151 Perhaps the largest 
mobilization of Legion members to support official police and military authority was reported in 
El Paso, Texas, where the representatives of the local post announced that “men [were] 
organizing a home guard consisting of a regiment of three battalions of four hundred men each.” 
The update explained, “This post is near the Mexican border and believes in preparedness.”152 
In many cases, these efforts toward “preparedness” did not necessarily precipitate major 
riots, but in Elaine, “preparedness” certainly maximized the violence that was visited upon the 
sharecroppers who had dared to organize a union. And, Elaine is not the only place where this 
happened. A series of updates between August of 1919 and January of 1920 indicate that pre-
planned Legion involvement also characterized the deadly Omaha riot, which overlapped with 
the events in Elaine. In the August 1st, 1919, edition of the Legion’s weekly magazine, a lengthy 
report was filed describing a meeting between the mayor of Omaha and the members of the 
newly established Douglas County Post of the American Legion there. The mayor made a report 
of union activities to Legion members, inciting them with images of “the red flag of anarchy 
[being] carried down Farnam Street in a parade”, asking them  
“Now what are you going to do with that red flag if it does appear?’ 
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‘Tear it down and tramp on it,’ yelled several members of the Legion.” The mayor 
continued: “‘A wave of anarchy has touched Omaha and we’ve got to stop it….The 
police force would be inadequate in an emergency. So, before I leave this meeting 
tonight, I’m going to obtain from your chairman a roster of The American legion and if 
disturbances arise, I’m going to ask you men of the Legion to help maintain order. Can I 
count on The American Legion?’” The members of the Douglas County Post responded, 
“we’ll say you can!”  
 
The report concluded, “Before they adjourned the members passed a resolution that everything 
savoring of anarchy which might arise in the territory covered by Douglas post should be put 
down immediately and firmly.”153  
The meeting between the mayor and the Legion’s Douglas County post took place on 
June 25th, and was reported in the Legion’s weekly magazine on August 1st. On September 28th, a 
major riot broke out in Omaha, and posses comprised of white civilians, many wearing military 
uniforms, randomly killed and assaulted African Americans throughout the city, and looted or 
burned homes and businesses in the most prominent blocks of the Black section of town over the 
course of three days of violence. Not only did federal troops and police fail to quickly control the 
violence, but as in Elaine, there are numerous reports indicating they may have participated in it. 
Nonetheless, a few weeks later, the October 24th, 1919, edition of the American Legion weekly 
magazine reported that, "The Legion has been complimented by General Wood for the efficient 
aid in handling the riots in Omaha. Four hundred members were deputized as special police. ‘I 
hope,’ says the general, ‘that throughout the length and breadth of this land the Legion will make 
arrangements to meet any situation of lawlessness which may arise.’”154 Such arrangements were 
indeed being made in numerous states representing every region of the country.  
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The Legion received criticism from some quarters, on the grounds that their extreme 
tactics were creating disorder rather than preventing it. But in spite of these occasional dissenting 
voices, newly formed posts of the Legion continued to establish close relationships with law 
enforcement agencies and were allowed to act as a kind of special police force in many of the 
communities where they operated, despite the violent and repressive tactics they often employed. 
For many, the Legion’s involvement in violence and threats of violence may have been an 
attractive, rather than a repellent aspect of the organization. The January 9th, 1920 edition of the 
magazine included a report from the Richard L. Kitchens Post out of Helena, Arkansas – the 
same post whose members had been placed in charge of posses that engaged in killing sprees 
during the Elaine Massacre three months earlier in October. “There are now over 400 members 
in Richard L. Kitchens Post,” read the report, “the membership having been doubled in the recent 
drive.” 
Even with all this evidence of overlapping membership in vigilante groups, private 
militias, state militias, police and military forces, it is still tempting to imagine that the resultant 
violence was caused by mismanagement. If only the lawfully constituted authorities had handled 
these incidents, un-“aided” by private/vigilante groups, perhaps their behaviors would have been 
less characterized by prejudice and one-sided violence.  
Here, I turn to a second body of evidence, which consists of legal manuals that govern the 
lawful use of force in the suppression of civil disorders. I focus on three patterns related to 
militarized violence during the wartime and Red Summer riots, patterns that have been the most 
widely critiqued in literature from history, sociology, and political science: First, that when 
troops were called to restore order, they used excessive force. Second, that more often than not, 
when troops were called in, they sided with the aggressors, and failed to protect the targets of 
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violence, that is, failed to protect black people, or in other regions of the country Mexican- and 
Asian-Americans, and instead either didn’t intervene or actively joined in white mobs’ violence 
against various racialized groups, including immigrant “foreigners.” And third, that the rights of 
criminal defendants were not respected during the trials and investigations that followed the 
riots, leading to an unequal (and in some cases grossly inaccurate) distribution of blame, such 
that union members and people of color involved in riots faced sanctions ranging from expulsion 
from their communities to torture and legal execution, while very few white rioters were ever 
held to account for their behavior.   
In the remainder of this chapter, I examine each of these patterns and demonstrate that 
they are not a result of vigilante groups’ encroachment on authority of lawfully constituted 
police, nor do they represent a failure of “the rule of law” when it is corrupted by prejudice. In 
fact, each of these patterns is a manifestation of how the rule of law works during a crisis, and 
each pattern reflected adherence to – not deviation from – the laws of military behavior 
governing domestic emergencies. 
 
The Use of Excessive Force by Police and Troops 
Certainly, when you read depictions of the major conflicts of the period, the amount of 
force, and the destructiveness of the weapons used, seems excessive, particularly when you 
consider these involved conflicts between citizens, not conflicts with a wartime enemy. In East 
St. Louis, for example, at least 50 persons were killed and 250 buildings were destroyed.155 In 
Omaha and Elaine, military units used artillery and mounted machine guns against civilians who 
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were either unarmed, or armed only with rifles, rocks, and clubs.156 In a number of the riots, the 
death toll didn’t start to rise until after the military was called in, even though the most 
commonly stated justification for activating troops was generally to prevent the loss of life.  
But when you compare the actions of troops to guidelines on the use of force to suppress 
civil disorders, it becomes clear that excessive violence is explicitly called for by central tenets 
of emergency law. Emergency law places decisions about force squarely in the hands of 
whatever authority is invested with the power to declare the exception. As articulated in Byron 
Bargar’s manual on The Law and Customs of Riot Duty (quoting the Supreme Court in Luther v. 
Borden), “Power is essential to the existence of every government…The State itself must 
determine the degree of force the crisis demands.”157 Bargar goes on to say that “the enforcement 
of law by the military arm of the government is necessarily arbitrary and harsh.”158 What are the 
limits on this arbitrary and harsh form of government? Legal texts indicate that once the 
emergency is over people are welcome to sue whomever they want, but while the emergency is 
in effect, “whatever force is requisite, is lawful.”159  
Byron Bargar is not a lone voice – he represents an uncontroversial consensus view in 
legal texts published during the 1910s and 1920s. The War Department’s own manual required 
that troops called on to put down disorder do so “with as little force as possible” yet the very 
next sentence immediately transformed this limitation by saying that “In the majority of cases the 
way to accomplish this is to use at once all force necessary to stop the disorder.”160 In the War 
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Department’s manual, “as little force as possible” is accomplished by the use of “all force 
necessary,” which is essentially the same principle as Bargar’s assertion that the state can use 
“whatever force is requisite.” The War Department goes on to summarize the priorities of troops 
called to riot duty as follows: “Allow no tumultuous gathering; permit no delay; a few stern, 
resolute words; if these be not heeded, then strike resolutely, boldly; let there be no hesitation; if 
necessary, take life at the outset.”161 The use of excessive force was permitted, even required by 
law, and the determination of what amount of force was requisite was left solely to the discretion 
of individual authorities called to respond to the crisis.  
This transference onto “individual discretion” is part of why norms of whiteness, 
masculinity and ‘Americanism’ were and are such important technologies for determining who 
can legitimately perpetrate violence. When violence is executed, its success or failure is a 
manifestation of the success or failure of individual men. This narrative facilitates the twin 
discursive processes of scapegoating on the one hand, and lionizing on the other, both of which 
attribute responsibility for violence onto individual men, while obfuscating the source and 
authorization of violence in rules of law. In the words of Brigadier General Louis Babcock, 
“Officers must rely upon their common sense and military judgment, rather than upon set rules, 
in solving the ever-changing problems arising in the performance of this important duty.”162 
Since the execution of state power during times of crisis relied on Officers’ “common sense and 
judgement,” rather than “set rules,” military experts agreed that “An ambitious officer may, by 
decisive action and proper disposition of troops, acquire fame.”163  
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Troops Act Prejudicially toward Different Classes of Rioters 
Troops summoned for riot duty sometimes had no information or wrong information 
when they arrived on the scene. In Elaine, Arkansas, for example, troops from Camp Pike were 
told that a Bolshevist-inspired sharecroppers’ uprising was taking place, when in fact the sheriff 
had initiated an unprovoked attack on a lawful meeting of a sharecroppers union. When troops 
arrived on the scene, they joined in the violence of the white mob rather than putting a stop to it, 
because that’s what they had been called in to do. In other riots I have mentioned military leaders 
were called in and told of generic racial and industrial disturbance. When soldiers arrived on the 
scene their version of “restoring order” in involved the wholesale destruction of some of the 
most successful and prominent African American neighborhoods of cities such as East St. Louis, 
Chicago, Omaha, and Tulsa, and the displacement of thousands of residents (in addition to high 
death tolls).  
This kind of complicity, or obvious taking of sides, is rightfully criticized in historical 
and legal assessments of these incidents. But what is mentioned less often is that soldiers and 
officers who behaved in these ways may have been following the law, not simply corrupting it 
with their personal prejudices. Brigadier General Louis Babcock’s “Manual for the Use of 
Troops in Aid of the Civil Authority,” (1918) refers frequently to the “lawless element,” as in 
this passage: “The frequency of explosions of dynamite and other high explosives laid by the 
lawless element in our large cities, shows the danger to be apprehended from this source in times 
of riot and disorder.”164 The invocation of bombs and explosives, and the association of the 
bomb-wielder with an unspecified “lawless element” carried all the weight of the classed, 
racialized, sexualized tropes of “lawlessness” I have previously discussed. Of course, there were 
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anarchists and Bolsheviks during this time who did plant bombs and explosives, but in passages 
like these the law subtly draws on that truth to make a more questionable assertion that in any 
time of riot and disorder, the military’s first response should be to crack down on the “lawless 
element,” regardless of whether any actual bombs or actual anarchists or Bolsheviks were 
involved.  
Byron Bargar’s manual advocates that “forces may be used in a general round-up of the 
disorderly elements of the community,” predicting that “When the jails are full of these people, 
lawlessness will begin to disappear.”165 The War Department’s manual agrees, stating that, “in 
some cases, where resistance is particularly bitter it may be necessary to evict all the inhabitants 
of some blocks.”166 The War Department goes even further, providing a very specific list of 
exactly who comprises this lawless element of society: professional agitators, anarchists, 
socialists, thieves, cutthroats, vagabonds, and ruffians.167 Notice how this list creates an amalgam 
of wartime enemies, criminals, and ideological or political enemies: drawing on the earliest 
colonial discourses from frontier, border, and plantation of who is an appropriate target for lynch 
law/emergency law, terms that over several hundred years came to carry particular types of 
classed, gendered, and racialized meanings. 
In cases where the military came in and sided with particular classes of citizenry, rather 
than saying that this represents incompetence or prejudice or corruption, it’s important to note 
that these types of distinctions were spelled out by law. As symbolized in Figure 25, military 
leaders who were properly prepared to administer martial law in a community affected by a 
strike, riot, or insurrection, would have been prepared to preventatively declare areas of the city 
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to be sources of “disorder,” and target these areas for mass removal as a legal tactic or strategy 
for “restoring order.”  
 
Figure 25: "Driving Em Out," Robert Hanson, The Great Bisbee Deportation, 22. 
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Suspected Rioters Were Abused 
This is an especially prominent theme in analyses of the Elaine Race Riot, or the Elaine 
Massacre as some prefer to call it. One of the most widely criticized aspects of this incident was 
the use of torture to extract false confessions from the sharecropper union’s leaders regarding the 
supposed uprising. During and after the riot, hundreds of African Americans were arrested, and 
first questioned separately as to who the union organizers were and the details of their planned 
insurrection. When confessions and details were not forthcoming, certain individuals were 
identified who were most suspected of wrong-doing based on the limited intelligence available 
from the Committee of Seven’s infiltration of the union in the weeks leading up to the conflict. 
These individuals were separated from the rest of the group and tortured, often within earshot of 
the other arrestees. Then a new round of interrogations of all the arrestees would begin. This 
continued for several rounds over the course of more than a week until finally twelve African 
American men were identified as union ringleaders. They were charged with responsibility for 
the five white deaths that occurred, hastily convicted in a jury trial, and sentenced to death by a 
judge. No one was ever prosecuted or convicted for the 250+ African American deaths that 
occurred, deaths that were explained away by discourses of necessity and emergency.    
Although the sharecroppers’ convictions would eventually be struck down by the 
Supreme Court, it should be noted that the police and military were following, almost to the 
letter, emergency law pertaining to the use of the military in civil disorders, which had this to say 
about the interrogation of prisoners: 
Catch the…apparent leaders of the mob and separate and isolate these men by confining 
them in non-communicating cells of the city prison or county jail. Make out a list of 
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questions …Bring out each man separately and get his answers to these questions. It is 
wonderful what a difference there will be in the answers. Each man knows the truth, but 
each man tells a different lie in order to conceal it. Then proceed to administer 
punishment for the lies told. Then ask the same questions over again. The answers will 
again vary, but some of the men will have weakened and told the truth in some instances. 
Some of the answers to the various questions will be found to corroborate others and thus 
the true answer may be deduced. If not – proceed as before. Punishment and re-
examination and the truth will eventually come out.168 
 
Notably, the residents of Helena, Arkansas bragged throughout the trials that in any other section 
of the country, the men would have been immediately lynched. Helena residents were proud of 
their community for never having had a lynching in the history of the town. However, I would 
suggest that the residents of Philips County did not really need to engage in the practice of 
lynching, because the larger discourse of lynching was so fully incorporated into the laws 
surrounding civil emergencies, which they had successfully defined the sharecroppers union to 
be. There was little need for a Jim Crow style lynching, because emergency doctrines had 
already activated a space of exception where official military violence could occur with 
impunity.   
This brings me to the conclusion, and to the title of this chapter, the notion of “The Use 
of Organized Bodies.” In this chapter I have suggested that the U.S. system of law emerged out 
of an amalgam of practices from border, frontier and plantation that included racialized structural 
exceptions, designed to allow an incredible unleashing of state sanctioned violence, with gender 
used as a key technology for naturalizing violence and disavowing responsibility for perpetration 
onto men instead of law. I have called attention to how the discourse of emergency allowed 
disparate private and social forces to be organized into official bodies: vigilante groups, sheriff’s 
posses, military units – bodies of people who were authorized to engage in violence – as well as 
bodies of law that provided a structure of legitimation within which these individuals were 
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permitted to act with wide latitude. The next chapter offers a more in-depth case study of an 
incident when this occurred: the Elaine riots of 1919.  
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CHAPTER 4 
The State and the Mob in the Elaine Riot of 1919 
 
Communities may not be able to stop agitation or effectively counteract it,  
but they can see that the processes of law are applied with severity.  
– “Race Riots,” Helena World, October 11, 1919  
 
 Small and innocuous, the plaque in the American Legion Hut in Helena, Arkansas, which 
honors local veterans of World War I, might leave a careful reader feeling disconcerted. “Erected 
as a tribute to the patriotism of the boys of Helena who so nobly gave their lives at their 
countries call,” [sic] the plaque includes the names of six men (Figure 26). Four of these were 
enlisted soldiers who died after battles in France in the autumn of 1918: Mike Hammett and 
Marvin Grauman, both killed in action; Richard Kitchens, who died in-country of pneumonia; 
Figure 26: Photo taken by author, 2013. American Legion Hall, Helena, Arkansas. 
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and John Connelly, who was wounded in battle and later died in a government hospital in the 
U.S. The listing of these names on a memorial to soldiers’ sacrifices during the First World War 
is unsurprising. But following them, the names James Tappan and Clinton Lee appear, both 
described as having been “Killed Oct. 1st, 1919, Elaine Riot.”169 This is odd because, by October 
of 1919, the First World War had been over for quite some time. A formal armistice was 
declared in November of 1918, and the Treaty of Versailles was signed in June of 1919. James 
Tappan and Clinton Lee were no longer members of the armed forces when they died in October 
of 1919, having been discharged several months earlier when hostilities ended.170 Their deaths 
occurred less than 20 miles from their homes in Phillips County, Arkansas – 4,500 miles away 
from European warzones, and nearly a year after the end of combat. Both men were killed during 
a domestic racial conflict, the Elaine race riot, which erupted in response to a unionization effort 
spearheaded by black sharecroppers. How did James Tappan and Clinton Lee, who died during a 
conflict driven by the violent racialized economies of cotton production in the Mississippi River 
Delta region, end up on the same plaque with the names of men who died the previous year in 
hospitals and battlefields thousands of miles away, in a global military conflagration?   
 Answering this question requires understanding the story of the Elaine race riot, a story 
which is typically remembered – when it is remembered at all – as an example of extralegal mob 
violence that exemplifies southern (in)justice at the height of the Jim Crow era.171 I hope to 
instead explore how the violence that unfolded in 1919 in Arkansas was an example of 
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legitimized, state-sanctioned violence, justified by reference to national emergency conditions, 
and carried out by constituted authorities at the local, state, and federal level.  
In light of this, and in ways that might prove surprising, the American Legion plaque 
actually serves as an uncannily accurate public rendering of the political and cultural logics that 
were responsible for the violence that occurred in Phillips County nearly one hundred years ago. 
Historically incongruous though it might be, the plaque admits openly what most other 
treatments of the riot ignore or gloss over: that the white men who slaughtered black 
sharecroppers in the swamps and canebrakes of Phillips County did so “at their country’s call.” 
They did so during a spasm of national violence that was a direct extension of the militarized 
culture of a nation at war; in fact, their violence was so much an extension of the nation’s 
involvement in World War I, the names of two white men who died during the riots could be 
placed next to the names of other men who died in the battlefields of France, and this would 
seem perfectly coherent to their fellow veterans who wished to preserve and honor their memory. 
The plaque was intended to provide a certain kind of closure for the white residents of Phillips 
County, who were invested in constructing their use of violence against black sharecroppers as 
ethical violence in service to the nation-state – violence that was necessary for the restoration of 
pre-war normalcy in a new post-war social landscape. But, seen from a different perspective, the 
plaque could also be said to represent a failure of closure, because in its admission of the 
relationship between the waging of international war and the perpetration of domestic race riot, it 
provides an opening through which a critique of state violence can be formulated.   
This chapter tells the story of the riot, highlighting the extent to which it reflected 
patterns of state power (local, state, and federal), rather than being a result of unchecked mob 
violence or mob “domination.” I show how the riot emerged from expanded civilian and official 
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policing, which itself was a reflection of the militarization of culture in a nation at war. My aim 
in re-telling this story is to place it in a national and global context, to highlight the role of state 
action, and to call attention to details that have gone un- or under-analyzed in past treatments. 
 
The Elaine Riots of 1919 
By the time shots were exchanged between white lawmen and black sharecroppers late at 
night on September 30th of 1919, white residents of Phillips County had been in a state of high 
alert for several years. A smaller group of men representing the leading business and political 
interests of the area had spent at least three weeks preparing for an all-out race war. The details 
of the night in question are open to debate – who fired the first shot? Did police set out to harass 
the sharecroppers, or were the officers ambushed by armed guards while pulled over to fix a flat 
tire on their squad car? These questions are significant, but more important than the answers 
(which are unknowable), is the fact that the apparent emergency of an armed confrontation came 
out of a long chain of escalating tensions and official preparation for violence. When a 
confrontation finally occurred, it had all the desperate characteristics of an emergency – chaotic 
movements of people, tragic misunderstandings and accidents, mass killings over a dispersed 
area, and official confusion that at times reached the level of collective hysteria. Though it may 
be an apt descriptor however, the temporal connotations of the term emergency, which invokes 
sudden and unexpected danger, belies the careful, long-term cultivation that set the stage for the 
events that would unfold.   
On the night of the initial shoot-out, a deputy sheriff, accompanied by a railroad security 
agent and a black trusty172, were driving near a tiny settlement called Hoop Spur when they came 
                                                          
172 This is an inmate who is trusted by the police and given more freedoms in exchange for services/help. For 
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upon a secretive meeting of a nascent organization for sharecroppers, the Progressive Farmers 
and Household Union (PFHU). The officers stated that they stumbled on the gathering while in 
pursuit of a bootlegger, after they pulled off the road to fix a flat tire. They alleged that black 
union members standing guard outside the meeting opened fire on the lawmen after they 
accidentally came into their vicinity, immediately killing the railroad security agent and 
wounding the deputy sheriff. The injured officer and unharmed trusty escaped in different 
directions and alerted Sebastian Straub and Frank Kitchens from the Phillips County sheriff’s 
office in Helena that a shooting had taken place. The law enforcement officers at the scene of the 
shoot-out were initially uncertain of the nature of the trouble, and speculated that they had 
disrupted a large bootlegging operation – or at least this is what was reported to the local press. 
But Sheriff Kitchens and Acting Sheriff Straub believed they had something more significant on 
their hands. Both men had heard rumors that sharecroppers were planning to cause trouble and 
wondered if this was what their deputies had actually interrupted. Through the early hours of the 
morning, they gathered local men into posses, and waited for daylight to find and arrest the 
shooters.   
By the morning of October 1st, as posses set out for Hoop Spur (just a few miles north of 
the slightly larger town of Elaine), the incident that would soon be known as the Elaine race riots 
had barely begun, and yet there were already different, and contradictory stories circulating 
about what had happened outside the church the night before. The local paper reported that an 
officer had been ambushed and killed by members of a bootlegging operation.173 The posse 
members who set out for Hoop Spur were under the impression they might be on their way to put 
down some sort of black tenants’ uprising. Members of the Progressive Farmers and Household 
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Union (PFHU), who had rushed home or scattered into the woods following the shoot-out, 
reported to family and friends that the deputy sheriff’s gang had fired on their meeting 
unprovoked, killing several persons. Some claimed that their own guards fired no shots; others 
held that if the guards did shoot it was only in self-defense. Union members suspected that the 
men who shot at the church had gone to Hoop Spur with the deliberate intention of breaking up 
their meeting. About fifty black men, concerned that retaliatory violence would soon follow, 
gathered at the home of union leader Frank Moore (the “Moore” of Moore v. Dempsey). They 
were armed with rifles, and prepared to defend themselves.174 Other black residents – those who 
knew something was amiss – hid in their homes or prepared to take refuge in the intricate 
network of swamps, canebrakes, and bayous characteristic of the delta. They did not realize that 
a white security agent had been killed, but even without this information, they were aware of the 
implications of what had happened the night before. Shooting at white men, whether they were 
private citizens or police, was likely to bring a violent response.175  
The question of whether the police stumbled on the meeting accidentally, or came 
intending to break it up, and the question of who actually fired the first shots, are among the 
many details of the Elaine race riots that might never be known definitively. For their part, the 
local sheriff’s office was active in the summer and fall of 1919, trying to rid Phillips County of 
bootleggers. Arkansas was one of several states that passed its own prohibition legislation about 
a year in advance of the 18th amendment, which did not go into effect until 1920. Crime reports 
in the Helena World in the weeks and months leading up to October of 1919 were dominated by 
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cases of people charged with the illegal sale and transport of whiskey and mash, indicating that 
the sheriff’s office did expend considerable time and energy enforcing the newly enacted ban on 
alcohol. Their story of stumbling on the union meeting in pursuit of a bootlegger is plausible 
considering the larger context of escalating conflicts between bootleggers and sheriffs in 
Arkansas and across the nation at the start of the Prohibition era.  
If the deputies did stumble on the meeting by accident, it is also plausible that the black 
guards stationed outside the union meeting might have shot at them. Many historians who have 
studied Elaine have been reluctant to acknowledge this, since it seems to disrupt a simpler and 
more comfortable narrative of unmitigated white violence perpetrated against a passive and 
therefore “innocent” black population.176 Yet as scholars of black political culture more 
generally have pointed out, a tradition of organizing – including militant resistance to racial and 
economic oppression – had existed throughout the south since at least the antebellum era.177 This 
was particularly true in Helena and in Phillips County more broadly, which had been a center of 
black political life in Arkansas since the Civil War, and which enjoyed a black-majority 
population of 75%, lending black residents a certain degree of influence even in the face of 
systematic exclusion from the official realms of politics. Jeannie Whayne, an expert in Arkansas 
history who has closely studied the riot, points out “The fact is that the black union organizers 
were men, southern men. They were angry over their treatment, they understood the seriousness 
of the actions they were taking, they were familiar with guns, and they were ready to use 
them.”178 The union chose to station armed guards outside their meeting because they were 
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prepared for trouble; if confronted by a group of armed white men late at night it may well be 
they fired on the deputy’s car, either pre-emptively or in self-defense.  
On the other hand, there are plenty of indicators that the deputy’s interruption of the 
PFHU’s meeting was not coincidental or accidental – the story told by the sharecroppers, that 
their meeting was interrupted as a deliberate act of anti-union intimidation, and that they were 
fired on unprovoked, is equally plausible. World War I dramatically altered social and economic 
conditions throughout the nation. Relations between white and black communities, as well as 
between capital and labor more broadly, deteriorated significantly after the U.S.’s entry to the 
war in 1917. Anti-black and anti-union sentiment were fueled by an amalgam of volatile political 
currents. Starting in the early 1910s, build-up to the war increased global demand for raw 
materials and consumer goods, and the burden of meeting this demand fell largely on the U.S, 
even more so after armed conflict broke out in Europe and Africa. Rising wartime prices were a 
potential economic boon for landowners and industrial capitalists, but for common laborers they 
amounted to dangerous inflation unless wages rose concurrently. Unions representing workers in 
most major industries initiated strikes and other labor actions designed to claim their share of 
wartime profits.179 
But although unions were widespread and ostensibly popular amongst some groups of 
Americans, union activity during wartime attracted criticism. To belong to a union, which would 
negotiate with employers for a fair contract, was acceptable. To go on strike or otherwise cause a 
work stoppage or slow-down was more controversial. Representatives of the War Department 
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and the Commerce Department of the Council on National Defense released statements 
criticizing workers who went on strike, which they argued was at best unpatriotic, and at worst 
treasonous, to the extent that such actions interfered with U.S. war readiness.180 The New York 
Times supported the positions of these government institutions, editorializing that “The 
Government’s difficulty is not the opportunity for the establishment of the unlawful activities of 
unionism or for the unfair betterment of conditions of organized labor at the expense of non-
unionists and taxpayers alike.” Editors of the Helena World took care to reprint such statements, 
usually accompanied with a special note emphasizing that local leaders’ opinions aligned with 
those espoused by national bodies. 181 
The association between union membership and anti-Americanism was amplified by 
perceptions that the most militant labor leaders were also immigrants, legally considered white 
but hailing from racially suspect national, religious, and cultural groups. The confluence of 
patriotic pro-war and anti-immigrant nationalism became all the more potent after the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917, which added the specter of a global communist threat to existent concerns 
about connections between unionism, immigration, and anti-Americanism. Although African 
Americans were not immigrants, they too came in for increased scrutiny as a result of combined 
pro-war, anti-immigrant, and anti-communist sentiment. J. Edgar Hoover, the first director of the 
F.B.I., (newly created in 1919, but preceded by a similar organization called the Bureau of 
Investigation, founded in 1908), considered the militancy of African Americans among the 
number one domestic threats facing the nation in the years during and following WWI. These 
national investigating bodies, staffed by federal police drawn from the ranks of secret service 
agents and U.S. marshals and working alongside the Military Intelligence Bureau, expended 
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considerable resources on the surveillance of African American political and social 
organizations. They also censored black newspapers and investigated individuals considered to 
be influential leaders. African Americans were thought to be especially vulnerable to Bolshevik 
propaganda; they were considered easily deceived by whites who encouraged them toward social 
agitation and rebellion.182 A national narrative developed over the course of WWI that connected 
pro-war nationalism with anti-immigrant sentiment and suspicions of union organizing; these 
currents combined and were transformed into a politics of anti-blackness.  
In Phillips County, Arkansas, this national dynamic manifested in day-to-day tensions 
over the movements of strangers through the area, and growing suspicions among white 
landowners and merchants that something nefarious was afoot with the laboring population of 
black tenants. Residents carefully followed national debates over restrictions on immigrants, 
which were considered a badly needed national security measure. Proposed restrictions (the 
majority of which were put into effect) required alien enemies to obtain a permit for travel, 
prohibited them from coming within 100 yards of docks or ports, and banned them from 
traveling on waterways. Phillips County’s boundaries were comprised of the Mississippi River 
on the east and the White River on the west and so Helena, on the Mississippi side, was the home 
of depots and spurs for several major rail lines. In fact, Helena was one of the only port towns, 
and certainly the largest, to be found on the long stretch of the Mississippi river extending 
between Memphis, Tennessee, and Vicksburg, Mississippi, a geographical factor that had long 
influenced patterns of trade and settlement in the area. The proliferation of rail and water travel 
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in and around Helena meant it was the home of industrial facilities – not just endless fields of 
cotton and giant stands of river-grown timber, but also the mills, gins, and factories required to 
process these raw materials and prepare them for transport to urban centers such as New Orleans, 
Memphis, St. Louis, and Chicago. Many local residents considered their town to be a potentially 
strategic target for hostile internal enemies and felt personally invested in helping to enforce new 
wartime restrictions.  
In early October of 1917, a dredge boat exploded at Crittenden, about 80 miles north of 
Helena, and although the cause of the explosion was never determined, it was widely suspected 
that pro-German spies were to blame. Over the following weeks, Helena’s daily local paper 
printed a series of plausible, but unsubstantiated rumors – that one of the men implicated in the 
explosion had mailed a trunk to Helena, that the trunk contained nitroglycerine, and that one or 
more agents of the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.)183 was “headed to Helena with the 
intention of committing some sort of overt act.”184 Sheriff Frank Kitchens notified mills, 
factories, and compresses around the county to place extra guards on their property. Local 
residents speculated as to whether the I.W.W. might be involved in recent disruptions to their 
telephone service. The editor of the paper advised the reading public that “careful watch be 
maintained by the people of Helena and vicinity for strangers who cannot give proper accounts 
of themselves,” a description that very well could have applied to black union organizers from 
nearby counties, and white lawyers from Little Rock, who would soon begin to travel and speak 
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at late-night meetings of laborers and tenants in secret locations scattered through the 
backwoods. E.M. Allen, president of the recently founded Helena Men’s Business League, 
warned the public that, “since this country entered the great war, German interests, directed from 
a central office in this country, have been doing everything possible to encourage strikes, labor 
troubles and internal strife of every nature wherever the opportunity presented itself.”185 
Undoubtedly, “internal strife of every nature” included the deliberate provocation of racial 
hostilities as a means to undermine America’s social cohesion, not to mention its labor force. 
Allen reiterated instructions that the newspaper had printed previously: “Citizens everywhere are 
warned to question the loyalty of any men or group of men who attempt to demoralize civic 
activities.”186 The editor of Helena’s paper recommended that “immediate action [against such 
individuals] be taken when deemed necessary,” following this with the ominous statement that 
“what this action should be should not be difficult to determine.”187 In case anyone did have 
difficulty ascertaining what action was needed, an editorial a few days later asserted that 
organizations like the I.W.W. “should be stamped out completely by the Government. Members 
of it should be treated as they deserve, even to assessing the death penalty. When a house is 
infested with rattlesnakes, there is but one logical thing to do, and that is to kill the snakes.”188   
As in other parts of the country, concerns about pro-German and/or pro-Bolshevik 
influence manifested partially through increased suspicion and surveillance of black 
communities in and around Helena and the larger Phillips county area. Helena’s management of 
race vis a vis the larger war effort consisted of active surveillance and repression, carried out by 
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police and military officials, complemented by a more subtle and insidious campaign of positive 
propaganda, directed by a variety of social and civic institutions. The Bureau of Intelligence and 
the Military Intelligence Bureau kept tabs on even the smallest and most innocuous black 
organizations; for example, in Helena, they monitored The Royal Circle of Friends, an all-black 
burial insurance society founded by Helena resident R.A. Williams, which allowed poor and 
working-class people to pool their money so they could afford headstones and funeral services 
when one of their community passed away.189 Despite the apolitical nature of such a service, the 
Royal Circle was organized along the lines of a fraternal organization, a type of group that 
inspired fearful curiosity on the part of government agents because of their secretive nature and 
thus their potential to act as an alibi for political organizing. Black churches and schools were 
specially targeted for visits from members of the Phillips County Home Defense Council, which 
helped to coordinate war readiness activities at the local level. The organization dispatched 
“four-minute men” and representatives of civic organizations like the YMCA and the Red Cross 
to deliver pro-war speeches tailored to reach black audiences.190   
Such propaganda efforts were occurring all over the country, and a number of influential 
black leaders threw their support behind the war. Widespread black support for the war was not 
enough, however, to appease the suspicions of many whites, or of the government agencies 
charged with domestic intelligence and policing. Nor did their support for the war minimize 
black communities’ rejection of a racially restricted democracy. The contradiction between 
fighting a global war “to make the world safe for democracy” while racial violence and 
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segregation at home persisted, proved difficult for many black citizens (and especially for black 
soldiers) to tolerate. The critical rhetoric espoused by leading civil rights organizations as the 
war wore on in turn aggravated official suspicions regarding the questionable loyalty of black 
Americans. “Racial feelings,” as they were often called in newspapers, became more and more 
laden with tension and mutual suspicion. Major riots occurred in 1917, first at East St. Louis, and 
then near Camp Logan in Houston, Texas. Following the Houston riot, nineteen black soldiers 
were executed, making the incident one of the largest mass executions in American military 
history. The incident represented the worst fears of whites in terms of the dangers of arming a 
potentially hostile minority racial population; and it also represented the worst fears of black 
people, who noted bitterly that the soldiers’ willingness to sacrifice for the nation had been 
rewarded with what amounted to a “legal lynching.”191 After the Houston riots the Helena World 
began to feature regular news items describing African American support for the war, and letters 
from local black enlistees reporting that they were happy and well-treated in their segregated 
military units.192 “Those who have an idea that such soldiers are mistreated or deprived of their 
rights in the army should read what Simmons has to say,” advised the newspaper editor in a 
preface to one such letter.193 From the small offices of a rural southern newspaper, to the grand 
halls of the White House and the War Department, white officials faced the same delicate 
contradiction. Could they cultivate black patriotism without fueling black nationalism? Could 
they train black soldiers without creating black militants?    
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As explored in more detail in the previous chapter, after the signing of the armistice in 
1918, rather than subside, domestic racial and economic tensions only continued to escalate, with 
groups like the American Legion, the American Protective Counsel, the Citizens Protective 
League, and others engaging in surveillance and law enforcement activities that blurred the 
private-public division of state and policing power.    
As was the case in other areas where American Legion posts were founded, the political 
apparatus of Phillips County viewed the members of this veterans’ organization as natural allies 
in their work to suppress dissension and political agitation, and included them in the elite circle 
of county officers and landholders who were entrusted with law enforcement responsibilities. 
Men like E.M. Allen, president of the Helena Men’s Business League; Phillips County Sheriff 
Frank Kitchens; and former Sheriff Sebastian Straub, were keenly aware of the waves of rioting 
that unfolded across the country in places like Chicago and Washington, DC, as the summer of 
1919 wore on. The news was especially alarming to Sebastian Straub, former sheriff of Phillips 
County and a major landowner and cotton producer, and to Jos. C. Meyers, a merchant who was 
one of the pre-eminent suppliers of “furnish” to sharecroppers in the area.  Both had been 
hearing rumors since the winter of 1918 that “some trouble was brewing” among the 
sharecroppers working in the area. It is not clear if they coordinated their activities or worked 
independently, but both men hired private detectives from Chicago to pose as itinerant laborers, 
and over the course of the winter, spring, and summer of 1919, received from these detectives a 
series of alarming reports indicating that black farmers, including a number of veterans, were 
holding secret meetings, often late at night. Some of these meetings had been visited by white 
men. Late in the summer of 1919, these detectives told Straub that the sharecroppers’ planned to 
demand a “settlement” from their landlords, and when this settlement was not forthcoming they 
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alleged the sharecroppers had a list of 21 landowners who would be killed along with their 
families, and their land redistributed amongst union members. In September, Sheriff Frank 
Kitchens developed a protracted illness, and Straub was appointed acting sheriff of the county.194 
Undoubtedly he viewed his activities spying on local sharecroppers as an extension of his duties 
as a lawman. He continued the surveillance, discussed his knowledge with members of the 
Men’s Business League, and informed the families who were supposed to be the targets of the 
sharecroppers’ insurrection that they should prepare for trouble in early October.  
Individual planters took action based on these reports, or not, depending on the 
seriousness with which they took the supposed threat.195 But members of the Men’s Business 
League and of the recently founded local post of the American Legion evidently took the reports 
very seriously. With officers from Camp Pike and Fort Smith, they began to coordinate 
emergency preparations for possible racial violence in Phillips County. As early as August 14th, 
about six weeks prior to the start of the Elaine riots on October 1st, the potential for racial 
conflict in the area, and the role that local law enforcement, military units, and white veterans 
should play if such conflict were to occur, was the subject of advance conversation, preparation, 
and planning. At a whites-only event celebrating the founding of the Richard L Kitchens Post of 
the American Legion in Helena, members of the Men’s Business League approached U.S. Army 
major general S.D. Sturgis, who advised them that “the army…could provide troops to quell 
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domestic violence, but only in an extreme emergency.”196 For any disturbances that fell short of 
this “extreme emergency” standard, the Legion members eagerly volunteered their services. 
In light of the fact that Sebastian Straub and Jos. Meyers – aided by local landholders, 
private detectives, police officers, and black residents – had been spying on the PFHU for almost 
a year leading up to the riot, and had specifically identified October 6th as the date of an alleged 
insurrection, the black sharecroppers’ suspicion that police were sent a week in advance to 
deliberately break up their meeting cannot be easily dismissed. The fact that Sheriff Kitchens and 
Acting Sheriff Straub reported one thing to the newspaper, yet told the posses they activated 
something different, also does not speak well to the integrity of their story. Influential black 
spokespeople at the national level found every aspect of the story – from the allegations of a 
planned insurrection, to the idea of the police innocently wandering into the union’s meeting 
while fixing their flat tire – to be frankly incredible. “The persons capable of planning and 
executing such a terrible deed were not above furnishing that excuse for their action,” stated Ida 
B. Wells in a booklet on the riot, written based on interviews she conducted with union leaders 
and their wives and distributed by the NAACP to raise funds for the sharecroppers’ legal 
defense. “Had this been a conspiracy of Negroes to kill whites, they would not have started in by 
killing their own members, breaking up their own meeting, nor burning their own church.”197 
Even some whites who accepted the story of the insurrection found the police officer’s story of a 
flat tire outside the union meetinghouse contrived and convenient: “it was …hard to understand 
how it so happened that the car in which [the police] were driving was able to pull through 
several miles of ‘bad’ roads, then suddenly came to a standstill on a ‘good’ road near the negro 
church where the first shots were fired,” wrote Louis Dunaway, reporter for the Arkansas 
                                                          
196 Robert Whitaker, On the Laps of Gods, 78. 
197 Ida Wells Barnett, The Arkansas Race Riot.  
 157 
 
Gazette, in a travelogue published a few years later.198 Certainly, if Meyers and Straub informed 
the Men’s Business League and the threatened plantation owners that “trouble was brewing,” it 
makes sense that they would also inform Sheriff Kitchens, and that he might then make this 
known to his deputies. Once Straub was appointed acting sheriff, he would have been involved 
in decisions about when and where to dispatch personnel. If he was willing as a private citizen to 
hire detectives to spy on the union, surely he would have had no qualms as acting sheriff about 
using police officers to do so (especially if he believed they were conspiring to commit murder). 
In my opinion, even if the specific officers involved in the shoot-out didn’t know exactly what 
they were getting themselves into, when they reported back what happened to Straub and 
Kitchens, these men probably knew that bootleggers were not responsible for the shooting.     
Whether or not the officers intentionally set out to disrupt the union meeting, once they 
realized that was what had happened, Straub and Kitchens worried that union leaders would 
attempt to carry out their rebellion early. In response to this fearsome possibility, the men 
activated their emergency plans for racial violence, plans that had been in development for 
several months, at least since the launching of the local American Legion post in August. They 
made calls to a pre-identified list, and soon a few hundred men, most of them members of the 
Legion, began to gather in downtown Helena and at the mercantile company in Elaine.199 J.W. 
Butts was one man who received the call to arms; his family was on the alleged hit list held by 
the union. Butts’ recollection, committed to writing in 1960, seems to indicate that the sheriff 
already suspected the shootout involved the union, even while his early-morning report to the 
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press stuck to the story of a bootleggers’ ambush. “I was astounded on the morning of October 
1st to receive a telephone call from my brother at approximately 7 o’clock,” he remembers, 
“telling me that trouble had already occurred at Hoop Spur and he was going down to Elaine 
with a group of other men, who had been deputized, and there they would search the trains and 
aid in guarding Elaine.”200 As the men arrived, the sheriff formed them into posses, most of 
which included a mixture of civilians, civil officials, police officers, and veterans. The men were 
deputized, and those that needed them were supplied with guns and extra ammunition. They 
decided to wait for the light of morning to set out toward Hoop Spur and track down the people 
who had been at the church. 
If mass violence was still preventable after the union meeting shootout, it was now 
coalescing into the realm of inevitability. From Helena and Elaine, several large groups of armed 
white men, most with police and military backgrounds, were preparing to go to Hoop Spur to put 
down what they feared might be a kind of modern-day slave revolt. Waiting in farms and fields 
along the way, armed black men – also led by military veterans – lay hidden, waiting to defend 
their families, friends, and neighbors who were hiding in nearby fields and forests. They 
anticipated an onslaught of white violence, provoked by nothing more than the legal and 
nonviolent activities of their chartered farmers’ union. When the two groups clashed, their 
combined military training (and more generally, the militarized culture that now governed race 
relations in the county and the country at large) all but guaranteed deadly results.   
As dawn turned to daylight, armed white men from Elaine to the south and from Helena 
to the north converged on the stretch of riverfront cotton fields near Hoop Spur. “We were all 
loaded and ready,” recalled Henry Bernard, “and the American Legion met us there.”201 The men 
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drew on their experience in the army to form platoons led by ex-servicemen, while a lookout on 
horseback directed them toward any congregation of black people he happened to spot. Bernard 
remembers the groups’ coordinated movements: 
He says, ‘There’s a big gang over there in that cotton field.’ We went over there, and they 
took to the woods. And he said ‘There’s another one down this bayou,’ said there were 
some 45 or 50. So we got in the corn field and went down this bayou to flank the house. 
When they saw us, they got in this bayou.202 
 
Dr. Butts did not collect oral histories from black residents of Helena, but it is not that great a 
challenge to read through the testimony of white posse members and imagine the sharecroppers’ 
perspectives. Some of them had been trying to form a union and had been shot at the night 
before, with some of their members killed. Others were aware of the union’s meetings and 
thought the idea, on the whole, ill-advised, either because they genuinely opposed unionization, 
or because they feared precisely this sort of reaction on the part of white authorities.203 Still 
others might not have been aware of the union’s activities and were simply on their way to work 
in the morning. Regardless of their knowledge about or opinion of the union however, black 
people in southern Phillips County were confronted that morning by large groups of armed white 
men marching against them in military formation. They saw the thick roughage of corn, cotton, 
and cane that thrived in the Mississippi river’s marshy inlets and bayous, and took cover in its 
protection as fast as they possibly could.204    
 Posse members took the sharecroppers’ evasive actions as evidence, not of fear or self-
preservation, but of guilt, and became even more aggressive in their attempts to chase black 
people down, firing shots after them as they tried to run away. Ed Ware, secretary of the union, 
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had already heard rumors that posses were forming to do violence. He was near his house 
discussing these reports with a neighbor when he saw one of the platoons come around the bend 
and proceed toward his land: 
I went out in my field about 200 yards from my house, sitting there talking to two other 
men about the threats that I had just received. I happened to look up and I saw a Negro by 
the name of Kid Collins running down the road in front of my house and followed by a 
crowd of white men. […] They had almost surrounded my house when the old man, 
Charley Robinson, and Isaac Bird and myself began to run. The old man was crippled 
and could not run and they shot him down and took him up from there and carried him 
and put him in my wife’s bed and let him stay there four days.205  
 
Joseph Fox and Albert Giles had a similar recollection of that morning: “we saw about 150 
armed white men coming to our house and we left the house and ran on down into the woods and 
carried our sister down in the woods with us and they came and hunted us out and they shot at 
the women and killed three men.”206 Frank Moore, whose group included armed men, still chose 
to flee rather than to fight when they saw the size and strength of the posse-platoon formations 
coming after them:  
There was about 300 or 400 white men armed with guns walking and in automobiles at 
the railroad coming from Elaine to kill us. So we all ran back of the field and just as we 
got back of the field there was a big crowd of white men shooting and killing Jim Miller 
and his children and brother and setting them on fire. So when we saw them shooting and 
burning them we turned running and went to the railroad east from there.207 
 
Large numbers of them did make it to cover, where they began a long period of tense waiting, 
some subsisting in the canebrakes for almost a week before surrendering themselves to military 
authorities.  
It was during the chaos of these morning hours, with multiple posses coming from 
different directions, and then dispersing and chasing after smaller groups of black residents, that 
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posse members James Tappan and Clinton Lee were killed: veterans of the first world war, sons 
of prominent local families, and members of the Richard Kitchens Post of the American Legion 
in Helena. Clinton Lee’s death was blamed on the sharecroppers, supplying the first-degree 
murder charge that was later the basis of twelve capital convictions and a Supreme Court appeal. 
At least one person in Frank Moore’s crowd did fire back at the crowd of men that was pursuing 
them, though black survivors of the event either didn’t know who that person was or 
intentionally avoided naming them. Frank Moore vehemently denies that it was him.208 Ida 
Wells-Barnett, writing of the incident a few months later, did not bother to dispute the possibility 
that Lee was killed by one of the sharecroppers (be it Moore or someone else), but argued that 
the murder charges were invalid because the killing was committed in self-defense:   
Clinton Lee met his death while he and hundreds of other white men were chasing and 
murdering every Negro they could find, driving them from their homes and stalking them 
in the woods and fields as men hunt wild beats. […] Both these white men … were in the 
attacking parties with crowds of other white men. If there was any conspiracy, it would 
seem to be among white men to kill and drive away Negroes.209 
But the white residents of Phillips County, and particularly of Helena, were aggrieved and 
outraged – they shut down virtually the entire city for both men’s funerals a few days later, even 
as the county was still being patrolled by federal troops and martial law remained in effect.210  
The deaths of Tappan and Lee also had a more immediate, and a more chilling effect: 
they made local officials feel they had lost control of the situation. Multiple calls were made: to 
the governor of Arkansas, requesting assistance from federal troops, and to what I believe were 
probably sheriff’s offices, county courthouses, or private homes of pre-identified men in 
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neighboring counties. These calls served to officially mobilize a battalion of 500 federal troops, 
dispatched with the Governor of Arkansas at their side, who arrived the next day (October 2nd),  
and to unofficially mobilize at least 1000 [double check] white men from surrounding counties in 
Arkansas and across the river in Mississippi, who began arriving in Phillips County later in the 
afternoon on October 1st, and continued to arrive over the course of October 2nd. Both the U.S. 
army and the civilians from neighboring counties lent their assistance to put down what they 
believed was some sort of Bolshevik-inspired revolution on the part of the region’s black 
majority; they brought with them hundreds of rifles and a dozen mounted machine guns, 
supplemented by an extra shipment of rifles and ammunition from the police department in 
Memphis, Tennessee. The violence committed following the death of Tappan and Lee ultimately 
escalated into what Bessie Ferguson, the first academic to ever study the riot, would describe as 
“a ruthless and indiscriminate hunting down and killing of negroes.”211 It will likely never be 
known how many people were killed, but estimates range from 100 – 850. The most recent 
comprehensive analysis of the death toll arrived at approximately 250 as the safest estimate 
possible from integrating assorted accounts of what took place.212 To this day, rumors of mass 
graves persist among older black residents of Phillips County.213   
During the first day of the riot, a loose assembly of Phillips County’s leaders and 
powerbrokers began to cohere as a formal investigative body that dubbed itself “The Committee 
of Seven.” Although this body was at first an impromptu collaboration, it was soon given official 
power by the Governor to investigate the riot and issue indictments, and it grew out of previously 
existing relationships forged in the Helena Men’s Business League, The American Legion, and 
                                                          
211 Bessie Ferguson, “The Elaine Race Riot,” Thesis (M.A.), George Peabody College for Teachers, 1927), 60. 
212 Robert Whitaker, On the Laps of Gods. 
213 I first came across mention of this in Whitaker’s text; the rumor was repeated to me when I travelled to Helena 
in April and October of 2013.  
 163 
 
the institutional centers of county politics. The formation of The Committee of Seven and the 
identities of the men entrusted to lead posses typify the state collusion that characterized the 
perpetration of the Elaine Massacre. The members of The Committee of Seven included Frank 
Kitchens, the sheriff of Philips County; T.W. Keesee, Sr., president of the Helena Cotton 
Exchange, and owner of 2000 acres of productive cotton land; J.G. Knight, mayor of Helena; 
E.M. Allen, president of the Helena Businessmen’s League as well as owner of major property-
holdings in the town of Elaine; H.D. Moore, a county judge; E.C. Hornor, president of the Bank 
of Helena with capital invested in more than 12,000 acres of cotton-producing land; and 
Sebastian Straub, another large landowner and Acting Sheriff during the riot. The men who were 
drafted to head up posses also had connections to both private and official realms of power: 
members of the Richard Kitchens American Legion post were all recently demobilized WWI 
combat veterans; Herbert Thompson was a captain in the American Expeditionary Forces in 
France; Dick Dazell was a deputy sheriff; J.G. Myers was a major in the Arkansas National 
Guard; and Amos Jarman was the previous sheriff of the county. Members of the Committee, 
and of posses, had been entrusted with public offices, elected posts, and special appointments; 
they were affiliated with leaders in business, agriculture, politics, and the military. They viewed 
themselves as upholders of law, not as its defilers.  
The language used by the Helena World underscores that the men who participated in the 
posses saw themselves as agents of law and order, acting “at their country’s call,” as the Legion 
plaque would later reiterate. They were participating as supplemental troops – emergency first 
responders if you will – in an urgent military mission. In its first lengthy article following the 
initial day of rioting, the paper’s narration of the previous day’s events describes a sophisticated 
military operation. They twice refer to the conflict as a “race war.” While describing a brief 
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period of calm that was interrupted by renewed rumors of trouble, the paper declares that 
“another battle appeared to be imminent.” Members of posses were “maintaining headquarters” 
at strategic locations, while county judge H.D. Moore acted as a kind of communications officer 
and “set at a desk with a telephone at his elbow and kept in constant communication with posse 
leaders.” Judge Moore also coordinated with the Assistant Superintendent of the Missouri Pacific 
railway to send special trains of armed men between Helena and Elaine “at a moment’s notice” if 
needed. James Tappan was said to have been “shot from a ‘trench’ while crossing a field in 
company with two other young fellows,” language that is remarkably reminiscent of the 
experiences of “trench warfare” that defined WWI for most common soldiers, and was now 
transplanted by newspaper editors to the cotton fields of Arkansas, where the rich farmland was 
laced with miles of canals and irrigation ditches. When describing veterans, the paper identified 
posse members by both name and military ranking. As the first day of fighting wore on and 
nighttime approached, the men waited eagerly for federal troops from Little Rock; if they 
constituted a mob you might think they would fear the arrival of troops, but instead they mention 
the “cheering news” that solders are on the way, indicating that they saw the battalion as 
reinforcements coming to their aid.  
While waiting overnight, the large platoons of men divided themselves into smaller 
groups of three to five armed citizens who then “patrolled each block in the downtown and 
residential sections of the city,” while “a small army waited at the Phillips county court house to 
respond to emergency calls.” The men assigned to these duties referred to themselves as 
“sentries,” and enforced a curfew, challenging anyone who tried to pass, and investigating 
reports of shooting and other strange noises.214 They also felt the terror and fear that any soldier 
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does, although the fact that the negro insurrection was almost entirely fabricated meant these 
fears usually proved unfounded. “We that night formed a cordon around the town of Elaine to 
repel any invasion which might come from the woods around, where we knew a world of 
negroes were,” J.W. Butts would later recall. “No incident happened during the night, though I 
was scared as hell when several cows came wandering through the cotton patch where I was 
stationed, and resisted the impulse to shoot.”215  
Platoons, headquarters, patrols, sentries, army. Being “stationed” as part of a “cordon” to 
“repel an invasion.” Constant communication. Special trains. These are not the words of an 
hysterical mob. When one takes the language used by the Helena World holistically, it’s clear 
that the so-called mob violence that occurred during the first and second day of the Elaine riots 
was conceived of, organized, and executed as a sophisticated military operation, albeit a military 
operation carried out with the assistance of many people who were not part of any official 
military hierarchy. In case any doubt remains as to the spirit of cooperation that existed between 
civilian first responders and the official military forces sent to restore order, the sentiment is 
expressed beautifully in a thank you note from Colonel Isaac Jenks to the residents of the county, 
published in the Helena World about a week following the conclusion of the riot:  
On behalf of the officers and men of the United States Army who have been stationed 
among you for the past several days, we wish to express the thanks of the military for the 
hospitality, friendliness, and hearty cooperation accorded us at all times. We speak for all 
our forces here, officers and men, when we say that to serve you in the emergency has 
been a pleasure, and no one rejoices more than we of the Service that the clouds which 
threatened have now disappeared.216 
 Not to be outdone, the soldiers comprising the 76th Field Artillery Unit sent their own thank you 
note:  
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The officers and men of the 76th Field Artillery wish to thank the people of West Helena 
for the kindness and hospitality they have shown us during our stay here. It has been a 
pleasure rather than a duty for us to serve them. During our stay here they have shown us 
the hospitality of the Southern people. We only wish that our stay was a little longer that 
we might become better acquainted. We wish to thank the Mayor and his officers for 
their help in our little stay. We hope to have the opportunity to visit your wonderful little 
city again in the near future, but not on the same mission.217 
It’s no wonder the editors of the paper were so eager to associate Clinton Lee’s death 
with an official, war-related military action. They issued an “Important Correction,” declaring 
that 
In the excitement and uncertainty created by the events of yesterday it was stated that 
Clinton Lee was shot and killed “accidentally.” The statement was made in absolute good 
faith, but investigation divulged that young Lee was shot by a negro with a high power 
rifle. Other Helena boys who were with him bear witness to this fact. The sympathy of 
the entire city goes out to this bereaved family and that of James A. Tappan, who died 
from his injuries yesterday afternoon. They died in the line of duty, and their memories 
will live forever in the hearts of the people of Phillips county.218   
 
The American Legion Hall had not even been built yet, but citizens of Helena already had 
declared what the plaque would later memorialize: Tappan and Lee died in the line of duty. They 
gave their lives “at their country’s call,” and that is why they merited placement alongside the 
names of those men who died in the trenches of France.   
In the years after the riots, the NAACP’s relentless media campaign and the legal 
bungling of county prosecutors began to turn public opinion against the government of Phillips 
County and the state of Arkansas. After the fact, some local partisans attempted to blame the 
violence that had occurred on “mobs from Mississippi.” For example, Bessie Ferguson’s thesis, 
completed in 1927, concluded that the “indiscriminate killings which took place” were the 
responsibility of “a party of twelve men from Mississippi equipped with eleven guns and an axe 
[who] created havoc wherever they went.”219 Based in part on recollections gathered from 
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residents of Helena, such a statement served to acknowledge the undeniably brutal violence that 
took place (which by that time the NAACP had documented quite convincingly), while still 
displacing responsibility for the violence elsewhere, onto outsiders from Mississippi who acted 
beyond the bounds of propriety. In this way they could still lay claim to their own residents’ 
honor, who used ethical violence on behalf of law and order, and who shouldn’t be held 
responsible for what those crazy Mississippians might have done.  
Some posses may have armed themselves with unusual weapons, such as axes or 
whatever else was on hand, and in retrospect perhaps some white residents of the region 
genuinely regretted the scale of violence that took place. But the Mississippians who flooded into 
Phillips County had good reason to believe their presence and their actions were welcome. They 
had been specifically invited by a call for reinforcements, issued in local papers and probably 
also by private calls among the networks of spies and informants that had been strengthened and 
extended by domestic intelligence agencies during the war. When these Mississippians arrived 
they found posses being directed by none other than the Phillips County sheriff, who was backed 
by a local judge, the mayor, and a special committee of leading citizens. Some of these 
Mississippians may have even collected rifles or extra ammunition from the Phillips County 
Courthouse, which quickly gathered a large arsenal and offered such supplies free for the taking. 
After the first day of fighting concluded, The Helena World reported that  
Parties of armed men who came to Helena from Clarendon, Marianna, Marvell and other 
points near Helena on the Arkansas side, and other parties from Lula, Tunica, Friars 
Point, and Clarksdale, Miss, aided in patrolling the streets of Helena last night, and 
assisted in preserving order in the trouble zone.220  
 
The paper described the parties from Mississippi as “visitors,” who “aided” and “assisted,” not as 
invaders, mobs, or brutes. In the days following the riot, ambassadors from a variety of 
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government offices and social agencies in Mississippi and Arkansas visited Phillips County and 
consulted with Phillips county officials over strategies they could put in place to prevent negro 
uprisings in their own districts.221 If there was ill-will between white residents of Helena and 
their white counterparts in surrounding delta counties, it was not remarked on during or in the 
immediate aftermath of the riot. It was not until much later, when officials from Phillips County 
began to face criticism, that the story of mobs from Mississippi being responsible for the damage 
began to circulate. In light of the scapegoating dynamics that often surround these types of 
incidents, attempts to isolate responsibility onto “mobs” that always seem to hail from elsewhere, 
and whose identities never seem to be ascertainable, should be read with a high degree of 
skepticism.   
 The hundreds (perhaps thousands) of local/regional men from Phillips county and from 
surrounding delta counties in Mississippi and Arkansas, were relieved of their duties when a 
battalion of 500 federal troops, bearing 12 machine guns and hundreds of regulation army rifles, 
arrived in Helena on the morning of October 2nd, along with the Governor of Arkansas, Charles 
H. Brough. Some of the soldiers were not thrilled about being sent on this particular mission. 
The troops sent to Phillips County were members of the Third Division Infantry, veterans of the 
Second Battle of the Marne. This had been a punishing three-week battle in which more than 
12,000 Americans were killed or wounded (a tiny fragment of the total casualties, which 
exceeded 200,000). The division had a reputation for solid fighting under pressure, but they 
resented being sent into a domestic conflict when their terms of service were so close to being 
over. Arthur Brown, one of the soldiers dispatched to quell the riot, recalled,  
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One of the men was shot in the foot and he was as mad as a March hare for he went 
through 8 battles in the War…He never received a scratch, was cited for bravery, 
received the D.S.C. [Distinguished Service Cross], and was one of 27 men out of 175 
who came from the battles without a wound, alive, and to come down in a negro 
settlement and get a shot foot makes him mad as – so you see how things are.222  
Troops sent to restore order in Phillips County were angered by this duty, anger mostly directed 
at the black citizens of the area, who they were told had initiated the violence. Moreover, since 
black people had already been put in the position of having to either flee or defend themselves, 
soldiers were brought into a situation where “neutrality” would have been impossible. They were 
brought in by the same political leaders who organized the posses; they were brought in on the 
side of the posses and therefore they were vulnerable to the self-defensive actions of armed black 
people in the area.  
To invoke the epigraph at the start of this chapter, the collaboration between county-level 
law enforcement, civilian posses, and military commanders against the Progressive Farmers and 
Household Union showed that “Communities may not be able to stop agitation or effectively 
counteract it, but they can see that the processes of law are applied with severity.”223 This is both 
the problem of Elaine, and the legacy of Elaine, with which I am trying to grapple, and my 
reason for wanting to include it in the dissertation. Understanding what happened at Elaine 
highlights, not the problems and legacies of the racist “mob,” but the problems and legacies of 
the racial state, whose “processes of law” developed to function on a spectrum of severity. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, once martial law has been declared, rules governing the use of 
force are framed to allow overkill. That is to say, military commanders facing a violent domestic 
crisis are encouraged to use as much force as deemed necessary to restore order and the military 
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manuals I discuss in that chapter often warned against “half-measures,” whose inadequacy might 
encourage further resistance. In the hands of angry, resentful troops fresh from the trauma and 
chaos of war, the processes of law were applied with extraordinary severity, transforming the 
Elaine race riot into what some scholars now insist was a massacre.   
There is no question that troops sent to Phillips County to put down the race riot 
participated in the torture and killing of African Americans. Stories of such incidents are 
included in accounts of survivors, soldiers, and other eyewitnesses. Union leaders interviewed by 
Ida Wells recounted that, once arrested by soldiers, they were handed over to the Committee of 
Seven in Elaine and Helena, whose members ordered brutal acts of torture, including whipping, 
drugging, and electrocution. At least one soldier was usually present during these interrogations, 
while others stood guard in and outside the county jail and other buildings used as makeshift 
prisons, fully aware of the torture being carried out inside, and sometimes actively 
participating.224 Arthur Brown, one of the soldiers activated for riot duty, recalled:  
One negro was burned the other day. Some hanged and one dragged. They do not stop to 
do burial but a [indecipherable] and the negro is dumped in and covered up. They are 
giving a negro the 3rd degree, and he is confessing his part in the affair. One big fat negro 
is made to do double time which means he’s kept running from one place to another. If he 
stops for an instant he is prodded with a bayonet. One negro woman is kept awake. She 
has not slept for three days. The minute she dozes, she is made to walk. Another was 
given a drink of liquor to loosen up and he sure did talk, implicating several. These have 
been brought in.225 
 
These kinds of reports were confirmed by white Helena residents, such as Gerard Lambert, who 
owned the Lambrook plantation in Phillips County.  
Troopers brought [a prisoner] to our company store and tied him with stout cord to one of 
the wooden columns on the other porch. He had been extremely insolent and the troopers, 
enraged by the loss of two of their men that day in the woods, had pressed him with 
questions. He continued his arrogance, and one white man, hoping to make him speak up, 
poured a can of kerosene over him. As he was clearly unwilling to talk, a man suddenly 
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tossed a lighted match at him. The colored man went up like a torch and, in a moment of 
supreme agony, burst his bounds. Before he could get but a few feet he was riddled with 
bullets. The superintendent told me with some pleasure that they had to use our fire hose 
to put him out.226 
 
Torture was used by federal troops, and by county-level officials, for a number of interrelated 
purposes: to punish the black arrestees for their “uprising,” to gather what was considered 
urgently-needed intelligence about the extent of the union’s plot (or really, to manufacture 
evidence of it, since it’s improbable there ever was a plot in the first place), and to terrify other 
black prisoners into testifying against fellow arrestees lest they receive the same treatment.  
Although there is little dispute that troops participated in torture, and that they killed 
some people who they perceived to be resisting, beyond this narrow consensus the actions taken 
by soldiers to “restore order” on October 2nd and 3rd (and to a lesser extent for the rest of the 
month when they remained stationed in Phillips county) are another area of factual dispute about 
which scholars of the riot disagree. Griff Stockley asserts that federal troops went further than 
just a few isolated incidents of brutality and torture, and perpetrated what he calls a massacre. He 
asserts that troops used machine guns to mow down black sharecroppers in the fields and 
canebreaks; in at least two incidents he claims they disarmed and then slaughtered large groups 
of more than one hundred persons, groups that included men, women, children, and the elderly. 
Stockley’s assertion rests on a patchwork of evidence, most of which consist of accounts 
gathered during or soon after the riots, combined with recollections of Phillips County residents 
in oral histories conducted years (or in some cases decades) afterward. Yet, Jeannie Whayne, a 
historian who specializes in Arkansas history and the history of the delta more broadly, insists 
that although some individual troops may have used excessive force, the military as a whole was 
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probably responsible for stopping a massacre, not perpetrating one. In her estimation, had it not 
been for the interventions of military commanders, violence against black people by the white 
civilian posses would have continued to escalate unfettered; instead it was mostly concluded 
within a day or two. Whayne criticizes Stockley’s evidence for consisting of (at best) hearsay 
and circumstantial evidence and (at worst) relying on the self-serving statements of Phillips 
County residents who have motive to deflect blame away from themselves (and have shown a 
clear propensity to do so).227  
I cannot claim to arbitrate evidence that is widely agreed to be inconclusive. Instead, my 
goal is twofold: (1) to think about how the violence of the riot reflected a collusion of different 
kinds of state authorities, operating during a “state of exception,” and (2) to think about how the 
event is remembered, and to reflect in particular on the effects of remembering the Elaine riots as 
a problem of “mob-domination.” In light of those purposes then, I would want to re-direct the 
debate between Whayne and Stockley away from the question of precisely how many people 
were killed by the posses, vs. how many were killed by the military, or whether the military 
fueled the riots versus quelled them. Those questions are over-determined by a false binary 
between the “mob violence” carried out by posses, and the military violence enacted during the 
process of “restoring order.” One risk of such a binary is that it separates the ‘mob’ from the 
‘military,’ failing to reflect the blurriness that actually existed. Another risk is that, once 
dichotomized in this way, a certain legitimacy is granted to state violence, and withheld from the 
violence of the mob. The violence of the military is normalized; the only question really left to 
ask is, did they use their legitimate violence appropriately? Was the violence used by troops 
excessive, arbitrary, and capricious?   
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For example, one iteration of Stockley’s critique of the army is his statement that “United 
States troops worked with the white mobs that were in the area,” and he limits this critique to a 
small number of rogue units, who he supposes were acting under poor leadership. He contrasts 
these excessively violent units against others who acted protectively, either by disarming un-
deputized white posses, or by taking black survivors of the massacre into custody without 
harming them. In other words, Stockley’s critique of the army is that, at times, legitimate state 
authority became “mob-dominated,” thus permitting irregularities and injustices to occur.    
Whayne takes a slightly different tack but ends up drawing the same distinction between 
violence committed by enlisted troops and white citizens. She says at the end of her debate with 
Stockley: 
I was half hoping that Mr. Stockley would convince me…that the military was 
responsible, and perhaps we could turn to the federal government and demand 
reparations. But I remain convinced that the evidence is simply not there. What we have 
is undisputed evidence of a massacre, and that a great injustice was perpetrated against 
African Americans in the Arkansas delta. But we cannot lay the blame for that event at 
anyone else’s feet. I’m a child of the Arkansas delta, just as is Mr. Stockley, so I speak as 
a native daughter. The responsibility for what took place there is our responsibility. Just 
as the responsibility for the poverty and injustice that exists there today rests with us. No 
amount of trying to blame all of that on someone else will suffice.228  
 
In Whayne’s analysis, federal troops can hardly be blamed for using lethal force to put down the 
riot once it was already under way, particularly when they encountered “a state of great 
excitement,” featuring hundreds of armed whites in pursuit of African Americans, some of 
whom were also armed and putting up active resistance. The responsibility for the massacre lies 
with the white community of Phillips county: they harassed the union, they activated the posses 
from across the delta, and thus in Whayne’s view they are responsible not only for the violence 
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committed by the “mobs,” but also by extension for the violence used by the military to restore 
order once they arrived and found both whites and blacks heavily armed and fighting.  
This is a good point to reflect on the rhetoric of “mob violence,” which is the 
predominant language used to describe this riot (language that shows up again in Moore v. 
Dempsey, as we shall see in the next chapter). Throughout Ida Wells-Barnett’s piece, for 
example, she refers to all these groups of white men as “mobs,” summarizing the riot in this way: 
“What they could not do lawfully they did unlawfully with the aid of public sentiment and the 
mob.”229 The booklet, distributed under the auspices of the NAACP’s legal defense fund, was 
part of a larger arsenal of propaganda the organization distributed as part of their multi-pronged 
campaign against lynching and mob violence.230 “Mob” and “illegal” were terminology that 
many individuals and organizations found attractive for strategic polemical reasons. To call a 
white posse an “unlawful mob” was a counter-discourse against the predominant white narrative 
that held these groups were dutiful citizens engaged in the work of law enforcement and the 
protection of their communities.231 As I argued previously these descriptors must be read 
critically. Calling lynching and mob violence “illegal” – indeed, the very attribution of such 
violence to a “mob” in the first place - was not so much an empirical description, but rather a 
strident critique and a long-term aspiration. By using the term “unlawful mob,” Wells-Barnett, 
and the NAACP, undermined the white version of the story by attributing criminality to the 
white posses instead of to the black sharecroppers. The NAACP contended that whites’ methods 
of “crime-fighting” were actually an animalistic display of mob mentality, rhetoric that both 
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reflected and advanced their larger critique of white supremacist violence as inimical to the 
practice of democracy. When Ida Wells called the actions of white people “unlawful,” she was 
painfully aware that it was the sharecroppers who were on trial for their lives, while the actions 
of whites had never been subject to any sort of legal sanctioning. 
One reason the mobs were not subject to legal sanction is that, however ‘unlawful’ their 
actions may have been in theory, most of what they did was under the banner of legally 
constituted authority. The mobs were led by combat veterans, who held respected positions in the 
community. The mobs were given firearms and ammunition by the sheriff’s office to use in 
putting down the alleged insurrection. The mobs were, quite possibly, called up by a regional 
phone tree designed with precisely this purpose in mind. And, the mobs were part of a vaster 
pattern of organized surveillance and repression of African American communities, being carried 
out by both state and federal governments.    
 Following the language of writers like Barnett, as well as the language used in legal 
briefings by the NAACP-hired defense attorneys who worked the Moore v. Dempsey case, 
current-day historians also tend to describe the men who patrolled Phillips County on the first 
day (and likely killed many people) as “mobs.” Even the treatments that use the more accurate 
terminology of “posse” do not (in my opinion) sufficiently foreground the legality of posses. 
There is a similar tendency to describe as “mobs” the thousands of men who flooded into the 
county from surrounding areas on the second day of the riots. By extension, all the violence done 
by these groups is labeled as “mob violence,” and the Elaine riots and subsequent trials are 
remembered as being “mob-dominated.” In contrast, the federal troops who arrived in Phillips 
County escape the designation “mob” in most accounts, by virtue of being part of the U.S. army. 
Mobs are disorganized and leaderless; the military is formed of cohesive units accountable to a 
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chain of command. So, although both groups commit horrible acts of violence, including 
indiscriminate slaughter of unarmed people, torture, burning, etc., the violence committed by 
civilians is described as “mob violence” while the exact same violence committed by the U.S. 
army is described as “restoring order.”  
Ironically, the major exceptions to this approach can be found only in the most racist 
treatments of the riots. Just as the problematic American Legion plaque helps to make state 
violence more visible, the racist defenses of white Phillips County residents tend to highlight the 
orderly and organized nature in which they approached a dire emergency, and the subordination 
of “mob” mentality to the forces of law and order, while the more progressive/liberal treatments 
of the riot make a very strong distinction between mob and law, perhaps because they are 
invested in a redemptive narrative of Elaine’s role in the nationalization of the bill of rights and 
the liberalization of the state on matters of race.  
This is a moment where the methodological choice to focus on perpetrators of violence 
and perpetrator discourses becomes very important. My own research into this incident so far 
leads me to reject many aspects of the “white” narrative of Elaine – I do not, for example, 
believe that the sharecroppers were planning an insurrection, and I strongly suspect the police 
intentionally broke up the union’s meeting. I also believe there was a much higher death count in 
the incident than military leaders were ever willing to admit. But when it comes to the narrative 
regarding the riot itself, I find more convergences than divergences between the white narrative 
and the black narrative, with the major differences being, not factual, but polemic and rhetorical. 
Whites and blacks agree that armed posses committed mass violence throughout Southern 
Phillips County; whites and blacks agree that black people were rounded up and arrested en 
masse, that they were shot [at] when they tried to run away or resist, and that once arrested many 
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were subjected to torture. The substantive difference is that the black residents of the community 
(and people then and now who are sympathetic to them) describe this as “mob violence,” while 
the people who carried out the violence describe it as “the ultimate triumph of law and the 
determination of constituted authority.”232 The counter-narrative of the sharecroppers is 
important because it offers a critique of what “the ultimate triumph of law” tends to look like in 
America. But the force of this critique is severely blunted if we do not also give credence to the 
discourses of the perpetrators of violence, who tell us as plainly as they possibly can that their 
violence emerged from “constituted authority” and not from any “mob.” We need new polemics 
for our own time; if we carry forward the polemics of a century ago, we also carry forward a 
false distinction between “mob violence” and “restoring order.” This then creates a framework 
where the state’s norms for evaluating the legitimacy of violence become our own norms, and 
private violence is the only kind of violence visible as “violence,” while activities related to 
policing are normalized as mere responses to or suppressors of violence. In other words, if – 
usually in our eagerness to distance ourselves from them – we ignore what perpetrators of 
violence tell us about the violence they enact, we miss an opportunity to understand something 
about how state-sanctioned violence works, ideologically, legally, and materially.  
I would offer that bodies of literature describing states of exception offer good reason 
why the line between troop violence and mob violence has proven so difficult for scholars like 
Whayne and Stockley to draw. Even if the entire Arkansas delta was dug up and all the 
sharecroppers’ bones recovered and duly accounted for (a suggestion that is sometimes 
mentioned but has never been acted on), this blurry line would never become clear, because this 
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blurry line is the trademark of a state of exception, particularly in how it has developed and 
reproduced itself in United States culture. 
The Elaine riots grew out of a quasi-legal space that allowed violence to flourish. Far 
from being a sudden emergency, or what the paper initially called an “ambush,” the conflict was 
years in the making, and grew from seeds of suspicion, surveillance, and a collaboration of 
official and unofficial policing techniques, techniques whose scope was greatly expanded thanks 
to the infusion of federal resources and attention that were justified by concerns over military 
readiness and national security. The rules of emergency allowed the state to incorporate the mob: 
civilians were deputized, provided with arms, and permitted to function as semi-autonomous 
military squads. Simultaneously, the terms of emergency allowed the state itself to behave like a 
mob: the rules of engagement not only allowed but required and encouraged maximum force to 
ensure prompt domination. The domination sought by military forces is a kind of domination that 
is only possible if the use of force is cruel and capricious – if it is, in effect, terrifying to those 
who are its targets. The editor of the Helena World summed up this strategy with concision: 
“The troops, 500 strong, are equipped with rifles and machine guns and the effect on the 
turbulent negroes of the southern part of the county is expected to be pacific.”233  
Although it is never articulated as such, there is some ideal vision of state violence, either 
unconscious or simply untheorized, that lingers in the subtext of scholarship on Elaine. Scholars, 
journalists, legal analysts, and other commentators on the riots aspire for some exercise of state 
violence that would be protective of the marginalized and productive of the conditions of justice, 
and upon examining what happened at Elaine, they decry the state for not living up to these 
ideals, or they decry the white people of the delta for corrupting the state’s power and wielding it 
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incorrectly. The state’s actions during Elaine fall short, but the possibility of a “pure state,” one 
that is out from under the thrall of the mob, is maintained as an unspoken fantasy. Within this 
framework, the only critique of state violence that is readily available is one that critiques that 
violence for being specifically racial. That is, state violence itself is normalized, even idealized, 
but the use of that violence in an excessive, arbitrary, or capricious manner (against a group of 
people based on race and class, or in the service of particular racial or classed interests) is the 
legitimate subject of debate and criticism. What I would instead like to tease out, both in this 
chapter and in the larger arc of this dissertation, is that we might have this process flipped. That 
is, the problem of state violence is not that it is racial or even that it is used in service of 
capitalism. Rather, the problem of the state is that it is an organized system of violence, and the 
reason it is an organized system of violence is that organized systems of violence are necessary 
to enact the types of arbitrary, excessive, and capricious forms of control that are necessary to 
produce race and capital.234  
Rather than use Elaine as a reason to support the liberalization of state violence, I would 
argue that the Elaine riots offer a trenchant critique of how state power in the U.S. is 
fundamentally organized, and gives particular insight to how states of exception are produced 
and reproduced.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 ‘Mere Form of Law’: Mob Violence in Moore v. Dempsey 
 
 Despite plenty of variation in how the riots are now told, there are no longer two 
competing versions of what happened at Elaine – the alleged “Negro insurrection” is disproven, 
or at least disbelieved, and Elaine is described as a race riot, and sometimes even as a racial 
massacre. Narratives of the riot reflect widespread agreement that the PFHU was a legal and 
peaceable organization; that the riot was instigated by whites disrupting a peaceful gathering; 
and that African American deaths were far greater than the 25-person figure initially reported by 
the military. The ascendance of this narrative reflects the enduring success of the NAACP’s 
publicity and legal campaign on behalf of the Elaine sharecroppers. It also reflects the efforts of 
historians who, starting in the 1960s, brought the incident and associated legal briefings to light, 
conducted research into the activities of the PFHU, and weaved the story of the riots into modern 
historiographies of sharecropping, Jim Crow, and labor organizing.235   
This chapter explores the ascendance of this more cohesive narrative of the riots, 
focusing on how the incident is now associated primarily, if not exclusively, with the concept of 
“mob violence.” The first section draws on some of the earliest sources on the riot, including 
newspaper reports published during and immediately after the riot in 1919; articles written by 
Walter White and Ida B. Wells, which circulated in black newspapers and were used in NAACP 
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fundraising and publicity campaigns while the sharecroppers’ cases were under appeal; and a 
master’s thesis published in 1927, written by Arkansas resident Bessie Ferguson, which 
represents the first academic treatment of the riots. Based on these materials, I suggest that the 
association between the Elaine riots and “mob violence,” represents a complex social discourse, 
within which there are competing and contradictory versions of “mob” and “law” at work. From 
the perspective of whites in Phillips County, black sharecroppers had conspired to commit mob 
violence against whites, and their attempted insurrection had been put down by law. From the 
perspective of African Americans, a sharecroppers’ union attempted to seek the protection of 
law, and was met instead by lawless mob violence. My goal here is not to imply that these two 
versions are of equal validity, but rather to identify the broader philosophical and legal issues 
that were at stake in the rounds of court appeals that followed the sharecroppers’ convictions, as 
each side of the story was asserted and/or contested within the judicial system.  
Next I turn to the legal material associated with the Arkansas riot cases, which include 
briefings filed by both defense and prosecution, as well as formal rulings issued by the Arkansas 
State Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. I examine the briefs and rulings for 
evidence of how the final ruling affected the multiple interpretations of “mob” that were at work 
in conflicts over the riot. Since the court ruled in favor of the defendants, many commentators do 
not acknowledge how the ruling either disputed or declared irrelevant key aspects of the 
appellant’s case. I argue that the descriptor of “mob violence” which is now inseparable from 
accounts of the riots reflected courts’ ambivalence toward the defense’s allegations of state 
violence.  The historical legacy of the court case has been understood as a major victory against 
mob violence, guaranteeing a fair trial with due process. I argue instead that the case’s short-term 
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and long-term effects have been more limited and ambiguous, excising some forms of mob 
violence but leaving others embedded in the everyday forms and ceremonies of the legal system.  
I conclude by reflecting on a range of current-day sources of information on the riots, 
from personal websites and wikis, to libraries, encyclopedias, and reviews of scholarship. I 
reflect on the ways in which the discourse of mob violence continues to shape and delimit how 
the riots are understood in the present. The case has been described as a blow against mob 
domination, but this description does not account for the complexity of the multiple mobs that 
acted during the Elaine riots. Which “mobs” were struck down by the ruling, and which were 
allowed to continue operating? What does this tell us about states of exception? 
 
‘Every Right to Feel Proud’: White Perspectives on Law and Mob 
Immediate post-riot accounts in the Helena World underscore the extent to which white 
perspectives and black perspectives diverged on the issue of “mob violence.” White leaders in 
Philips County were extremely satisfied with the manner in which they had handled what they 
perceived to be an incipient black uprising. They compared the details of their riot favorably with 
disturbances that had taken place in larger cities of the North and Midwest. “In view of the mob 
spirit prevailing in various sections of the country, Helena and Phillips county has every right to 
feel proud of the conduct of the people here during a period of the utmost tension,” declared the 
editor of The Helena World on October 3rd, a day after federal troops arrived to restore order.236  
In spite of the fire which must burn in the breast of every citizen who knew and loved 
those who have been slain in the line of duty…there has been no suggestion of departing 
from due process of law and no threat of mob violence. Every man and woman in this 
county has faith in the ultimate triumph of law and in the determination of constituted 
authority.237 
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The local paper repeatedly referred to the riot as “the most serious trouble that has come upon 
[the town] since the Civil War,”238 a significant claim considering that Helena had been occupied 
by Union troops during the war, and was the site of a battle that claimed more than 200 lives and 
left almost 1000 wounded. But despite the extreme nature of the recent emergency, “Philips 
County emerged from the ordeal of fire and withstood the acid test…there has been no resort to 
mob violence and no attempt to seek revenge outside the pale of law,” reported the World. This 
was not necessarily surprising, considering that white Helena residents’ collective identity had 
long included a conscious commitment to law and order and an aversion to mob mentality. 
Despite its location in the lynch-prone cotton-producing Mississippi river delta region, no 
lynchings had ever been recorded in the county, a fact that white leaders occasionally boasted 
over. The political leadership of the town envisioned themselves as stewards for an up-and-
coming modern city, one that eschewed the kind of violence that might dampen prosperity by 
scaring away labor, investors, or new business. “Review the record of other cities and 
communities in which similar disorders have occurred and compare,” challenged the typically 
boosterish newspaper editors. “We have set the good example, and thus challenge the world to 
set a higher mark than ours. We are back to normal and no man can criticize the method by 
which we have attained that condition.”239  
The paper’s assertion that Philips County was “back to normal” was not quite true, 
however. There was still the matter of the alleged insurrection, the five white men who were 
dead, the hundreds of black residents who remained in police or military custody, and the 
possibility that the union’s so-called conspiracy was not isolated to Philips County but actually 
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extended throughout the South, and perhaps even the entire nation.240 Arkansas Governor 
Charles Brough was just as impressed by Helena residents’ handling of the riots as they were 
impressed by themselves. In private communications with county leaders, and in speeches 
following the affair, Brough repeatedly emphasized “the patriotism and self-restraint of the white 
citizens of Phillips county in refraining from mob violence,” promising that the white 
leadership’s strategy for squelching the riot “would always be a badge of honor to that 
county.”241 In light of their admirable conduct during the riot, Governor Brough officially 
designated the Committee of Seven to be in charge of the post-riot investigation, asking them to 
identify the root causes of the riot and the extent of the sharecroppers’ plot; the Committee was 
also charged with gathering evidence sufficient to indict any persons who were criminally liable 
for what had occurred.242 The Committee began its work immediately, meeting for hours each 
day in the Phillips County courthouse, and traveling to Elaine to interrogate prisoners who were 
held there.243 They took these duties seriously, ever cognizant of the trust that had been placed in 
them by the Governor, and by extension the law-abiding citizens of the county, something they 
rarely failed to mention in their public statements.  
White leaders’ commitment to law and order was not limited to matters pertaining 
directly to the riot. They instituted a wholesale social inventory of the county, and instituted new 
policing protocols designed to crack down on all sorts of illicit behaviors. “The work of our 
people is not finished,” intoned an editorial published a few days after the riot concluded.  
There should be a thorough house cleaning and the process should be applied first right 
here in Helena. The sale of whiskey, wood alcohol, denatured alcohol, and sundry other 
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spirits continues in Helena… and a vicious element is always gathered [where these items 
are sold]. There are pistols in the hip-pockets of Negro boys…The old or young man who 
habitually carries a deadly weapon, naturally has inclination to use it on something, and 
that something might be another boy or man. Lacking a target, he discharges his weapon 
in the air and disturbs the peace of the city. Automobiles careen over the streets of the 
city at high speed throughout the night and it is not uncommon for the occupants to 
indulge in loud talk. Sometimes the program is interspersed with yells and profane 
language. All these things contain the potentials of trouble and disorder, and they ought 
to be stopped. … It is hoped that the Committee of Seven will exert its influence to wipe 
out this damnable traffic and charge authorities with stopping the gambling and pistol-
toting and the wild hullabaloo at night.…We have got to clean up and we have got to 
begin at home.244 
 
Since the county remained under martial law, military commanders were able to enact some of 
these restrictions immediately, without having to wait for new laws or policies to be considered 
by any public body or voted on by citizens. Shortly after the appearance of the editorial, military 
officials halted the legal sale of whiskey, and personally visited grocers and druggists throughout 
the county to inform them they could no longer sell otherwise legal products that contained a 
high percentage of alcohol.245  
 Officials also took steps to prepare for and prevent future outbreaks of violence. When 
federal troops began to withdraw from the county, members of the Committee requested that 
they leave their guns and ammunition at Helena “for protection against any blacks who may still 
be looking for trouble.”246 Citing the “absolute need of providing means of preserving peace,” 
the Committee of Seven decided that, if the War Department was not willing to leave a portion 
of its own arsenal behind, the county should purchase the necessary weapons instead. They 
advised the county to stock at least 100 regulation army rifles and 5000 rounds of ammunition to 
be stored at the sheriff’s office in case of another riot. The purpose of this requisition was to 
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prevent future outbreaks of lawlessness. In a telegram sent to the Governor’s office and to 
officials at the War Department, the Committee of Seven announced, “Our county has never 
permitted mob violence to exist and we intend in the future to maintain the proud record of our 
past.”247  
 Phillips County’s white leadership was not just proud of their commitment to law and 
order: they saw this commitment as being central to their identity as a community. They 
celebrated the triumph of orderly government over the forces of anarchy that had threatened their 
community with violence. This was not a case of whites creating justifications or rationales for 
their resort to mob violence, as has sometimes been documented in connection with lynchings.248 
Helena-area whites did not perceive themselves to have utilized mob violence in the first place.  
 
Black Perspectives on the Riot: Reconstructing Law and Order as the Work of a Mob 
 Mere days before the convicted sharecroppers’ execution date, lawyers from Little Rock 
and New York City filed an appeal with the first circuit court of Arkansas seeking to nullify the 
convictions on the grounds that the defendants had not been granted fair trials. This first appeal 
specified only that eligible black residents had not been permitted to sit on the jury – a complaint 
that Phillips County officials dismissed as an inconsequential technicality considering that all-
white juries were and had been the norm throughout the South for several decades, and the 
Supreme Court had so far declined to intervene. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the 
appeal, and a new execution date was set for the twelve men. Defense attorneys didn’t intend to 
give up so easily, however. They resubmitted their appeals to the Arkansas State Supreme Court, 
this time based on judicial error. In the rush to convict their clients (readers might recall that the 
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jury’s deliberations only lasted about five minutes for each trial) the jury ballots for one group of 
six defendants had not been properly filled out, thus nullifying the verdict. New trials would be 
needed for these six men, and a worrisome wrinkle had emerged, as now the original group of 
twelve union organizers was split into two, with the convictions of one group upheld while the 
other group’s convictions were voided pending their retrial. As 1919 drew to a close, the 
Committee of Seven and Phillips County’s white residents more broadly, had so far failed to 
achieve any legal closure to the incident.    
In December, Walter White published a cleverly titled article in The Nation, “Massacring 
Whites in Arkansas,” in which he flipped the mainstream script about the riots. Black union 
members had been accused of plotting to massacre whites, but White alleged it was the whites 
who had done most of the massacring.249 The article debunked the allegations of a black 
insurrection, explained the larger context of agricultural peonage, and revealed the horrific 
torture that had been employed to coerce confessions from the accused men. Shortly after the 
publication of White’s article, early in the winter of 1920, the NAACP began to circulate a 
booklet on “The Arkansas Cases,” whose outraged subtitle informed readers that the brutal 
stories of violence contained within were “not a description of conditions in Mexico or the 
Belgian Congo, but in the United States!”250 The booklet, based on interviews Ida B. Wells 
conducted with the imprisoned sharecroppers and their wives, was timely and effective. Its 
analogies to Mexico and the Belgian Congo referenced recent global conflicts, and compared 
Phillips County’s white residents to the United States’ least civilized wartime enemies – a tried 
and true rhetorical strategy in national campaigns against lynching and mob violence.     
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The NAACP’s publicity and fundraising efforts were boosted by the work of their legal 
team, which simultaneously pursued two different defense strategies for the two groups of 
defendants respectively. For the men whose convictions had been upheld, they prepared a new 
appeal on new grounds, which I will return to momentarily. But for the men whose convictions 
had been overturned, and who were facing retrial, they took a different route, executed by Scipio 
Jones, an African American lawyer based in Little Rock who did most of the Arkansas-based 
legal work in conjunction with NAACP attorneys based on New York and Washington, DC. 
Jones knew that the Phillips County prosecutors were reluctant to re-try one group of defendants 
while the other group’s convictions were still under appeal. They felt the wiser course of action 
was to wait and see how the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the case; if their side lost, then some 
of the evidence from the original trial might be ruled inadmissible and retrials for both groups of 
defendants might be required. On the other hand, if their side won then the original convictions 
would be upheld and the prosecution could quickly re-try the other half of the group, and execute 
all 12 men together as originally planned.  
What the county failed to consider, however, was that the State of Arkansas several years 
earlier had passed a statute aimed at providing criminal defendants with speedier trials. If 
defendants were bound over for two successive terms of court, their charges would be 
automatically dismissed. Twice, Scipio Jones appeared in court prepared to defend the six 
sharecroppers facing retrial; and, twice, he offered no objection when the prosecution requested 
postponement.251 When the third court term rolled around and prosecutors once again requested 
postponement, Jones surprised them by citing the relevant state statute and requesting the judge 
to dismiss all charges. The prosecution objected that the defense had agreed to their requests for 
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postponement, but Jones pointed out that the law didn’t require defense to object. It only 
required that defense be ready to proceed, which Jones had diligently ensured was part of the 
record each time he assented to postponement. The NAACP and Scipio Jones had managed to 
free six of the men despite the manufactured evidence and prevailing spirit of bias against their 
clients. This was not accomplished by providing the defendants with a fair trial, however. On the 
contrary, it was accomplished by avoiding trial altogether.  
The downside to this victory, at least from the NAACP’s perspective, is that the process 
by which the men were acquitted did not set any meaningful legal precedent – not for the other 
six men whose appeals were pending, or for the dozens who had been convicted on lesser 
charges, to say nothing of future defendants who might be subjected to the same treatment the 
sharecroppers in Elaine had received. The NAACP could only achieve its larger goals by 
litigating the cases of the remaining six based on constitutional claims and the underlying merit 
of the cases. To this end, the legal team had used the time between appeals to interview 
witnesses and survivors of the riot and gather affidavits that contradicted the public story 
conveyed by the Committee of Seven. In addition to the testimony of black survivors and 
witnesses, crucially, staff attorneys located two white railroad security officers (colleagues of 
one of the white men who was killed). Immediately following the riots, these men left the area. 
They did not live in Phillips County; their railroad security jobs involved a life of travel. As 
outsiders, and as white men of a different class background than the elites who populated the 
Committee of Seven, the security guards were less invested financially, socially, and legally in 
the narrative the Committee had created.252 They confirmed the indiscriminate killing of 
unarmed black civilians, cast doubt on the murder accusations that had been levelled against the 
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black union leaders, described the torture used to coerce the defendants into confessing, and 
asserted that these activities had been open, widespread, and occurred with the full knowledge 
and participation of the Committee of Seven and military field commanders. When the time 
came, lawyers for the defense were prepared with new material for their appeal, which accused 
the Committee of Seven of inflaming public opinion and creating an atmosphere of “mob 
domination,” such that the jury was intimidated into returning a “mob verdict.”253 The 
appellant’s brief described the sharecroppers’ trial as being “but an empty ceremony carried 
through in apparent form of law.”254  
The members of the Committee of Seven and leading civic organizations of Helena were 
grievously offended by accusations that they had encouraged mob spirit to prevail in the county. 
They had pointed out on more than one occasion that, unlike in the race riots in Chicago, 
Washington D.C., and Omaha, where white mobs engaged in unprovoked attacks against 
innocent black bystanders, in Elaine, “every Negro killed…met their death at the hands of civil 
officers, citizen posses organized and duly commissioned, or soldiers of the United States 
Government, all of whom were engaged in the work of suppressing outlawry and restoring 
order.”255 County officials had received letters and telegrams from the Governor of the state, and 
from numerous military officials, praising the manner in which they conducted themselves. 
Where did the NAACP get the audacity to compare the methodical deliberations of the 
Committee of Seven to the hysterical behavior of a lawless mob? It’s probably clear to most 
readers in the 21st century who was right and who was wrong in this case, but in 1919, many 
white residents of Phillips County were convinced they were the ones being mobbed. They had 
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been threatened by some sort of uprising, and they made careful and diligent use of legal 
channels to put down that uprising. Now they were accused of evincing a “mob spirit” and the 
men who were responsible for James Tappan and Clinton Lee’s deaths might be released on 
what they perceived to be legal technicalities. 
The Arkansas State Supreme Court, however, found no evidence to corroborate defense 
claims of mob domination. “The trials were had according to law,” explained the justices:  
The jury was correctly charged as to the law of the case, and the testimony is legally 
sufficient to support the verdict returned. We cannot therefore in the face of this assume 
that the trial was an empty ceremony conducted for the purpose only of appearing to 
comply with the requirements of law when they were not in fact being complied with.”256  
 
Normally that would have been the end of it – indeed, the Governor of Arkansas signed new 
death warrants for the men, and Phillips County began to make arrangements for their burial. But 
the defense secured a writ of habeas corpus before a Chancery judge, once again halting the 
executions at the last minute. The Attorney General of Arkansas gave his opinion that the 
Chancery court had overstepped its jurisdiction, but due to the conflicting legal writs, the case 
would now proceed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
 
Arguments Before the Supreme Court 
The stakes in the Arkansas Riot Cases were exceptionally high. In the words of Scipio 
Jones and Moorfield Storey, who authored briefs on behalf of the six co-defendants whose 
appeals eventually continued all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court,  “The evidence on which 
[the sharecroppers] were convicted was manufactured, the witnesses were beaten and terrorized, 
and the record of the whole case shows what, if consummated, is only judicial murder.”257 But 
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the stakes extended even beyond something so grave as judicial murder, for the trial of the 
sharecroppers was not only about their right to due process when accused of crime, it was also 
more broadly about the criminalization of black people’s social and economic mobility. In an 
unusually emotional passage, Storey and Jones pleaded with the justices to understand the 
gravity of what had happened in Arkansas, and what it would mean if the sharecroppers were 
allowed to be legally executed:  
We have distinct evidence that all Negroes at that time were in danger of their lives, and 
that two or three hundred men were killed. What would be expected of human beings in 
circumstances like that? Can we ask that they lie down and be killed without any attempt 
to assemble for their own protection?258 
 
The defense lawyers making their appeal to the Supreme Court were not only defending these six 
black sharecroppers against charges of murder. More broadly, they were asking for recognition 
of their clients’ humanity.   
This appeal on behalf of black humanity began with the most basic of rights – the right 
not to be made to “lie down and be killed.” But the brief as a whole touched on other rights as 
well. The first major section of the appellant brief, titled “The Origin of the Trouble,” is 
comprised of a thorough overview of the sharecropping system and the suffering of black 
agricultural laborers within it, with specific details from the lives of farmers in Phillips County. 
The lawyers recounted on behalf of their clients how sharecropping had “kept them down, 
poverty stricken and effectually under [the white planters’] control,” and called it an “oppressive 
and ruinous system.”  They went on to describe their purpose in forming a union, the attack that 
occurred on their meeting at the Hoop Spur church, the formation of white posses who hunted 
and killed hundreds of innocent black residents of the area, and the torture rooms created by the 
Committee of Seven to manufacture evidence of the alleged “insurrection.” In fact, one must 
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read six or seven pages deep into the appellants’ brief before one even arrives at the gross 
injustices that attended the actual trials being appealed.  
The issue of peonage was so central to the NAACP’s decision to pursue the case, they 
often discussed the trials as a referendum on the status of black agricultural laborers in the South, 
and a number of black news outlets shared this perspective. The NAACP’s annual report for 
1922, for example, widely re-printed in black and progressive papers, referred to its work on the 
cases as “Defense of the Arkansas Peonage Victims,” and included its update on the case 
alongside their related work under the broader category of “The Fight Against Peonage.” Likely 
co-authored by a number of staff and board members, the annual report stated that  
[T]he fight has been conducted not only to right a grievous wrong done to these colored 
farmers. It is hoped as well, by taking their cases before the highest tribunal in the land to 
open up the entire question of peonage, which is the greatest economic handicap and 
source of much of the brutal exploitation under which the colored man suffers in the 
cotton-raising communities of the U.S.259  
 
Other papers that reported on the case also stressed the occupational status of the defendants, 
using descriptors like “our farmers,” “colored farmers,” or “Negro peons.”260 Through this case, 
the NAACP sought to criminalize whites’ use of legalized, state violence, arguing that the 
Committee of Seven’s actions were actually a form of “mob violence,” which reinforced the 
economic exploitation of black communities as a whole.  
The injustices of the trial – and the fact that there had been a trial at all – made the Elaine 
riots a perfect test case for the larger goal of “opening up the entire question of peonage.” The 
sharecroppers who were accused of murder were appointed counsel who made little substantive 
effort to defend them; their trials lasted for less than 45 minutes and verdicts were returned in 
                                                          
259 “American Nation Aroused to Lynching Danger Says NAACP Report for Year 1922; Arkansas Riot Victims’ Case 
Carried,” The Appeal, January 6, 1923, 2.  
260 This is in contrast to typical news accounts of lynching or mob violence, which would usually focus on other 
aspects of the victim’s identity, for example “Accused Murderer Lynched” or “Georgia Negro Lynched.” 
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approximately five minutes. Members of the posses who had only days ago been killing black 
people in the canebreaks were allowed to serve on the jury, as were members of the Committee 
of Seven, and the evidence presented at trial was the product of horrible acts of torture. Even 
with the brutal manufacture of evidence, what evidence existed was still insufficient to sustain a 
guilty verdict, argued the defense. At most, the prosecution proved that the defendants might 
have been present when the shots that killed Clinton Lee were fired. Were it not for the extreme 
prejudice existing against their clients, counsel for the defense argued that no reasonable jury 
would have returned guilty verdicts for first-degree murder.261  
Egregious though these legal errors might have been, the overall composition of the 
appellants brief indicates that lawyers for the defense saw the procedural problems of the case as 
merely the tip of the iceberg. Their clients were not just on trial for murder, they were on trial 
because they had attempted to organize a union of sharecroppers. The case was about their 
clients’ right to peaceably assemble, their right to petition to address their grievances, their right 
to the protection of law, and their right to reap the fruits of their own labor. The case was also 
about their clients’ right to defend these rights, with violence if necessary, even against attacks 
carried out under cover of law. Their clients had been charged with murder as part of a 
systematic effort to suppress all those other rights, and so the stakes of the case went far beyond 
the need to ensure a “fair trial.” The problems of the trial were not problems of due process or 
minor errors in the application of law. “We are not speaking of mere disorder, or mere 
irregularities in procedure,” defense attorneys argued, “but of a case where the processes of 
justice were actually subverted.”262 The trial itself was a vehicle of unfairness and no amount of 
procedural tweaking could make it otherwise.  
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Mobs and “Mob Spirits” 
The problem facing the defense as they proceeded to make their case of mob violence 
was that the trials “were not mob-dominated, but were actually mob-conducted.”263 The mob 
acted through the law, not against it. The appellants’ brief claimed that “although a trial in form, 
[it was] only a form,” and that “the whole proceeding [was] a mask,”264 or as Chief Justice 
Holmes phrased it in his summary of their position, “an empty ceremony, conducted for the 
purpose only of appearing to comply with the requirements of the law, when in fact the law was 
not being complied with.”265 But how could they prove that the law was not really the law, that 
the trial was not really a trial, when the Committee of Seven had successfully engaged the 
“form” of law by complying with its requirements? The defense had to prove mob domination in 
trials that were, on the face of things, “had according to law.” They devised two strategies for 
addressing this problem. In some sections of the brief they refer to a literal mob of “several 
hundred white men…assembled at or near the Court House and jail for the purpose of mobbing 
[the defendants],” which would have lynched the men if not for the presence of U.S. soldiers.266 
Additionally, if the mobs outside the courtroom were not enough to convince the judges, the 
defense also posited a more abstract “mob spirit,” arguing that “all, Judge, jury and counsel, 
were dominated by the mob spirit that was universally present in court and out.”267  
Defense lawyers had very little concrete evidence to prove the existence of literal mobs at 
the time of trial. Even if there had been mobs present at the time of the defendants’ arrest (which 
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Phillips County maintained were not mobs, but deputized posses), the trials occurred nearly a 
month later when Phillips County was “back to normal.” Beginning about a week after the riots, 
the newspaper calmly reported updates from the Committee of Seven regarding plans to try 
union members and alleged ringleaders, including the intended timeline, whether or not the court 
would be open to the public, and other logistics related to the mass prosecution.268 Authorities do 
not appear to have felt threatened by a mob – on the contrary, their deliberations over how to 
manage the trials indicate they had some control over the presence of spectators and their 
behavior at trial. It is true that soldiers were present outside the courthouse during the trial, but 
it’s not clear that they were there to protect the black defendants from a lynch mob. In fact, the 
opposite is more probable. Although the paper frequently mentions soldiers in or around the 
courthouse in the days and weeks following the riots, there is no mention of hostility or conflict 
between the soldiers and white residents of the town or county. “The troops are quartered in the 
Circuit Court room in the court house and ready to respond to an emergency,” the Helena World 
reassured its readers after the riot had ended.269 A few days later, the paper promised that, 
although the majority of troops had been released from duty, a small contingent would remain 
stationed at the courthouse to prevent any attempt to rescue those who had been arrested. In other 
words, the soldiers who were stationed in the Phillips County Courthouse were there to protect 
whites against black mobs (the insurrectionists or their sympathizers), not the other way around.  
 As for the presence of “mob spirit,” a “spirit” might be even harder to prove than a literal 
mob. Defense described “the excitement and feeling against the defendants,” and the “unfriendly 
and violent spirit” that characterized their trials. But how does one concretize “excitement” and 
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“unfriendliness” in briefs that will be read by men hundreds of miles away, months or years after 
the riot occurred? Defense held that the evidence against the sharecroppers was so flimsy, they 
couldn’t have been found guilty except for the extreme prejudice against them. But this argument 
was somewhat circular, using the fact of a guilty verdict as evidence of that verdict’s 
irrationality. And in any case, it was not the Supreme Court’s job to assess the evidence for guilt 
or innocence. The constitution might guarantee a trial with due process, but it does not guarantee 
that verdicts will be correct.270 The defense’s assertion of a “mob spirit” rested more on 
hypotheticals than it did on hard evidence. “No juryman could have voted for an acquittal and 
continued to live in Phillips county and if any prisoner by any chance had been acquitted by a 
jury he could not have escaped the mob,” they reported to the court. These claims were built on 
conditional assertions regarding the existence of a hypothetical juryman who wanted to acquit 
the sharecroppers, but couldn’t because he was intimidated by “mob spirit.” Of course, no such 
juryman existed. The actual jurors in the case believed the men to be guilty, and quickly and 
unanimously voted to convict. There is no evidence that any juror felt intimidated into returning 
a guilty verdict.     
The defense additionally submitted into evidence a series of letters and appeals written by 
Helena’s civic organizations to the governor of Arkansas in November of 1920, more than a year 
after the first trials had been completed. As the appeals dragged on, the idea of a plea bargain had 
been raised, with advocates for the sharecroppers suggesting Governor Brough should step in 
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and pardon the defendants, or at least commute their sentences. Many white residents of Phillips 
County were opposed to this and wrote letters of protest. The American Legion wrote one such 
letter, as did Helena’s chapters of the Rotary and Lion’s Clubs. The following letter, authored by 
members of the original Committee of Seven, is a typical example: 
Dear Governor:  
We, the undersigned members of the Committee of Seven, appointed by you in 
the Elaine-Hoop Spur Insurrection in this County, earnestly urge you to let the law take 
its course untrammeled by Executive Clemency.  
With all the provocation our people refrained from mob violence. The reason they 
did this was that this Committee gave our citizens their solemn promise that the law 
would be carried out. This Community can be made a model one so far as resorting to 
mob violence is concerned, but should the Governor commute any sentence of these 
Elaine rioters, this would be difficult, if not impossible.  
We respectfully urge you to support law and order as we supported it. There were 
150 Negroes legally guilty of murder in the first degree – actively present and assisting in 
the willful and deliberate murder of white citizens – and this Committee assisted in 
seeing that only leaders were brought to trial. Leniency has been already shown. We 
think the law itself is on trial. All of our citizens are of the opinion that the law should 
take its course.271  
 
Defense attorneys asserted that these letters were an open admission of mob domination. Their 
interpretation was that the defendants would have been lynched, “but for…the promise of some 
of said committee and other leading officials that if the mob would stay its hand they would 
execute those found guilty in the form of law.”272 They argued that, “only conviction followed 
by execution would have been regarded as an equivalent for lynching.” The presumption of guilt 
was so strong going into the trial, defense attorneys claimed, “a fair trial would have been 
impossible.” 
 Ironically, prosecutors and white residents of Phillips County felt these letters proved 
their aversion to mob violence. They were angry, and even tempted toward lynch law, but their 
leaders had reminded them of their commitment to law and order and asked them to trust that 
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justice could and would be had through formal prosecution in a court of law.273 Now that the 
courts had done their duty and the men were convicted, Phillips County’s leaders wanted the law 
to “take its course.” In his dissent to the ruling later, Justice McReynolds seemed flabbergasted 
that the defense had construed the letters as they did, calling the petitioner’s allegations 
“reckless.”  
I find nothing in this statement which counsels lawlessness or indicates more than an 
honest effort by upstanding men to meet the grave situation. … These resolutions are not 
violent and certainly do not establish the theory that defendants’ conviction in November, 
1919 – a year before – was an empty form and utterly void.274 
  
The United States Supreme Court therefore was asked to discern the presence of “mob spirit” in 
trials that were, on the face of things, “had according to law.” But, the only concrete evidence 
they had of this “mob spirit” were affadavits from the defendants and the railroad security guards 
(which the prosecution had never had the chance to rebut in court), letters written a year later by 
Helena’s leading civic organizations (which could be interpreted for or against the notion of mob 
spirit), and the defense’s assertion of their client’s innocence (a problem that writs of habeas 
corpus were not necessarily designed to resolve). Had the sharecroppers at Elaine been subjected 
to mob violence, and given “the mere form” of a trial? Or had the white citizens of Phillips 
County been subjected to an uprising and responded legally, and the issues being raised by the 
defense were “mere technicalities”? 
 
                                                          
273 As a more recent example, it is helpful to consider debates over treatment of suspected terrorists. Many 
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“We Believe the Law Itself is On Trial”: Technicalities and the Form of Law 
Before turning to the court’s decision, it’s worth pausing to consider an area of rhetoric 
where prosecution and defense diverge from each other, which involve the concepts of “mob” 
and “legal technicality.” From the white’s perspective, the sharecroppers’ union was the ‘mob’ 
and the white posses who fought them in the fields were agents of law and order. The white men 
who died during the riot were memorialized on a plaque honoring local veterans of World War I; 
this was certainly not how the perpetrators of mob violence would have been treated in Helena, 
which prided itself on commitment to law and order. The guilt of the sharecroppers was so 
evident in the minds of Phillips County’s white residents that their trial was in many ways a mere 
formality – a logical extension of the police and military force that had been necessary to stop 
the union in the first place. But, it was an important formality. It was by adhering to this 
formality that the white citizens of Phillips county distinguished themselves from a mob. It was 
the Committee of Seven’s utilization of the forms and ceremonies of law that made the 
sharecroppers’ execution a somber action of the state, as opposed to the frenzied ‘lawless’ 
execution they certainly would have suffered if town officials allowed them to be executed 
informally by white posses. From the white perspective, defense attorneys were taking advantage 
of Phillips County’s commitment to law and order. The defense was picking over the case, 
finding any mistake they could, throwing every argument that might possibly work at any judge 
they could get to hear their case.  
 For their part, the defense’s legal narrative relied on a very different understanding of 
“mob” and “legal technicality.” The Committee of Seven had acted like a mob – they had spied, 
broken up a peaceful meeting, and systematically attacked the entire black population of the 
southeast portion of the county. Then they had tortured pre-selected defendants into false 
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confessions of murder for the purposes of a sham trial. From the defense’s point of view, the trial 
itself was a “legal technicality” that concealed and legitimized the Committee of Seven’s mob-
like behavior.  They made multiple appeals, on every conceivable grounds, before any judge that 
would hear them, because, as they put it, “we are not speaking...of mere irregularities in 
procedure, but of a case where the processes of justice are actually subverted.”275 They did not 
see their defense strategy as based on “technicalities;” rather, they saw the original trial as a 
“false ceremony,” whose inauthenticity must be revealed by any means necessary. “It is our 
duty,” asserted defense counsel, “to declare lynch law as little valid when practiced by a 
regularly drawn jury as when administered by one elected by a mob intent on death.”276  
 The chart below (Table 1) delineates the competing versions of “mob” that went before 
the Court: 
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Table 1: Black and White perspectives on the riot and trial. 
 White Perspective  Black Perspective 
The Sharecropping 
System 
Status-quo economic system, 
to challenge it is akin to 
political insurrection and 
treason 
A “ruinous and oppressive” 
system held in place by 
legalized as well as mob 
violence 
Progressive Farmers 
and Household Union 
A “super criminal” 
organization, planning a 
violent insurrection 
A legal union pursuing civil 
court actions 
The American Legion  Patriotic combat veterans, 
with military training and 
discipline - well-equipped to 
put down an insurrection 
Leaders of the mob – 
instigated rioting the morning 
after shoot-out at Hoop Spur 
The Committee of Seven Civic leaders appointed by the 
Governor to investigate the 
riots 
Created mob spirit – oversaw 
torture of defendants, 
manufactured evidence, 
decided verdict in advance of 
the trial  
Federal Troops Military force enlisted for aid, 
proper channels were used 
and protocol for domestic 
disturbance was followed. 
Troops 
offered safety 
from posses 
led by the 
Legion and 
outsiders 
Troops killed 
unarmed 
people, 
arrested en 
masse, 
participated 
in torture of 
defendants. 
Mississippians/Outsiders Fellow concerned citizens 
who came to the aid of their 
neighbors 
Mobs from other parts, 
worked with local mobs 
Overall This was an example of 
whites using all lawful means 
to put down an insurrection, 
then bringing the leaders of 
the insurrection to justice in a 
court of law.  
The entire incident from start 
to finish was the work of 
white mobs. From the shoot-
out at Hoop Spur, to the next-
day’s American Legion 
posses and the other mobs 
that followed, and all aspects 
of the Committee of Seven’s 
investigation up to and 
including the trial & 
conviction.  
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The Construction of the Mob and the Narrowing of the Law 
From the outset of its decision, the court rejected or simply ignored most aspects of the 
defense’s briefs. Justice Holmes began his response to the appellants brief by clarifying that the 
court was “not affirming the facts to be stated,” but instead viewed the defendants’ testimonies as 
“only what we must take them to be.” In other words, since the affadavits were legally gathered, 
notarized, and entered into the record without challenge from the prosecution, the court was 
forced to “take” these facts, but in light of the prosecution’s objections, the justices refused to 
“affirm” them. By taking facts but not affirming them, Holmes on behalf of the Court slowly 
whittled away at the defendants’ arguments, defeating them not through legal argumentation, but 
simply by rendering them superfluous: 
The petitioners say that [Clinton Lee] must have been killed by other whites, but that we 
leave on one side, as what we have to deal with is not the petitioners’ innocence or guilt 
but solely the question of whether their constitutional rights have been preserved. They 
say that their meeting was to employ counsel for protection against extortions practiced 
upon them by the landowners and that the landowners tried to prevent their effort, but 
that again we pass by as not directly bearing upon the trial.277  
  
Holmes, speaking for the majority, accepted the form of the sharecroppers’ testimony, but 
‘leaves on one side’ or ‘passes by’ the substantive meaning of that testimony. But by passing by 
this testimony, he arrives at a very narrow legal judgment, namely, that the Moore v. Dempsey 
case spoke “solely [to] the question of whether their constitutional rights have been preserved” 
while everything else about the riots – and the circumstances leading up to them – was deemed 
“not directly bearing upon the trial.” So, the problem facing the black defendants was not that the 
majority of justices found their testimony legally insufficient. Instead, the problem was that the 
Court did not find their testimony legally relevant. These limitations set the stage for Phillips 
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County officials to continue to use legal procedures to extend their punishment of the 
sharecroppers, and evade legal accountability for their own resort to violence.  
When faced with explaining the sharecroppers’ testimony to the Supreme Court, Phillips 
County prosecutors tried to back-track and say that the affidavits were fabricated – but both 
Chief Justice Taft and Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes agreed that this was legally 
inadequate. The prosecution had already demurred to the content of the affidavits; if the 
affidavits were true (which the state had admitted by demurring) then habeas corpus was indeed 
appropriate and new trials with due process and untainted evidence were required. However, 
with all matters related to the exploitative sharecropping, police brutality, and murderous posses 
having been ruled irrelevant, the only issue at stake from the court’s perspective was the 
preservation of the appellants’ rights at trial. The defense counsel’s message that the trial itself 
constituted the unfairness was “passed by.” The court did not overturn the verdict, but instead 
referred the case back to a lower circuit court, this time with the instruction that the content of 
the affidavits would need to be examined for their validity.  
 This chart (Table 2) shows how the court’s ruling addressed (or failed to address) each 
aspect of the “mob” described by defense attorneys. 
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Table 2: Court’s ruling in relation to white and black perspectives.  
 White Perspective  Black Perspective Court’s Ruling 
Sharecropping 
System 
Status-quo economic 
system 
A “ruinous and 
oppressive” system  
“Not directly bearing 
upon the trial” 
Progressive 
Farmers and 
Household 
Union 
A “super criminal” 
organization 
A legal union pursuing 
civil court actions 
“Not directly bearing 
upon the trial” 
American 
Legion  
Patriotic combat 
veterans, with military 
training and discipline  
Leaders of the mob  Not addressed.   
Committee of 
Seven 
Civic leaders 
appointed by the 
Governor  
Leaders of the mob  “if true as alleged, they 
make the trial absolutely 
void…the District Judge 
should find whether the 
facts alleged are true and 
whether they can be 
explained so far as to 
leave the state 
proceedings 
undisturbed.” 
Federal Troops Military force enlisted 
for aid, proper 
channels were used  
Troops offered safety 
from posses but also 
killed unarmed people, 
and tortured detainees. 
Only mentioned as being 
there to prevent mob 
violence – no mention of 
role in riot and 
interrogation. 
Mississippians/ 
Outsiders 
Fellow concerned 
citizens  
Mobs from other parts Not addressed. 
Overall This was an example 
of whites using all 
lawful means to put 
down an insurrection, 
then bringing the 
leaders of the 
insurrection to justice 
in a court of law.  
The entire incident 
from start to finish 
was the work of white 
mobs, including the 
Committee of Seven’s 
investigation up to and 
including the trial & 
conviction.  
Everything related to the 
union, the attack on the 
church, and the riot was 
ruled irrelevant to the 
case. A lower court 
should review the 
evidence and determine if 
a new trial is required.   
 
When the court’s ruling is broken down in this way, the limitations of the verdict are striking. 
The court only addresses one portion of the defense counsel’s appeal, ruling every other aspect 
irrelevant. The portion where the court does rule in favor of the defense is conditional: “if true” 
then the trial is void, and so a new judge “should find whether the alleged facts are true.” Not 
only did the court refuse to affirm the facts as alleged by defense counsel, their ruling also left 
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open the possibility that even if the facts were proven, the convictions might still be valid if they 
could “be explained so far as to leave the state proceedings undisturbed.”278 In other words, the 
Phillips County prosecutors would receive a second chance to argue against the affidavits, and a 
fifth chance to re-prosecute the share-croppers with whatever evidence they could gather 
“legally.”   
That is what is now referred to as the Moore v. Dempsey decision. It is important to note 
that the decision, in terms of the practical reality of the situation, did not force the Philips County 
court system to provide the defendants with due process, nor did it overturn their convictions, 
nor did it “set them free” as is often proclaimed in shorter summaries of the verdict. The court 
instead proposed that the men be put on trial again. This limited proposal was not even 
mandated; indeed, a new trial never took place. At this point, Phillips County prosecutors had not 
actually lost at all – they had merely suffered a setback with the Supreme Court. Given that they 
had so successfully maintained the myth of the insurrection up to this point, it seems that if they 
had closed ranks they could easily have discredited the testimonies of two working class white 
men, employed as thugs by the railroad company, and a handful of black sharecroppers who 
were already stigmatized by suspicions of Bolshevik influence and anti-white violence. Both 
Cortner and Whitaker document that following their defection, both of the two white security 
guards had been fired from their jobs, one had been arrested on trumped up charges and held in 
jail for several weeks, and both had eventually been forced to leave the state due to threats 
against their life. Although the men were willing to sign affidavits about what they witnessed, 
there is no indication they would have been willing to actually return to Arkansas and testify in 
open court, let alone that their testimony would have been believed.279 Surely, after the 
                                                          
278 Moore et al. v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
279 Whitaker, On the Laps of Gods, 298. 
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investment of so much time and energy, and the humiliating mistake that had resulted in the 
release of the other half of the defendants on a technicality, the members of the Committee of 
Seven and the County prosecutor sincerely wanted to see the remaining defendants executed. 
Yet, Phillips County prosecutors did not proceed with the case. Instead, after a series of closed 
door meetings between Scipio Jones, members of the Committee of Seven, and the prosecuting 
attorney, the decision was made to drop the charges of murder, have the six men plead to lesser 
charges, and then to have their sentences commuted by the governor so that they would soon be 
released from prison. Not only that, all the men who were already in prison on felony convictions 
would be released through either sentence commutations or indefinite furloughs.  
 Why would the Committee of Seven and the Phillips County prosecutors have made this 
decision? The compromise they reached is unfavorable to them in every respect, and completely 
contrary to the desires of their own constituents. One is left thinking that Scipio Jones is the one 
who had leverage over the white elite, rather than the other way around, despite all appearances 
to the contrary. Whitaker interprets the decision this way: first, allowing the accusations 
contained in the writ of habeas corpus to be the subject of trial in a federal court would cause the 
affidavits to become widespread public knowledge – affidavits that told “of a massacre of blacks 
and of judicial proceedings of the most grotesque sort.”280 Whitaker supposes that in the delicate 
out-of-court negotiations that followed the incident, Scipio Jones asked members of the 
Committee of Seven to consider, “Did the state – and the Helena planters – really want a trial to 
be held in federal court that would focus on whether the initial trials had been grossly unfair? 
Did they want a re-airing of testimony that the sharecroppers had been whipped and tortured to 
testify falsely?”281  
                                                          
280 Whitaker, On the Laps of Gods, 266. 
281 Whitaker, On the Laps of Gods, 300. 
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Griff Stockley’s description of what he believed to be a cover-up jointly undertaken by 
federal troops and the Committee of Seven touches on similar themes of collusion and secrecy. 
He argues that, “If one accepts the evidence that a massacre by the military and white mobs took 
place, then the actions of the principals afterward take on an entirely different meaning and 
character.”282 Stockley notes that, “both the military and the white power structure in Phillips 
County (including Governor Brough) would make much of the argument that a massacre by 
blacks was averted by the quick response of the military.”283 But after the affidavits from the 
white railroad agents materialized, this argument seemed to crumble. Stockley concludes: 
Since the cases involving these particular affidavits never went to trial and thus were 
never tested in court, questions will always remain about the veracity and accuracy of the 
assertions in them; however, the fact that the prosecution went to such lengths to discredit 
[the men who wrote the affidavits] and then settled the cases without additional trial 
suggests the fear their prospective testimony engendered in the white power structure of 
Phillips County.284 
 
“Questions will always remain” about the veracity and accuracy of assertions that the mob, the 
Committee of Seven, and the military jointly perpetrated a massacre, jointly ran a number of 
torture chambers, and jointly covered up evidence that there had been no insurrection to begin 
with that might justify this extreme level of violent repression. Questions will always remain 
about these assertions, a lack of resolution that opened the door for ongoing violence and 
exploitation in Arkansas and elsewhere. To this day there has never been a reconciliation of a 
basic factual narrative of what occurred in Elaine, let alone any accountability or reparations for 
the extensive violence that is likely part of that story. 
Moore v. Dempsey was not able to touch, let alone undo, the effects of the riots for 
individual survivors, or for Phillips County’s black residents as a whole. Upon their release from 
                                                          
282 Stockley, Blood in Their Eyes, 35. 
283 Stockley, Blood in Their Eyes, 44. 
284 Stockley, Blood in Their Eyes, 45. 
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prison, the freed men became exiles from their former homes in Arkansas. The collective 
property losses of just those twelve accused union leaders totaled almost $90,000 (in 2013, this 
would be more than $1 million), and that figure does not include the losses incurred by the 79 
individuals who were given penitentiary sentences, or to the hundreds of other men and women 
who were detained, injured, and released only upon their promise to work at conditions set by 
their employers.285 The union was broken, its leaders killed or scattered. The courts refused to 
intervene until the prosecutors made a mistake that the judges could not easily ignore. The 
Supreme Court required that this mistake be corrected, but they did it in a way that left a glaring 
escape hatch for those who were actually responsible for the violence to avoid detection or 
punishment. The suppression of what really occurred was so successful that it would be more 
than 40 years before historians would vindicate the NAACP and the black sharecroppers of the 
county; of course, by then another two generations of hyper exploitation and the transfer of 
wealth out of the black community had been accomplished. To this day, more than 60% of the 
residents of Phillips County are African American, and nearly 40% of them live below the 
poverty line.286  
 
Perception of the Case as a Victory 
The corrective role of the judicial branch, especially at the federal level, has tended to 
weaken the tenor of critique found in commentary on the Elaine riots. Scholars of the Elaine 
massacre have turned to the Moore v. Dempsey decision as evidence that what happened in 
                                                          
285 J. S. Waterman and E. E. Overton, “The Aftermath of Moore v. Dempsey,” St. Louis Law Review 18 (1932/1933): 
117; Ida B. Wells, The Arkansas Riots. Waterman and Overton describe the effect of the decision on the defendants 
and their families. Wells notes the specific financial losses suffered by each farmer’s household. Financial 
calculation is estimated based on figures provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ “CPI Inflation Calculator” 
(http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).   
286 “Poverty Statistics by County: Phillips County, Arkansas,” The United States Census Bureau, 2010.  
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Arkansas was an abuse of state power, rather than an expression of state power. Examinations of 
the riot often conclude on an uplifting note: the riots demonstrate how the yokes of legitimate 
government can be overwhelmed by the spirit of the mob, but the subsequent verdict in Moore v. 
Dempsey demonstrates how the rule of law can exorcise the mob spirit and restore legitimacy to 
governing institutions. The Encyclopedia of the American Constitution and the Encyclopedia of 
Race and Crime both call Moore v. Dempsey a “landmark decision,” for its role in the expansion 
of habeas corpus and the nationalization of the 14th amendment. Monographs that examine the 
decision, such as Cortner’s A Mob Intent on Death, Whitaker’s In the Laps of Gods, and 
Stockley’s Blood in Their Eyes, all highlight the redemptive nature of the Supreme Court verdict. 
It is a case that is said to have helped cement the nationalization of the fourteenth amendment, 
and to have struck a blow against the power of racist mob violence. Jeannie Whayne, however, 
in a review of scholarship on the riots, suggests that such accounts “[do not] fully unpack the 
implications of the Moore decision by taking the reader through the cases that followed, which is 
unfortunate given the emphasis [placed] on its precedent-changing nature.”287 In other words, 
while histories of the Elaine riots tend to describe Moore as a victory of lasting consequence, 
they rarely support this claim with evidence of the case’s long-term impact. 
 This may be because such evidence is sparse. Michael Klarman, a legal historian who 
specializes in issues of race and the Supreme Court, describes the court’s decisions during the 
Progressive era as “minimalist constitutional interpretations – the very least that a straight-faced 
commitment to constitutionalism entailed.”288 Another legal scholar, George Thomas, offers 
                                                          
287 Whayne, “Black Farmers in the Red Autumn,” 335. 
288 Gabriel J. Chin and Randy Wagner, “The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the Counter-Majoritarian 
Difficulty,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, April 14, 2011); Klarman, “The 
Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure,” 886;  I put aside Klarman’s larger argument that such Supreme 
Court decisions represent a “counter-majoritarian” difficulty that then inspired social backlash. In my reading, the 
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Moore as an example of a “feeble response” by the Supreme Court: “the intervention provided a 
partial remedy to the worst kind of abuses, but really only sent a message to the authorities to be 
more discreet when forcing black suspects to confess.”289 Thomas’ concluded that “The only 
clear message [to state courts] is that the trial must be, in form, what trials look like.”290 Indeed, 
some legal scholars have even concluded that the Court was not obligated to intervene at all, and 
that the decision could have gone either way.291 Robert Whitaker reasons that the progressive 
justices on the court were so moved by the sharecroppers’ testimony of suffering, they found a 
way to do so even though they could just as easily have declared the trials valid.292 But this 
would seem to undermine the notion that the case strengthened the constitution and the rule of 
law, for it suggests the court acted out of benevolence – not legal duty – and future courts, 
lacking such benevolence, might be free to rule otherwise.  
It might seem unwise, or just petty, to critique a ruling for its benevolence, or to critique 
justices of the court for trying to reach beyond these minimalist interpretations during a period 
that has been described as the “nadir” of American black-white race relations. As I have worked 
on this chapter, the most consistent critique I’ve received is that the court did what it was legally 
able to do, and perhaps even more than it was legally able to do. What were the justices supposed 
                                                          
problem is not that these decisions were counter-majoritarian but that they upheld “tyranny of the minority” as 
explained by Chin.  
289 Thomas, “Bigotry, Jury Failures, and the Supreme Court’s Feeble Response,” 947. 
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to do? They could not have ruled on the validity of the sharecropping system as a whole. They 
could not have forced a state or federal court to prosecute members of the Committee of Seven 
for misconduct. They could not have awarded the sharecroppers “reparations” for what was lost 
during the riots. I agree with this feedback. Neither the constitution nor legal precedent would 
have allowed the Court to reach a decision that represented justice for the defendants in the 
Moore case.  
The legal scholars I quoted earlier agree as well. Despite their use of terms like “feeble” 
and “minimalist,” Klarman and Thomas do not suggest the court could have or should have 
decided differently than they did. Instead, Klarman suggests that the court was an obstacle to 
outright constitutional nullification at a time when substantive justice was impossible to achieve:  
In an era in which the South politically could get away with lynching, massive black 
disfranchisement, the formalization of segregation, and the reenactment of statutory 
codes for coercing black labor, the Court stood as a barrier to the adoption of schemes 
that came too near to formal nullification of the Constitution.293  
 
Despite the court’s willingness to go against popular opinion, in the larger context of extreme 
social and political inequality, Klarman concludes that, “in terms of concrete consequences, as 
opposed to symbolism, the Court's rulings made almost no difference in the lives of African-
Americans.”294 For his part, Thomas does not conclude that the courts could have decided 
differently; their feeble decisions were legally sound, or at least legally reasonable. Instead, he 
concludes that an entirely new federal appeals apparatus is necessary, which would be devoted to 
reviewing substantive claims of innocence, not mere legal error. In this way, defendants who are 
railroaded by community passion, over-zealous prosecution, and/or jury bigotry, could pursue an 
appeal no matter how diligently the “form of law” was followed during their trial.  
                                                          
293 Klarman, “The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure;” 945. 
294 Klarman, “The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure;” 897. 
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My own concern in this chapter is not with issuing a personal critique against the justices, 
nor with issuing a legal critique of the ruling. For me, the fact that the legal system could not, 
legally or practically, reach a fair or just decision is what merits attention – not what the decision 
“should have been,” but what it “could not have been,” and why. Such a profound failure 
demands more scrutiny than what is offered by either the idealism of Whitaker or the 
“hopelessness” of Klarman.295    
 
Form vs. Substance – Back to the Mob 
 The Moore v. Dempsey decision has been described as a redemptive decision that helped 
re-make the nation by federalizing the 14th Amendment; but, it has also been described as a 
minimalist interpretation of the constitution that lacked any real means of enforcement. Both 
interpretations revolve around a concern for form versus substance. Those who praise the Moore 
decision appreciate that it prevented the Committee of Seven from carrying out the work of a 
lynch mob under the guise of legal formality. Those who critique the decision point out that it 
elevated primarily the procedural aspects of legal formality and failed to touch upon the 
substantive, foundational issues of justice that were at stake. Both of these interpretations, 
however, are affected when one considers the complex construction of “mob” and “mob spirit” 
that was central to defense counsel’s strategy. In the defense’s account, the “form” of law refers 
to legal ceremonies enacted by the mob to cover up their flaunting of its “substance.”  For their 
part, the prosecutors did not try to claim that a mob-dominated trial would be legitimate – they 
                                                          
295 David Garrow, “Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education,” Virgini Law 
Review 80, no. 1 (February 1994): 151–60. Garrow calls Klarman’s analysis “hopelessly hollow.” Klarman argues 
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claimed that there was no mob in the first place, and that the law had been carried out in both 
substance and form. In response, the Supreme Court’s ruling held that if the defense’s allegations 
of a “mob” were true, the original proceedings were void; however, if the prosecution could 
explain what happened “so far as to leave the state proceedings undisturbed,” the sharecroppers 
could still be re-tried and convicted.  
This is a small but crucial difference. The defense’s argument was that the state’s 
legitimate proceedings were the work of a mob; the two were so intertwined as to be inseparable, 
and therefore the state had ceded its claim to legitimacy. The court’s response, however, posed 
the mob and the state as a dichotomy, and asked a lower court to determine if the mob’s 
influence could be sufficiently disentangled so as to “leave the state’s proceedings undisturbed.”     
Defense counsel’s careful, strategic, rhetorical construction of “mob” and “mob spirit” lost most 
of its nuance in the hands of the Court. The defense wanted to use the case to show how the 
entire political economy of the south was a form of legalized ‘mob’ violence, fueled by bigotry 
and prejudice that defense said amounted to a “prevailing mob spirit.” The court’s ruling, 
however, narrowed the defense’s construction of mob and “mob spirit” down to the most literal 
interpretation – an actual mob, vicious and threatening, that had unduly influenced the outcome 
of a legitimate state proceeding – and thus their ruling was based on a quite different 
understanding of “mob” than what the defense asserted.  
 In light of this, the current-day disagreements over whether Moore was “redemptive” or 
“minimalist” miss the point, because both viewpoints are based on the court’s interpretation of 
mob violence. The court’s interpretation of mob violence, however, was a very narrow version of 
what the defense meant by mob violence. And the defense’s decision to call what occurred “mob 
violence” was, in the first place, a rhetorical strategy for challenging state violence. The verdict 
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is seen as redemptive by those who feel it was a concrete step of progress toward the goal of a 
fair trial. The verdict is seen as minimalist by those who feel it did not go far enough toward the 
goal of a fair trial. But the defense did not want a “fair trial” for their clients. They wanted to 
prove that a fair trial could not be had within the larger political and economic context of white 
supremacy.  
 These different understandings of mob become all the more significant when one 
considers how the court’s paring down of “mob” manifests in popular memory of the riots. 
Consider the following descriptions, taken from a variety of semi-authoritative sources that enjoy 
wide public circulation (as opposed to the more nuanced descriptions one might find in academic 
or law review journals):   
The riot was an uprising which ensued after a gathering of African-American men, 
women, and children were attacked by the Ku Klux Klan at their church in Hoop Spur, 
Arkansas. In the days following the attack, fifty to sixty African-Americans were killed 
while attempting to defend themselves from their attackers.296 
 
Approximately 100 African-American farmers, led by Robert L. Hill, the founder of 
the Progressive Farmers and Household Union of America, met at a church in Hoop 
Spur in Phillips County, near Elaine. […] Whites resisted such organizing by blacks, and 
two went to the meeting. In a conflict, guards shot one of the white men. Violence ensued 
in the town and county, leaving five whites and 100-200 blacks dead.297 
 
A shooting incident that occurred at a meeting of the Progressive Farmers and Household 
Union escalated into mob violence on the part of the white people in Elaine (Phillips 
County) and surrounding areas. Although the exact number is unknown, estimates of the 
number of African Americans killed by whites range into the hundreds; five white people 
lost their lives.298 
 
                                                          
296 Frederick Walker, “Robert T. Kerlin Resources,” Virginia Military Institute Archives, November 14, 2015, 
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297 “Elaine Race Riot,” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, October 21, 2015, 
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Almost a century later, the association between the Elaine riots and “mob violence,” is so strong, 
at least one account of the riot falsely claims they were instigated by the KKK. In Wikipedia’s 
initial summary of the riots (viewed more than 20,000 times in the last year), the instigators of 
the riot are described generically as “whites,” who disrupt the sharecroppers’ meeting seemingly 
of their own volition. The article’s first mention of ‘guards’ refers to the African American men 
who stood guard outside the PFHU meeting, who whites accused of firing the first shots. No 
mention is made until much later in the article that the whites were themselves also “guards”; 
one was a sheriff’s deputy, the other a private security guard for the Missouri-Pacific Railroad. 
The Online Encyclopedia of Arkansas gives the most thorough account, but readers who stop 
after the first few paragraphs will come away with the concept of “widespread mob violence on 
the part of white people,” with details of county, state, and federal law enforcement violence not 
Figure 27 “The Elaine Riot: Tragedy and Triumph,” Public Broadcasting Service, 2002. 
https://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/tools_riot.html 
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appearing until much later in the entry.299 The Public Broadcasting Station (PBS) produced a 
brief, 20-minute video about the riots, featured as part of a larger curriculum on “the rise and fall 
of Jim Crow.” On the organization’s website, a link to the video is positioned alongside two 
iconic photographs (Figure 27). One depicts robed Klansmen from an unspecified place and 
time, and another shows the mutilated body of Abram Smith, one of two victims of a spectacle 
lynching that took place in 1930, in Marion, Indiana. The film reflects current historical 
scholarship on the riots, but the accompanying publicity and visual presentation of the website 
implies a strong connection to Klan violence, when in fact none has been documented.  
What these accounts have in common is that state action recludes (and even disappears), 
while the notion of “mob violence” is foregrounded. Over time, the Court’s interpretation of mob 
violence as a force external to law seems to have had more lasting reach than the defense’s more 
complicated notion of state-organized violence that uses the law as an extension of the mob. The 
court decided that mob-domination was illegitimate, but it could not take on the more complex 
problem of mob-conduction. As a result, the legal opinion that was issued failed to address the 
crux of the problem presented by Elaine – a problem that still faces Americans today. The 
problem at stake is not necessarily what to do when law is corrupted by inequality and violence 
(as implied by the concept of mob domination of the law). Rather, the problem at stake is, what 
can be done when the law itself acts as a conduit for inequality and violence?  What can be done 
when the law, rather than being dominated by violence, in fact operates as the very system that 
enables the violence of domination?   
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion: Lynch Law All Around Us 
 
It would be difficult today to find anyone who publicly speaks out in favor of lynching; 
the twentieth-century civil rights movement brought shame to the term.  But, although America 
has mostly shed its associations with the racist, vigilante mob, what has happened to the more 
abstract “mob spirit” that defense counsel identified at work during the Elaine riots?  And, what 
has happened to the lawful ungirding of lynching, which for most of its history was used as a 
method of law enforcement? 
   
Utility of “the Exception” for Understanding Systemic Racial Violence in the United States 
 The concept of the exception helps to resolve a major paradox of systemic racial violence 
in U.S. history, which is the problem of how such violence has often taken place simultaneously 
within and outside of the law. For example, when we compare the actions of the Committee of 
Seven to the text or doctrine of law their behavior appears absolutely “illegal.”  But when we 
consider how that violence was carried out, it is equally obvious that primary responsibility lies 
with legally constituted authority, and the enormous powers these authorities were able to 
summon through the ordinary workings of governance – surveillance, deputization, military 
activation, interrogation, prosecution, and execution.  It would have been difficult, perhaps 
impossible, for a “mob” to squelch the sharecroppers’ union so effectively, without the material 
resources and legal authority conferred by all these different state powers.  So many aspects of 
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what happened at Elaine were, at least on the face of things, “legal,” the highest court of the 
nation was unable to find a constitutional basis for effective intervention.   
Similarly, when one reads news reports of large mobs binding jailers, breaking down 
prison doors, absconding with prisoners, and then gruesomely killing them, it is difficult to 
imagine any better description than “lawless mob violence.”  But of all the different kinds of 
criminals that local and state governments put so many resources into apprehending during the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries – horse thieves, bank robbers, moonshiners – why did lynchers 
prove so difficult to capture, prosecute, and convict?  When you then consider that the jailers 
were often in collusion with the mob, that prisons were left mysteriously unlocked or unguarded, 
and that small-town sheriffs proved conveniently unable to remember anyone’s name or 
description sometimes after lengthy interactions with a mob’s members and leaders, the term 
“lawless” seems less appropriate.  
In Agamben’s words,  
the state of exception is neither external nor internal to the juridical order, and the 
problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where 
inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other.300    
      
If lynching and mob violence are understood as “exceptional,” the ability of perpetrators to act 
within and outside the law is less contradictory.  Sheriffs, police officers, mayors, governors, 
military commanders and others who have featured in this research are constituted with a form of 
executive sovereignty – limited though it might be in theory by checks and balances – which 
allow them to formally or informally declare emergency conditions.  Within this state of 
emergency, exceptions to law are allowed. The dictates of legal procedure become secondary, 
and the very concept of ‘legality’ loses its force. During an emergency, necessity trumps legality, 
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thus allowing things to occur ‘under cover of law’ that would, in normal times, be illegal.  
Courts, retroactively, can attempt to correct some wrongs that occur within these states of 
exception.  In general however, the discourse of emergency offers sufficient legal cover to 
protect perpetrators in the aftermath of violence. The concept of the exception reveals that 
systemic violence is both legal and illegal, and this is precisely what makes it so powerful and 
difficult to challenge.       
 Conceiving of the systemic racialized violence I have described as “exceptional” has 
drawbacks as well. First, the term itself implies temporariness, invoking exceptions to law during 
times of emergency. Once the emergency is over, so too should be the exception. In Agamben’s 
theorization of the term, however, it is not so simple. The power to declare an exception 
continues to reside with sovereign powers even during times of normality. The very existence of 
the power to declare an exception thus influences the ‘normal’ social order, not just during a 
distinct crisis or emergency.  The state of exception – and the violence that occurs within it – 
remains an immanent threat, capable of reproducing social and political boundaries even in the 
absence of explicit acts of violence. Nonetheless, even though Agamben acknowledges that the 
power of the exception persists during times of normality, the terms exception and emergency 
tend to invoke a phenomenon that is temporary, or at least periodic. Some ethnic studies scholars 
have critiqued or elaborated on Agamben’s notion of the exception by positing the concept of a 
“permanent state of exception,” in order to describe how racialized exceptions to law are 
embedded in American institutions and in constant operation.  Achille Mbembe, for example, 
identified the plantation, the prison, and the colony as zones where permanent states of exception 
have been produced and maintained.301 Native studies and postcolonial scholars have added to 
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this list the frontier and the reservation.302  Furthermore, military historians and scholars who 
specialize in peace and conflict studies have pointed out that the U.S. has been in a near constant 
state of war since its founding in the late 18th century.303 To the extent that the power of the 
exception is rooted in wartime powers, the absence of distinct periods of “peace” in U.S. history 
draws into question whether the American ‘exception’ is really an exception at all, as opposed to 
being a permanent feature of our political and legal infrastructure. 
 Another drawback of Agamben’s theorization of the exception is that it has proven very 
awkward to apply in the context of the American political structure, which combines principles 
of republicanism, federalism, populism, and liberal democracy. Indeed, the United States 
received minimal treatment in Agamben’s text, confined to two or three pages in chapter one, 
which serve to raise more questions than they answer.  Agamben’s analysis is that the basis of 
the exception in the U.S. can be found in the national constitution, “in the dialectic between the 
powers of the president and those of Congress.”304 Which of these bodies has “supreme authority 
in an emergency situation”? – the constitution offers conflicting answers.  Agamben then traces 
this contested exception through a series of presidential and congressional actions during 
wartime, starting with Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War. 
“Whether strictly legal or not,” said Lincoln, the measures were taken “under what appeared to 
be a popular demand and a public necessity.”305  According to Agamben, these decisions indicate 
Lincoln believed “even fundamental law could be violated if the very existence of the union and 
the juridical order were at stake.”306 
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Agamben then moves to the first world war, claiming that “during WWI President Woodrow 
Wilson personally assumed even broader power than those Abraham Lincoln claimed,” however 
Wilson repeatedly received permission from Congress (unlike Lincoln), leading Agamben to 
conclude that Wilson, “instead of declaring the state of exception preferred to have exceptional 
laws issued.”307 During WWI , Congress “even made it a crime to ‘willfully utter, print, write, or 
publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of 
the United States.’”308   Agamben concludes his treatment of the U.S. with a brief examination of 
Roosevelt’s response to the Great Depression, Eisenhower’s decision to intern people of 
Japanese ancestry during WWII, and George W. Bush’s strategy for prosecuting the war on 
terror.  Agamben argues that  
because the sovereign power of the president is essentially grounded in the emergency 
linked to a state of war, over the course of the twentieth century the metaphor of war 
became an integral part of the presidential political vocabulary whenever decisions 
considered to be of vital importance [were] being imposed.”309 
 
Perhaps in part because the theory of the exception has been more frequently applied to absolute 
dictatorship and monarchies, Agamben locates the American exception as deriving from 
executive powers at the highest realms of government. For Agamben, the uniqueness of the 
American system lies in the fact that Congress, too, has the power to legislatively declare 
exceptions – and, on occasion, these powers come into conflict.  Even when they do not conflict 
(as when Wilson and Congress were united on the need for emergency measures during WWI), 
they produce different kinds of exceptions – the exception of unilateral presidential declaration, 
as distinct from the issuing of “exceptional laws” by Congress.     
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What this theory of the exception does not account for, however, is that the U.S. system 
features a complex republican system that distributes sovereignty horizontally across multiple 
branches of government, and vertically across local, state, and federal jurisdictions. Further 
complicating things, the American system has significant populist elements, such that 
sovereignty is also vested in ‘the people’ themselves, with powers to vote, sit on juries, run for 
office, organize militias, and petition or protest against the government, among others.  This 
makes it more difficult to identify precisely where ‘sovereignty’ resides, and therefore to 
determine who (if anyone) claims the power to unilaterally declare an exception. If one considers 
the exception to revolve exclusively around the suspension of habeas corpus by the president or 
Congress, many important elements of exceptional governance will go unaccounted for – a 
problem that is exacerbated further if one wants to fully understand racialized states of 
exception, whose permanence cannot be explained by presidential or congressional action alone.    
In the case of lynching, for example, this form of violence can be tied directly to wartime 
powers, with Virginia’s legislature excusing the actions of Charles Lynch on the basis that they 
were “timely and effectual measures which, though not strictly warranted by law, were necessary 
on account of the danger” posed by British loyalists during the American war for independence.  
But in this case, the power to declare an exception did not flow from the top down, as it did in 
each of Agamben’s examples.  Instead, the exception was first declared “on the ground,” by men 
like Charles Lynch who perceived themselves to be acting according to “the law of necessity.”  It 
was only later that Lynch’s unilateral decision-making was condoned and codified by the 
legislature, granting retroactive legal impunity. This pattern remained a feature of lynching 
throughout its use in frontier areas, where ‘exceptions’ were used to create and expand the reach 
of state power, rather than originating in some preexisting state power defined by the 
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constitution.  By the time Abraham Lincoln made the decision to suspend habeas corpus during 
the Civil War, far from being a radical departure from previous understandings of constitutional 
governance, Lincoln tapped into a long-standing tradition of American statecraft, governance via 
lynch law, which held that a different form of law held sway during wartime emergencies, and in 
particular within the border regions between warring parties. This may be why, in addition to 
referencing the relevant portions of the Constitution to defend his decision, as Agamben notes, 
Lincoln cited as equally important the fact that his enforcement of such wartime provisions 
“appeared to be a popular demand.”310  Furthermore, lynching was held in place through other 
forms of bottom-up “exceptionalism,” as well. Jury nullification, for example, is not an executive 
power – but it played an undeniable role in the ability of lynchers to perpetrate violence with 
impunity.      
Similarly, in the case of the Elaine riots, and other conflicts of the Red Summer, such 
violence was directly tied to the ability of Phillips County’s leaders to declare a state of 
emergency in the region. Here, the exception flowed from both the bottom-up and from the top-
down.  First, as noted by Agamben, President Wilson and the national Congress issued 
exceptional laws, creating an environment in which otherwise legal activities could be labelled 
and treated as illegal, particularly activities that represented any form of challenge (even mere 
utterances) against the status quo “American system of government.”   The laws issued by 
Congress and signed by Wilson, on the face of things, had nothing to do with sharecropping in 
the South.  But, by creating such broad powers of criminalization, the stage was set for pre-
existing conflicts to be opportunistically transformed into issues of war and national security.  
Within this space of exception the mayor of Helena and members of the Committee of Seven had 
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a legitimate legal basis on which to surveil and criminalize the sharecroppers’ union, which in 
turn set the stage for the violence that followed when an actual emergency (the shoot-out at the 
Hoop Spur Church) got underway.  Emergency powers allowed the sheriff to deputize civilians 
en masse; allowed the Governor of Arkansas to authorize military intervention; allowed the 
Committee of Seven to pursue extraordinary measures in their interrogation of suspects, and etc.   
Agamben is right when he notes American historians’ understanding of how World War I 
significantly expanded executive/emergency powers.  But, the power of the laws he cites (such 
as that which criminalized even mere criticism of the U.S. system of government) came not just 
from President Wilson’s direct implementation of measures like the Espionage act, but also in 
the “mob spirit” such laws created, such that law enforcement agents at multiple levels of 
government could suppress the lawful activities of its citizenry without even having to charge 
them with specific violations related to espionage or conspiracy. It was the ways in which these 
laws expanded on the power of criminalization more broadly, which allowed so many local and 
state level leaders to declare otherwise lawful activities as the work of insurrectionists, which 
thus necessitated a violent response. Since sovereignty is such a centerpiece of Agamben’s 
explanation of the exception, the diffuse forms of sovereignty found in the U.S. pose significant 
theoretical challenges that require further explication, far beyond the national constitution’s 
contradictory definitions of congressional versus presidential powers.  This is not to say that the 
notion of the exception cannot be applied to the U.S., it is only to say that Agamben’s 
theorization of sovereign power does not sufficiently explain how states of exception are invoked 
and maintained in the U.S. context.   
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Lynching Discourses 
“Law” and “lawlessness” are inadequate terms for understanding lynching. Agamben’s 
notion of the exception helps to explain how these categories become blurry during times or real 
or perceived emergency.  But at the same time, the notion of the exception as originating 
primarily in the national constitution and the sovereignty vested in congress and the office of the 
president, fails to capture the complexity of the American system, in which sovereignty (and thus 
exceptional powers) are diffuse, overlapping, and decentralized.  I propose that a more useful 
way of describing lynching lies in discourse, rather than legal doctrine.  Despite how much 
lynching has changed over time, and despite the complicated forms of ‘sovereignty’ that it 
entails, there are at least four discourses that have sustained and invigorated the practice over 
time.  These discourses include the notion of ‘emergency,’ but also extend to include 
constructions of race and crime, which were deeply imbricated in the origins of lynching and 
thus in the origins of American exceptionalism.      
 First, one of the most basic features of lynching discourse is the notion that the rule of 
law requires supplementation or modification in the face of emergency or crisis.  Emergency 
discourses lay the groundwork for lynching by minimizing constitutional procedures as mere 
technicalities that can and should be disregarded under dire circumstances.  During times of 
imminent danger and periods of extreme volatility, lynch law is a means to ensure a desired 
social or political outcome, even if it requires departing from legal norms. Rather than 
undermining them, this departure is claimed necessary to maintain the overarching integrity of 
dominant political institutions. The benefit of identifying this as a “discourse,” rather than trying 
to pin it down to a specific law or article of the constitution, is that “discourse” identifies the 
broader philosophy which undergirds the creation of legal doctrine like the constitutional 
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passages highlighted by Agamben.  The exception in America does not originate in the 
Constitution’s ascription of circumstances under which habeas corpus can be suspended.  The 
reverse might be more accurate: Americans included exceptions to habeas corpus in their 
constitution, because the principle of the exception was already “in the air and repeatedly 
embodied in motion”311 through settlers’ early experiences of colonial and Indian warfare, and 
how these wars intersected with practical obstacles to administering criminal justice in frontier 
zones.  In other words, it is not just that exceptions resulted from the constitution; the 
constitution itself resulted from exceptions.  It is the broader discourse of “emergency” that 
underlaid these exceptions. The parts of the constitution cited by Agamben are the effects of the 
discourse of emergency, the effects of the exception, not their cause.       
A second feature of lynching discourse relates to the construction of what Anne 
McClintock calls “anachronistic space,” that is, the process of mapping the boundaries of 
civilization across space and time, such that movement through physical space is imagined to 
also constitute movement through evolutionary time.312  In the symbolic universe constructed by 
anachronistic space, the world is filled with savage Others who do not abide by the rules of 
civilization. The civilized person must adapt in order to survive.  Narratives of anachronistic 
space map out zones that are governed by an alternative legal and moral order; these zones 
require governance by violence. Discourses of anachronistic space work alongside discourses of 
emergency to establish times, places, and circumstances where the rules of law cease to exist, 
pockets of lawless chaos that are produced and maintained within the larger legal order.  This 
adds to Agamben’s notion of the exception by clarifying that emergency discourses, in and of 
themselves, are not sufficient to cause the forms of mass political violence with which Agamben 
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is concerned.  President Bush’s pursuit of a “War on Terror,” for example, might explain why 
seemingly lawless practices could take place under cover of law, such as enhanced interrogation, 
extraordinary rendition, targeted assassination, and full-scale military invasion of sovereign 
nations. But, it does not explain how particular individuals or acts are labelled as terrorist in the 
first place, or why exceptional measures would be taken against some terrorists and not others.  
The notion of anachronistic space underscores that not all emergencies, nor all criminal-
terrorists, rise to the threshold of threat thought to justify the invocation of emergency powers. 
This helps also to address the process by which “permanent” states of exception can be created, 
defined by boundaries of race, sex, nation, and other axes of power/difference.            
A third feature of lynching discourse extends from the first two, and relates to social 
constructions of criminality.  Lynching discourses construct criminal activity as, first, 
constituting a social crisis or emergency and, second, representing a form of racialized savagery.  
The social crisis created by crime justifies severe sanctions, while the savagery displayed by 
criminals marks them as irredeemable subjects who cannot be integrated to society.  This third 
feature of lynching discourse constructs crime as not merely an undesirable behavior that 
requires some social/collective response, but more fundamentally as an existential threat that 
requires a severe and permanent solution, usually organized around the elimination of criminal 
bodies.  Recognizing the role of criminality helps to fill in some of the gaps left by an analysis 
that would limit “emergencies” only to those posed by international threats, like war or invasion.  
Especially when you look at how the problem of “crime” intersected with the problem of “war” 
during the origins of lynching, the justification for the exception came from this entanglement.  
Lynching was justified because the consequences of crime were exaggerated in a wartime 
situation; simultaneously, the exigencies of war prevented the regular administration of justice, 
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thus creating added need for the exceptional administration of justice in the form of lynching.  
War as crisis; crime during war becomes a special kind of sub-crisis; exceptional measures 
theoretically exist to help you win a war; but in the colonial context the purpose of winning the 
war is to win the right to create and enforce law.  So, creating and enforcing law (by lynching) is 
part of how the war is won and gets then built into the regular infrastructure for fighting crime.   
Finally, a fourth feature of lynching discourse involves the strategic deployment of meta-
languages that articulate race, culture, and nation, with sex, gender, and sexuality.313  These 
meta-languages constitute broad norms against which figures of perversion can be produced – 
ultimate Others who are appropriate targets of lynch law.  For example, black feminist scholars 
have pointed to the importance of “the myth of the black male rapist” and the “threat of social 
equality” in the perpetuation of Jim Crow era racial violence.314 Scholars situated in postcolonial 
studies have noted how the sexualization of ‘savagery’ undergirded the forms of lynching that 
characterized frontier areas during colonial expansion and warfare.315  This last feature of 
lynching discourse dissociates lynching from political culture, constructing violence as a natural 
(instinctual) response to the threats posed by perversion, savagery, and terror. This helps explain 
the ‘internal’ exceptions that Agamben’s work does not account for.  [elaborate]    
Neither empirical identifiers, nor legal doctrine, manage to capture the complexity of 
lynching, or of exceptional governance in the United States more broadly.  Critical and 
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interpretive strategies focusing on discourse are better tools to identify practices that manifest 
states of exception in the U.S.  
 
Lynching Discourses in Popular Culture 
By describing lynch law through its discourses, my aim has been to make contemporary 
engagements with lynching more visible and resonant.  We might consider, for example, the 
rhetoric of “modern-day lynching” that has appeared to describe disproportionate racialized 
police killing.   
  Considering how dramatically lynching has changed over time, the practice cannot be 
separated from the cultural narratives that accompany and justify it.  Without these narratives, it 
is difficult even to discern lynching from other forms of violence. We might consider, for 
example, the predominant contemporary television genre of the police procedural, where the 
U.S.’s cultural inheritance of lynch law is particularly visible in the form of the renegade crime 
fighter who is not above breaking the law in order to enforce it (tellingly, sometimes referred to 
as “the cowboy cop”). Given the historical relationship between lynching, settler-colonialism, 
and law enforcement, what are the implications of the prominent and celebratory role this figure 
plays in American social imaginaries?  Police procedurals and crime dramas feature a range of 
law enforcement agencies, with different jurisdictions, levels of authority, and investigative 
methods.  Yet with all this diversity, each are replete with narratives that invoke the moral 
quandaries of lynching. Just as was the case with lynchers in the 18th and 19th centuries, the 
heroes of this genre are those who are able to overcome the practical challenges posed by law in 
the quest to apprehend criminals – preferably without crossing that murky line where, “the 
lynchers are no better than the lynched.”  The glorification of this type of law enforcement 
 231 
 
officer, essentially a lyncher, is part of the social context in which debates over criminal 
justice reform play out, including real-life incidents of police brutality, racial profiling, 
capital punishment, and vigilantism.   
Consider the following examples, drawn from the most popular police procedurals of the 
last decade.316  Representing the gold standard of such shows, NBC’s Law & Order franchise 
follows the stories of detectives and district attorneys who work to put dangerous criminals 
behind bars.  The original Law & Order was split equally between policing and prosecution, but 
in subsequent spin-offs the “law” (policing) has come to dominate, while the “order” imposed by 
courts has been sidelined and reduced to an advisory role.  The show’s characters are depicted 
constantly pushing the limits of protocol when it comes to searches, evidence collection, threats 
and intimidation of witnesses, and physical violence against people suspected of crime. 
Criminals are constructed as being too sophisticated to be caught by straightforward legal 
methods; they must be manipulated or entrapped, or simply executed outright when legal 
mechanisms inevitably fail. Detectives and prosecutors are especially prone toward misconduct 
when faced with what they consider an emergency – an imminent crime, a victim that could still 
be saved, or one of many permutations of the “ticking time bomb” scenario.        
Two popular CBS dramas, the Crime Scene Investigation (C.S.I.) franchise, and Criminal 
Minds, feature the use of cutting-edge scientific investigation methods – forensics and behavioral 
analysis respectively.  These shows draw on discourses of anachronistic space, using science to 
dehumanize criminals into an assemblage of fingerprints and bodily residues (on CSI), or to a 
psychological “profile” (on Criminal Minds). On an advertisement for Criminal Minds, for 
example, Special Agent David Rossi explains to an introductory criminology class that “we use 
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behavioral science, research, casework and training to hunt down monsters— rapists, terrorists, 
pedophiles, and our specialty, serial killers.”317  The fact that these criminals are “monsters” 
underscores the necessity of using violent force to contain them, even if this means occasionally 
bending the rules or exploiting procedural loopholes.  On C.S.I.: Las Vegas, investigator Nick 
Stokes is demoted at the end of season 11 after leaving his jurisdiction to pursue, and ultimately 
kill, a suspected serial killer.  On Criminal Minds, FBI special agent Elle Greenway is 
unofficially forced off the team at the end of season two after killing a suspected serial rapist 
while off-duty (the official FBI inquiry rules the shooting justified).  Three years later, team 
leader Aaron Hotchner is exonerated for murdering a serial killer who had targeted his wife. 
Although both series idealize rigorous scientific methods, and thus seem to distance themselves 
from the irrational methods of a lynch mob, their scientific emphasis does not eliminate the 
perceived need for lynching. Quite the contrary: the scientific emphasis legitimizes lynching, 
leaving the audience confident in police officers’ ability to determine the objective “truth” of 
who is guilty, in contrast with courts of law, where alleged criminals can take advantage of legal 
technicalities and due process protocols.   
TNT’s The Closer, one of cable television’s most highly rated dramas, is implicitly based 
on the idea that courtroom justice – a full trial with due process – is too onerous to be effective, 
especially when dealing with dangerous criminals.  The show features homicide detective 
Brenda Johnson, a skilled interrogator who has a knack for eliciting voluntary confessions, thus 
eliminating the need for trial and appeals.  One of the The Closer’s most significant plot arcs 
involves the suspicious death of Turrell Baylor, an African American man who admitted to 
murdering an elderly man and his grandson in the course of a robbery, but only after receiving a 
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guarantee of immunity for his cooperation with the police anti-gang unit.  Johnson has obtained 
his confession, but her hands are tied by legal protocol. In a tense, under-narrated sequence at the 
end of season six’s eighth episode, Johnson drops Baylor off at his house, and drives away 
resolutely as a neighborhood mob closes in on him. The implication is that she, or someone 
within the department, leaked Baylor’s confession and then intentionally left him unprotected to 
meet his fate at the hands of neighborhood vigilantes.  This plot arc is especially remarkable 
when one recalls that the vast majority of incidents during the Jim Crow “lynching era” featured 
precisely this sort of custodial transfer between police and mob. By the premiere of season 
seven, The Closer’s main plot centered on whether or not Johnson would be the subject of a 
private lawsuit and department sanctions for Baylor’s death, consequences that were at the top of 
the NAACP’s wish list when it came to anti-lynching legislation. Despite these obvious parallels, 
the word “lynching” is never used to describe this plot arc – not by writers, fans, or media critics, 
nor by any of the characters in the show itself.  Perhaps this is in part because we are so 
conditioned to associate lynching with “lawlessness,” while remaining less cognizant of the ways 
that lynching is, and always has been, inseparable from the imposition of law.    
These representations are significant when one considers the liminal position between 
lynching and law. Historically and today, lynching has involved the passive or active complicity 
of law enforcement agents (official and private), who claim to act on behalf of public safety and 
security.  Even when their violence is excessive, disproportionate, or violates legal protocol, 
lynchers have enjoyed legal impunity so long as they can frame their actions within pre-existing 
narratives that articulate savagery and civilization with crime and punishment. The ubiquity of 
popular representations that almost unanimously embrace law-enforcement violence bolsters the 
narrative frameworks that are central to lynchers’ claims of respectability.  To return to the 
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examples I listed in the introduction (Trayvon Martin, Troy Davis, and Oscar Grant), only Oscar 
Grant’s killer was successfully prosecuted, and this was mostly the result of strenuous protest by 
Oakland residents (Grant’s killer was initially subject to a temporary job suspension).  He served 
two years in prison, a seemingly mild sentence considering the mandatory minimums that 
sometimes place non-violent offenders behind bars for decades. Recent FOIA requests for 
documents pertaining to the FBI’s internal investigations of officer-involved shootings revealed 
that 98% of such shootings, spanning the last two decades, have been deemed “justified” by the 
agency.  In the minority of shootings that were deemed improper, the most severe penalty was a 
letter of censure placed in the agents’ files.318      
Indeed, many of the most pressing civil rights and social justice issues of today revolve 
around various forms of “modern-day lynching,” from mass incarceration to ‘stop-and-frisk,’ 
racial profiling, the rise in deportations and militarized violence along the U.S.-Mexico border, 
and the detention and torture of suspected terrorists.  Critiques of these practices have some 
amount of mainstream currency; the New York Times recently called mass incarceration “a 
disastrous experiment that must end,” for example.319  But if there is to be a truly effective anti-
lynching movement in the present, it is imperative that we look to the past for critical guidance.  
The imposition of new laws, or changes in how old laws are enforced, or insistence on 
“professionalism” among law enforcement personnel, might serve to blunt the effects of lynch 
law, but they will not eliminate it entirely, because there is lawlessness within the law itself. 
Ironically, one answer to this paradox might lie with the reclamation of what it means “to 
take the law into one’s own hands.”  If lynch law is a mechanism of settler-colonialism, then 
“taking the law into one’s own hands” could be read as an assertion of anti-colonial sovereignty.  
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Organizations pursuing “transformative justice” strategies do just this, encouraging people and 
communities to “take the law into their own hands,” to seek out creative means of building safety 
that do not necessarily rely on institutions of colonial domination, such as police and prisons.320  
They are confident this will lead, not to lawlessness, but to more equitable social conditions 
“without the appointment of legislature, governor, judge, or hangman.”  Bancroft held these 
systems of violence were the necessary price man [sic] must pay for his “intelligence and 
reason,” a phrase intended to distinguish “civilized man” from “brutes who associate in 
comparative harmony.”  In some ways, he was right.  Legislature, governor, judge, and hangman 
- and prison, detention center, and torture chamber – have been the price America has paid for its 
reason (that is, for its imposition of colonial law.)  Only a thoroughly decolonized anti-lynching 
movement can hope to change this.   
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